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In 1989, the world commemorated the outbreak of the French Revolution two
hundred years earlier. The event was celebrated as the breakthrough of popular
sovereignty and modern constitutionalism. The names of Sieyès and Mirabeau
recall the achievements of the first French National Assembly, the abolition of
feudalism, the declaration of the rights of man, and the democratic constitution
of 1791.
In 2014, another event of French history was commemorated as well, though
it has been given much less significance in historical memory than the outbreak
of the French Revolution: the fall of Napoleon and the restoration of the monar-
chy under the house of Bourbon. It is true that a whole era has been named after
this event, but the term restoration does not bring to mind objectives which have
remained valid till today. The concept rather denotes the questionable attempt to
renew an obsolete reality in opposition to the spirit of the time. The history of the
Bourbon restoration in France seems to confirm this judgment, since the restored
dynasty remained in power for only sixteen years. Two hundred years after the
accession of Louis XVIII, the time has come to subject the prevailing interpreta-
tion of the Restoration to a critical examination.
The term itself is equivocal. Contemporaries viewed the return of the Bour-
bons to the French throne as a restoration not so much because monarchy as
such, but because divine right monarchy was reinstated and the principle of
popular sovereignty which every regime in France since 1789 had been based
on, was repudiated. If Louis XVIII had accepted the offer to become a democrati-
cally legitimized King of the French which the Napoleonic Senate had inserted in
its draft constitution of 6 April 1814, the monarchy would likewise have been re-
instated, but not in the sense of a restoration. Even though Louis was the de-
scendant of the old French dynasty, he would not have become King by historic
right, but King by the revolution, “un roi par la revolution,” as Jacques-Claude
Beugnot wrote in a letter to Louis on 2 June 1814, and instead of obtaining the
recognition of his inherited right to rule and of having the revolution absorbed
by the monarchy, he would have permitted the monarchy to be absorbed by
the revolution.¹
It was only the renewal of divine right legitimacy that imparted to the return
of the monarchy the character of a restoration. The legitimacy of a government is
 Jacques-Claude Beugnot, Rapport au Roi, 2 June 1814, Archives Nationales Paris 40 AP 7,
fol. 114; cf. Volker Sellin, Die geraubte Revolution. Der Sturz Napoleons und die Restauration in
Europa (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2001), 277.
the acknowledgement on the part of the subjects of its right to rule. Accordingly,
in order to be successful the restoration had to bring back to life convictions
which had been lost during the Revolution and the Empire. The operation suc-
ceeded thanks to the courage, the shrewdness, and the perseverance of Louis
XVIII. He handled the draft constitution of the Senate with utmost circumspec-
tion and instead of repudiating it out of hand he only insisted on its revision.
In the course of the revision in which members of the Senate and the Corps lég-
islatif participated, instead of the nation the monarch was declared the author of
the constitution and its democratic basis was replaced by the monarchical prin-
ciple. In this way the King remained in full possession of power, without howev-
er excluding the nation altogether from concurring in the determination of pol-
icy. When the revision was completed Louis XVIII imposed the constitution as a
constitutional charter (Charte constitutionnelle).² In the Middle Ages a charte or
carta was a document by which a ruler conferred privileges. A privilege was a
voluntary gift to which the recipient did not possess any rightful claim. By im-
posing the Charte the King formally recovered the legitimacy which his brother
Louis XVI had gambled away during the Revolution. Therefore the imposition of
the Charte must be regarded as the essential act of the Restoration. It is true that
by conceding the constitution Louis XVIII acknowledged substantial achieve-
ments of the Revolution, but at the same time he avoided basing on the Revolu-
tion his right to rule. Instead he transformed the Revolution from a menace to
the monarchy into a pledge for its stability.
Louis dated the Charte from the 19th year of his reign as if the monarchy had
remained in uninterrupted existence. As a matter of fact he had never acknowl-
edged neither the usurpation of the constituent power by the nation in June 1789
nor the abolition of the monarchy in September 1792. If, however, the monarchy
had not perished during the Revolution there was no need to restore it, and if it
had perished nobody in the world could have brought it back to life in the plen-
itude of its historic right, not even the nation which could only have conferred
democratic, not divine right legitimacy. Louis XVIII was convinced that only
the monarch himself was in the position to restore the monarchy and that its re-
storation did not mean remaking it but only consolidating it again and procuring
its general acceptance.
If Louis XVIII imposed the Charte in order to recover the recognition of di-
vine right legitimacy, the imposition of 1814 did not essentially differ from the
impositions of constitutions to which other monarchs in the course of the next
one hundred years were to recur. Accordingly, these impositions should no
 On the origins of the Charte constitutionnelle cf. ibid., 225–73.
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less be interpreted as monarchical restorations and restoration turns out to be
not a singular act, limited to a specific moment in history, but a method
which the European rulers adopted between the French Revolution and the
First World War if required, in order to render their imperiled thrones secure. In-
stead of an epoch of European history restoration thus turns out to be an epoch
in the history of each particular monarchy, and the 19th century is revealed as a
century not only of revolutions, but of restorations as well.
Nevertheless, the French restoration of 1814 occupies a special place within
this series. By imposing the Charte constitutionnelle Louis XVIII transmitted con-
stitutional government as created by the Revolution to the new century. One
might even attribute a revolutionizing effect to the Restoration, since no less
than the Revolution it served the progress of liberty. Therefore, next to the revo-
lutionaries of 1789 Louis XVIII must be numbered among those who paved the
way for constitutionalism in Europe. By imposing the Charte constitutionnelle
he demonstrated to the 19th century how elementary demands of the Revolution
could be rendered compatible with divine right legitimacy. The stronger the rev-
olutionary menace grew, the more restoration on the French example became the
strategy of survival in other monarchies as well. Not constitution making by con-
stituent assemblies based on popular sovereignty, but the imposition of consti-
tutions as in France in 1814 determined the constitutional development in the
monarchies on the continent, and the breakthrough of modern constitutionalism
in Europe is much less due to the Revolution itself than to the several restora-
tions which have been staged in the intent of avoiding or overcoming revolu-
tions. Whereas the Charte in its original form remained in force until 1830,
and after its revision during the July Revolution for another 18 years, some of
the constitutions which in other monarchies had been framed on its example en-
joyed an even much longer lease of life.
Restoration is opposed to revolution. Without the revolutionary menace re-
storations would not have taken place. The appearance and the magnitude of
the menace determined the moment of the recourse to restoration. Restorations
always originated from a crisis of monarchical legitimacy. The chance durably to
overcome the crisis was seen exclusively in the imposition of a constitution. By
the imposition monarchs sought to control the development instead of succumb-
ing to it. In 1814, a restoration took place in France only. Only in France the na-
tion had abolished the monarchy and declared itself the source of sovereign
power. Therefore after the collapse of the Napoleonic Empire only in France
the renewal of divine right monarchy implied the renunciation of principles
which had triumphed in the age of the Revolution. In the other countries
which had come under the domination of Napoleon, monarchs had not been de-
posed by their respective nations, but by victorious France. By their expulsion
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alone, however, they could not lose the assent of their subjects. Therefore after
the fall of the Empire they were not in need of a restoration of monarchical le-
gitimacy, and the period should no longer be named the age of restoration in
general, but of French restoration only.
The present essay aims at the rehabilitation of the concept and a reevalua-
tion of the policies of restoration. With this in mind the breakthrough of monar-
chical constitutionalism will be studied in selected European monarchies of the
19th century. The discussion will start by analyzing the French restoration of 1814.
The French restoration differs from the later restorations because the dynasty
had effectively lost the throne whereas in other countries restorations were un-
dertaken in time with the hope to prevent the fall of the monarchy. Both types
of restorations resembled each other in that they sought to attain their end by
the concession of a constitution. By granting fundamental rights and political
participation the monarchs hoped to secure the consent of the citizens. The
next chapter is devoted to the restoration of monarchy in that part of Poland
which Russia had annexed in 1815, at the hands of Alexander I. By imposing
a constitution he hoped to reconcile the Poles with their new sovereign. In Ger-
many, the first constitutions were imposed after the liberation from Napoleonic
domination. The examples of Baden, Bavaria and Württemberg will demonstrate
that the constitutions were meant to facilitate the political integration of these
states which had all been considerably enlarged since 1801. In December 1848
the King of Prussia imposed a constitution with the intention of checking the rev-
olution which had broken out in March. In 1834 the Estatuto Realwas imposed in
Spain in the hope of overcoming the dual crisis which had broken out after the
death of Ferdinand VII, the minority crisis and the succession crisis. In Italy im-
mediately before the outbreak of the revolution of 1848 in every state except
Lombardy and Venetia constitutions were rashly imposed in order to preserve
the monarchical principle. After the failure of the revolution they were repealed
everywhere except in the Kingdom of Sardinia. In the course of Italian unifica-
tion the Statuto albertino became the constitution of the Kingdom of Italy. The
transition of Russia to constitutionalism by the imposition of the fundamental
laws in April 1906 was an attempt to overcome the state crisis which had, a
year before, resulted in the outbreak of the revolution.
The investigation is centered on a number of typical examples. Austria, the
Scandinavian countries, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Portugal are not taken
into consideration. The comparison of different restoration processes in 19th cen-
tury European history aims at the analysis of an identical phenomenon, the act
of restoring, as embedded in a variety of changing circumstances. This objective
will be obtained only if the crises of legitimacy which required the imposition of
constitutions are studied along with their preconditions. The usefulness of com-
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parisons depends to a large extent on the choice of the phenomena which are
being compared. The exclusive application of the concept of restoration to the
epoch which followed the deposition of Napoleon has led researchers to com-
pare the policies of monarchs who had opposite objectives in mind. Under the
heading of restoration regimes both the Spain of Ferdinand VII and the France
of Louis XVIII have been analyzed. After the fall of Napoleon both monarchs re-
turned home from their forced exiles, and both of them were expected to sanc-
tion a constitution which had been elaborated for them on behalf of their na-
tions, in Spain by the Cortes, in France by the Napoleonic Senate. Unlike
Louis XVIII, however, Ferdinand VII refused acceptance of the constitution
and had their authors persecuted. In Italy no ruler was presented with a consti-
tution on his return.
The present essay is based on a broad variety of primary and secondary sour-
ces related to the restorations taken into consideration. To be sure, studies in
which restoration is analyzed as a general phenomenon and not confined to
one particular country are rare. One of them is the book by the Austro-American
historian Robert A. Kann of 1968, The Problem of Restoration. A Study in Compa-
rative Political History.³ Kann’s approach differs in more than one respect from
the present one. For Kann the term denotes the restoration of perished political
or social systems and not primarily the recovery of monarchical legitimacy. Ac-
cordingly, he numbers the return of the Bourbons in 1814, but not the other im-
positions of constitutions during the century, among the restorations, because in
France only the restoration of divine right monarchy had been preceded by a re-
publican interlude. His broad understanding of the term is shown by the fact
that he regards the foundation of the German Empire in 1871 as a restoration
of the Holy Roman Empire which had ceased to exist in 1806.⁴ Kann’s interpre-
tation follows a three step model where an original state is followed by an inter-
mediary stage, brought about by revolution or political decay, and this in turn at
last gives way to restoration. The model is applied to cases which go back to early
Antiquity.
The history of the concept of restoration is discussed by Panajotis Kondylis
in the article “Reaktion, Restauration” of 1984.⁵ Based on a variety of sources
 Robert A. Kann, The Problem of Restoration. A Study in Comparative Political History (Berkeley/
Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1968).
 Kann, “Restoration that came too late. From the Dissolution of the Holy Roman Empire in
1806 to the Proclamation of the Second German Empire in 1871,” ibid., chap. 17, 349–383.
 Panajotis Kondylis, “Reaktion, Restauration,” in: Otto Brunner, Werner Conze, and Reinhart
Koselleck, eds., Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe. Historisches Lexikon zur politisch-sozialen Sprache
in Deutschland, vol. 5 (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1984), 179–230.
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Kondylis shows that since the early nineteenth century the term has chiefly de-
noted the attempt to bring back to life outdated beliefs and institutions.⁶ At the
same time, however, he cites a memorandum by the general and diplomat Jo-
seph Maria von Radowitz for King Frederick William IV of Prussia of 4 February
1850, in which the term refers to the consolidation of an existing monarchy
through reform. Kondylis does not further dwell on this variant. On 2 February
Frederick William IV had signed the revised constitution for the State of Prussia.
In his memorandum Radowitz traces the origins of this constitution from the rev-
olution of March 1848. The imposition of the Prussian constitution of 5 December
1848 he calls the first step of a “process of restoration.” He explains that during
the following stages of the revolution “within the constitutional party the two el-
ements” had been separated, namely “the constitutionals in the abstract sense
of the term, the doctrinaires, who considered the constitution as the essential
achievement and the monarch only as a requisite within the same,” on the
one hand, and “the conservative constitutionals who regarded a strong and dig-
nified royalty as the main thing, the center, and the constitution only as a device
designed to limit it by positive rights of the people,” on the other. With these
words Radowitz pointed at the distinction between democratic and monarchical
principle, between democratic and monarchical constitutionalism. Of the revised
constitution he wrote accordingly that it had “in the main preserved the conser-
vative monarchical character”; “the doctrinaire party had been eliminated” and
had “lost its final struggle against the crown.” Radowitz called the triumph of
the revised constitution an “organic restoration.” For the future he recommended
to eliminate “step by step and strictly legally” the elements of the “false consti-
tutionalism,” “both in the heads and in the institutions.” The objective ought to
be “an organically arranged monarchical government that was not limited except
by the true rights of the subjects.”⁷
The key concept in the memorandum is “organic restoration.” Radowitz
used the term restoration even though in Prussia the monarchy had not been
abolished during the revolution. In the given context the term refers to the recov-
ery of political vitality by the monarchy after its temporary paralysis in March
1848. In Radowitz’ eyes the recovery succeeded because an alliance with the
“monarchical-constitutional party” had enabled the government to push back
the influence of the democrats. Radowitz called this restoration “organic,” be-
 Ibid., 179.
 Joseph Maria von Radowitz, “Denkschrift, vorgelesen dem Könige am 4. Februar 1850,” in:
Josef von Radowitz, Nachgelassene Briefe und Aufzeichnungen zur Geschichte der Jahre 1848–
1853, ed. Walter Möhring (Stuttgart and Berlin: Deutsche Verlagsanstalt, 1922), 159–160; see
also Kondylis, “Reaktion, Restauration,” 196.
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cause the King had defended his monarchical point of view, without “departing
altogether from the constitutional principle.”⁸ In this way Radowitz equates
Frederick William’s concession of a constitution with the concession of the
Charte constitutionnelle in 1814. In a similar mode of reasoning the Austrian
envoy to Naples, count Karl Ludwig von Ficquelmont, had used the term “resto-
ration” on 1 April 1824, in a letter to state chancellor Metternich. Ficquelmont
pointed out that after the introduction of consultative bodies in the Kingdom
of the Two Sicilies “la véritable restauration de la monarchie” (the true restora-
tion of the monarchy) could start.⁹ The King of Naples had not been deposed ei-
ther, and the monarchy had not been abolished. In the revolution of 1820 Ferdi-
nand I had simply been forced to introduce the Spanish constitution of 1812. A
year later the military intervention of Austria brought the constitutional interlude
to an end.
For both Ficquelmont and Radowitz restoration of the monarchy does not
mean its reinstatement after a republican period. Instead the term refers to the
process of consolidating it through reform or through the imposition of a consti-
tution. Radowitz’ concept of an “organic restoration” is applicable to every resto-
ration in 19th century Europe.
The present essay resumes the themes of earlier books of the author: a book
of 2001 on the fall of Napoleon and the restoration of the French monarchy in
1814, and an analysis of the foundations of monarchical legitimacy in the age
of revolution of 2011.¹⁰ In the seventh chapter of that book the legitimizing ca-
pacity of constitutions is discussed. The present work reverts to and deepens
these reflections.
 Radowitz, Denkschrift (see note 7), 159.
 Ficquelmont to Metternich, 1 April 1824, in: Ruggero Moscati, ed., Il Regno delle Due Sicilie e
l’Austria. Documenti dal marzo 1821 al novembre 1830 (Naples: Presso la R. Deputazione, 1937),
vol. 2, 238–239. See below, p. 100.
 Sellin, Die geraubte Revolution (see note 1); Sellin, Gewalt und Legitimität. Die europäische
Monarchie im Zeitalter der Revolutionen (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2011).
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France 1814
In the spring of 1814 France experienced a fundamental change of regime: the
Napoleonic Empire broke down and the Bourbons returned on the throne.¹
The political overthrow resulted from the simultaneous actions of several inde-
pendent agents. After the failure of Napoleon’s Russian campaign of 1812 Russia,
Prussia, Austria, and Great Britain had in the course of the year 1813 concluded a
military alliance. In early January 1814 the coalition armies advanced into French
territory. On 31 March 1814 they entered into Paris. In the first days of April Tsar
Alexander I was the sovereign who exercised the greatest influence. The Austrian
emperor Francis I and foreign secretary Metternich had remained in Dijon and
Frederick William III of Prussia readily subordinated himself to the Tsar for
fear of endangering the promises which Alexander had made in the treaty of Ka-
lisz. The English Prince Regent had not repaired to the Continent. The British in-
terests were taken care of by foreign secretary Lord Castlereagh, but he too ar-
rived in Paris only after the city had surrendered. On the French side the most
important agent was Talleyrand. After the entrance of the allies he persuaded
the French Senate formally to depose Napoleon and to adopt a monarchical con-
stitution which reserved the throne for the count of Provence, brother of Louis
XVI, who lived on exile in England. The count who had ever since 1795 named
himself Louis XVIII, accepted the invitation and returned to France, but was de-
termined to rule on his own conditions. In view to restoring divine right he sub-
jected the Senatorial constitution to a fundamental revision. It was only this re-
vision that turned the change of regime into the Restoration.
The restoration could only succeed if Napoleon was deprived of his power. Orig-
inally the taking of Paris and the overthrow of the Empire had not been the aims of
the coalition. Only Alexander I had, after the burning of Moscow in 1812, resolved to
march into the French capital and to take revenge on Napoleon. He considered it his
mission to liberate Europe from the yoke of Bonaparte. The Austrian foreign secre-
tary Metternich, on the contrary, had hoped well into March 1814, to conclude a ne-
gotiated peace with the Emperor. Under the lead of Napoleon, he believed, France
would continue to form a strong counterpoise to the power of Russia and in this way
contribute to the independence of Central Europe. As late as December 1813 Metter-
nich was ready to concede to Napoleon the border of the Rhine in exchange for a
peace treaty. To this proposal the British Foreign Secretary Castlereagh had objected
from the outset. Great Britain wanted to secure the independence of the Netherlands
 For the change of regime in France see Volker Sellin, Die geraubte Revolution. Der Sturz Na-
poleons und die Restauration in Europa (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2001).
DOI 10.1515/9783110524536-001
against the French menace by means of a broad territorial barrier which would in-
clude at least Antwerp and the estuary of the Scheldt. The advance of the coalition
forces on French soil superseded the controversy. From now on the coalition aimed
at the restoration of France within the borders of 1792, the year when the first rev-
olutionary war had broken out.
On 5 February 1814 at Châtillon-sur-Seine a congress was opened at which
Russian, Austrian, Prussian and British plenipotentiaries set out to negotiate
the end of hostilities with the French foreign secretary Caulaincourt. During ne-
gotiations the war continued. Napoleon had never made any concessions before,
since he had always felt sure to defeat his enemies. Therefore it was a great sur-
prise when at the meeting of 7 February Caulaincourt came up with the inquiry
whether the allies would consent to an immediate cease-fire if France accepted
their conditions of peace.² The unexpected volte-face is explained by the defeat
Blücher and the Prince of Württemberg had inflicted upon Napoleon at La Roth-
ière on 1 February. The Emperor was afraid that the armies of the coalition would
take advantage of the situation and proceed to the capital.³ Obviously, Napoleon
understood that the loss of Paris would terminate his reign.
Caulaincourt’s inquiry thrust the coalition into a crisis. On the very same day
the Russian plenipotentiary count Razumovsky obtained consent from his allies
that an answer to the French foreign secretary was postponed until new instruc-
tions had been secured from the various governments. The Tsar tried to protract
negotiations, because he still hoped to make true his long-cherished aim and
march into Paris. These tactics, however, could not be pursued indefinitely,
since the French government had signaled readiness to accept the conditions
of the coalition. To resolve the crisis Metternich invited the allied governments
to the allied headquarters at Troyes. Since Caulaincourt had already assented
to the territorial demands of the coalition, at Troyes the governments sought
to reach an agreement on their further course of action and their ultimate war
aims. Whereas Austria and Great Britain were ready to conclude an immediate
armistice with Napoleon, Tsar Alexander preferred to continue the war and effect
a change of dynasty in France. In order to facilitate the deliberations, Metternich
presented the governments with a questionnaire on the war aims to be pursued.
 Floret’s Journal, in: August Fournier, Der Congress von Châtillon. Die Politik im Kriege von 1814.
Eine historische Studie (Vienna: Tempsky, 1900), Appendix VII, 374; cf. Stadion to Metternich, 8
February 1814, ibid., Appendix V, 310; Sellin, Revolution, 93–94.
 Bassano to Caulaincourt, 5 February 1814, in: Charles-Tristan, comte de Montholon, Mémoires
pour servir à l’histoire de France sous Napoléon. Notes et Mélanges, vol. 2 (Paris: Didot; Bossange,
1823), 323; also in: Napoléon Ier, Correspondance, vol. 27 (Paris: Imprimerie Impériale, 1869),
no. 21285, 185, n. 1.
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Castlereagh and Metternich had already in January tried to reach an agreement
on the dynastic question before the opening of the congress at Châtillon. The
only alternative to Napoleon they took into consideration was the return of the
Bourbons. They thus excluded both an Austrian regency for Napoleon’s three
year old son and the appointment of the Swedish crown prince Bernadotte fav-
oured by the Tsar. During the ensuing debates at Langres the allies agreed that a
change of dynasty in France should not originate with them, but that they would
not impede the return of the Bourbons if such was the wish of the French peo-
ple.⁴ For the time being the conflict with the Tsar was adjourned. Since the mili-
tary operations were to continue, Alexander hoped to arrive in Paris before the
congress would have produced results, whereas Metternich sought by all means
to reach an understanding with Napoleon before Paris was taken.
Caulaincourt’s intervention of 7 February seemed to indicate that Napoleon was
at last ready to sign an agreement. The British and the Prussian representatives con-
curred with Metternich in the conviction that the opportunity should be seized, all
the more so since they did not doubt the legitimacy of Napoleon’s rule. In a paper he
had prepared for state chancellor Hardenberg the Prussian state councilor Friedrich
Ancillon argued that the French Emperor had in fact made a “bloody and deplorable
use” of his power, but that he had not in the ordinary sense of the word “usurped”
it.⁵ Metternich as a matter of principle denied the monarchs the right to interfere in
the form of government of an independent state. If they ventured to meddle in the
lawful succession in another state they “endangered the existence of every throne.”⁶
Neither Castlereagh nor Hardenberg perceived symptoms indicating that the citizens
of France were tired of Napoleon’s government.⁷ The Tsar, however, insisted on his
original plan. He kept ready to conform to the wishes of the French nation, yet he
maintained that these could not be ascertained before the allies had marched into
Paris. Upon arrival they should summon the members of the leading constitutional
bodies and other dignitaries and have them decide who should henceforth govern
France.⁸ It was in vain that Castlereagh pointed out to the Tsar the risks of this plan
 Sellin, Revolution, 99.
 Denkschrift Ancillon, Geheimes Staatsarchiv Preussischer Kulturbesistz, I. HA Rep. 92, Nach-
lass Albrecht, no. 56, fol. 95–96.
 Vote autrichien, in: Fournier, Congress, Appendix III, 287.
 Castlereagh to Liverpool, 16 February 1814, in: Charles K.Webster, ed., British Diplomacy 1813–
1815. Select Documents Dealing with the Reconstruction of Europe (London: Bell, 1921), 150; Vis-
count Castlereagh’s Answer to the Austrian Queries, 13 February 1814, ibid., 155; Hardenberg’s
response, in: Geheimes Staatsarchiv Preußischer Kulturbesitz, I. HA Rep. 92, Nachlass Albrecht,
no. 56, fol. 117r.
 Conférence tenue à Troyes le 13 février 1814. Questions posées par l’Autriche. Réponse du Cab-
inet de Russie, in F. M. Brunov, Aperçu des principales transactions du cabinet de Russie sous les
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and warned him that this course of action might oblige the allies to support Louis
XVIII with their forces in a civil war against Napoleon. Such a constellation, how-
ever, would burden a serious liability on the restoration of the Bourbon monarchy.⁹
The King would be blamed that he had recovered the throne with foreign support
only. The breach of the coalition seemed imminent.¹⁰ It was averted only because
from 10 to 14 February at Champaubert, Montmirail, Château-Thierry, and Vau-
champs Napoleon scored several successes in battle and immediately withdrew
the powers he had given to Caulaincourt under the impression of the defeat at La
Rothière. Once more the end of the war moved far off and the chances of a return
of the Bourbons on the French throne anew became uncertain.
In a letter to Metternich dated 15 February the journalist Friedrich Gentz ex-
pressed his surprise at the fact that to all appearances the four governments had,
in marked contrast to their monarchical character, acquiesced in the principle of
popular sovereignty in that they had conceded to the French nation the right to
determine their form of government by themselves.¹¹ If the French were permit-
ted to depose Napoleon it had to be explained in which way such a step might be
warranted. Gentz recognized only two ways of justifying a deposition. Napoleon
had either illegally usurped the throne or he had made an unjust use of his pow-
ers. Even if Napoleon had usurped the throne, this deficiency had long ago been
remedied by the tacit consent of the nation and the recognition of his imperial
dignity by his European fellow monarchs. A deposition of the Emperor for the
abuse of the powers conferred upon him presupposed the existence of someone
who was entitled to state the abuse. Such a contingency, however, was not pro-
vided for by the constitution, quite apart from the fact that one could not con-
cede to the French nation “the initiative of a revolution of throne and dynasty”
without at the same time conceding the same right to all other nations as well. In
this way, however, one would proclaim a universal “right of rebellion.”¹² If Na-
poleon was a legitimate ruler who could be deposed through a rebellion only,
then the ensuing restoration of the Bourbons would likewise be an “arbitrary
règnes de Cathérine II, Paul I et Alexandre I, in Gody učenija ego imperatorskago naslednika ce-
sareviča Aleksandra Nikolaeviča, vol. 2 (St. Petersburg 1880) (Sbornik Imperatorskago Russkago
Istoričeskago Obščestva 31), 377.
 Castlereagh to Liverpool, 16 February 1814, in: Webster, Diplomacy, 151.
 Hardenberg to Frederick William III, 14 February 1814, in: Fournier, Congress, Appendix III, 291.
 Gentz to Metternich, 15 February 1814, in: [Friedrich von Gentz], Briefe von und an Friedrich
von Gentz, ed. Friedrich Carl Wittichen and Ernst Salzer, vol. 3, part 1 (Munich: Oldenbourg,
1913), no. 145, 243–255; also in: Clemens von Klinkowström, ed., Aus der alten Registratur der
Staatskanzlei. Briefe politischen Inhalts von und an Friedrich von Gentz aus den Jahren 1799–
1827 (Vienna: Braumüller, 1870), 58–75; cf. Sellin, Revolution, 107– 110.
 Gentz to Metternich, 15 February 1814, in: idem, Briefe, vol. 3, part 1, no. 145, 247–249.
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and violent act.”¹³ Gentz’ commentary revealed the embarrassment the revenge-
fulness of the Tsar had brought down upon the allies. He wished that the “break-
neck question of the dynasty” had not been posed at all.¹⁴ Gentz believed that
the allies were not allowed to depose Napoleon and didn’t even have the right
to support a revolt of the French nation if it occurred without their interference.
In his view the monarchs of Europe were not even allowed to promote the rees-
tablishment of Bourbon rule in France.
At about the same time a staunch advocate of monarchical legitimacy ar-
rived at an entirely different conclusion. On 10 February Baron vom Stein, former
imperial knight and outstanding Prussian reformer, reminded Tsar Alexander
that within a few days he would get the opportunity “to depose the tyrant, to se-
cure a durable peace, and to return to France her legitimate sovereign.” If, how-
ever, the allied sovereigns should consider making the form of government in
France “dependent on the formation of the national will,” they would attribute
to the French a right that these did not possess. The house of Bourbon had “not
committed any act by which it had forfeited its right to the throne.”¹⁵ Stein
agreed with Gentz that a legitimate ruler could be deposed on the condition
only that he had abused his powers. Other than Gentz, however, he regarded Na-
poleon as a ruler who had never enjoyed legitimacy.
On 17 February the congress reassembled at Châtillon under most adverse
circumstances. The allies presented the draught of a peace treaty in which France
was conceded the territorial extension it had possessed in 1792. Napoleon how-
ever kept insisting on the border of the Rhine. Not even during the following
weeks did a compromise materialize. On 19 March the congress was broken off
without any result. Caulaincourt had again and again pressed in on the Emperor
to make him consent to the terms the coalition had offered. No later than 18 Jan-
uary he had pointed to the danger of a revolution.¹⁶ On 3 March he wrote the
“tocsin” was ringing.¹⁷ He reported the visit of Prince Paul Esterházy whom Met-
ternich had sent to transmit a last warning. By this move the Austrian foreign
secretary once more revealed how eagerly he wanted to preserve Napoleon’s
throne. Esterházy had added that the allies were under the impression that Na-
poleon risked everything for the sole reason that he expected to regain every-
 Ibid., 250.
 Ibid., 245.
 Stein to Alexander I, 10 February 1814, in: Karl Freiherr vom Stein, Briefe und amtliche Schrif-
ten, ed. Walther Hubatsch, vol. 4 (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1963), no. 767, 515–517.
 Caulaincourt to Napoleon, 18 January 1814, Archives du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères
Paris (MAE), Mémoires et Documents (MD) France, vol. 668, fol. 119r.
 Caulaincourt to Napoleon, 3 March 1814, ibid., fol. 346r.
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thing. This impression was fatal because it undermined the position of those who
hoped to end the war through negotiations.
By refusing to depart from his exaggerated war aims and to enter into negotia-
tions Napoleon irrevocably played into the hands of his fiercest opponent, Tsar
Alexander of Russia. Trusting on his superior military abilities he obviously was los-
ing his sense of reality. But time was working for Alexander. On 24 March the allies
decided to march on Paris. Before departure, on 25 March, they turned to the French
public with a declaration in which they put the blame for the failure of the congress
of Châtillon on Napoleon and defended their insistence on the borders of 1792 by
the incessant menace to the peace which had for many years originated with Napo-
leon. The declaration ended with an appeal to the French nation to stand up against
their Emperor: “Where should the guarantee for the future come from unless such a
destructive system is terminated by the general will of the nation?”¹⁸ In their help-
lessness the representatives of monarchical Europe appealed to the revolution to
make Napoleon cede. Gentz’ warnings had been of no avail.
On 29 March the allied armies appeared before Paris. On the next day French
units engaged them in heavy fights. Within the capital the political responsibility
rested with Napoleon’s brother Joseph. In January, before he left for the front, the
Emperor had appointed him his plenipotentiary and president of a regency council.
The fighting in front of the city walls caused Joseph to lose all of his courage. He
followed the Empress and her son to Rambouillet and gave full power to marshals
Marmont and Mortier to conclude a capitulation at their discretion. Marmont used
this power that night. The French troops were given free conduct to Fontainebleau.
On the morning of 31 March Alexander of Russia and Frederick William III of Prussia
entered Paris at the head of the allied armies without fighting. Napoleon had taken
precautions for this eventuality and given order that every dignitary of the regime
abandon the city before it would be taken. The enemy should not meet anybody
in Paris with whom he could conclude political agreements. Napoleon had ex-
pressed a particular warning of Talleyrand who until 1807 had served as foreign sec-
retary under him. “That is surely the greatest enemy of our house,” he had enjoined
to his brother.¹⁹ Talleyrand at this time performed the scarcely more than ceremonial
duties of vice-president of the Senate, by the title of Vice-Grand-Électeur. Like all the
other dignitaries of the regime he had on 30 March made for Rambouillet, but be-
 Déclaration des Puissances Alliées lors de la rupture des négociations de Châtillon, portant
confirmation solennelle de leurs Traités, 25 March 1814, in: Comte d’Angeberg (L. J. B. Chod’zko),
ed., Le congrès de Vienne et les traités de 1815, précédé et suivi des actes diplomatiques qui s’y
rattachent, vol. 1 (Paris: Amyot, 1863), 146.
 Napoleon to Joseph Bonaparte, 8 February 1814, in: idem, Correspondance, vol. 27, no. 21210,
132.
France 1814 13
fore his departure taken care that at the Barrière des Bonshommes he would be re-
fused passage by the commander of the National Guard on duty and thus compelled
to remain in the city.
When the allied armies marched into the capital the Russian foreign secretary
Nesselrode visited Talleyrand at his residence in the rue Saint-Florentin. In the after-
noon the Tsar, the King of Prussia, and the commander-in-chief of the coalition
army, Prince Schwarzenberg, joined the company. Alexander accepted the invitation
to stay in Talleyrand’s house along with his foreign secretary.²⁰ As the decision to
march on Paris had already shown the allies had abandoned all hope to arrive at
a negotiated peace with Napoleon. But how could the Emperor be removed from of-
fice? Who should succeed him? And how could the consent of the French nation to
a change of regime been secured? These were the questions the Tsar discussed with
Talleyrand. In a country the governments of which had since a quarter of a century
been based on the principle of popular sovereignty, in the given situation the next
step to take would normally have been the call of a constitutional assembly. How-
ever, the holding of elections alone would have implied the usurpation of an author-
ity which was still in exclusive possession of the Emperor. Holding elections would
have been difficult due to the fact that vast areas of territory were still occupied by
the coalition armies and the remainder under the control of Napoleon. Furthermore,
they would have taken weeks to carry out, thus creating a dangerous power vacuum
for an indefinite period of time.
But history presented more than one instance where constitutional bodies
without formal legitimacy in times of necessity had adopted the role of advo-
cates of the national interest and brought about a change of regime. A suitable
model for the solution of the actual problems of France appeared to be the Glo-
rious Revolution of 1688. Whereas in England, Parliament had changed the dy-
nasty by decree, Talleyrand, in his discussions with Tsar Alexander, brought into
play the Napoleonic Senate. Once more an intensive debate unfolded about who
should follow Napoleon on the throne. More than one solution was discussed,
including those which the coalition had already rejected. Talleyrand would
have preferred that Napoleon had been killed in battle. In this case a Regency
government could have been set up for his son, as he explained to the Duchess
of Courland in a letter of 21 March.²¹ This alone proves that he cannot, as he as-
serts in his memoirs, have won over the Tsar for the case of the Bourbons by ar-
 Sellin, Revolution, 131, 195– 196.
 Talleyrand to the Duchess of Courland, 21 March 1814, in: [Charles Maurice de Talleyrand-
Périgord, duc de Bénévent], “Correspondance du prince de Talleyrand avec la duchesse de Cour-
lande,” L’Amateur d’autographes. Revue historique et biographique 1 (Paris 1862/63), 45.
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guing that Louis XVIII was “the legitimate King of France.”²² If at all, Talleyrand
had used this argument not so much in order to propose the removal of the
house of Bonaparte, but to dissuade the Tsar from supporting candidates
other than the count of Provence. In any case to claim legitimacy for the
house of Bourbon did not mean that the monarchy of the Ancien Régime should
be restored. Talleyrand himself reports to have assured the Tsar that both the ad-
herents of the old monarchy and the advocates of “a new monarchy under a lib-
eral constitution” strove at the return of the Bourbons. For this reason alone the
Bourbons should, if they were invited to return, “not be placed on the throne of
Louis XIV.”²³ This would certainly have contradicted the revolutionary role that
the Senate was forced to play with a view to bringing about the change of regime
under the appearance of a legal procedure. The Senators would scarcely have
agreed to depose the Emperor invoking the national will and then to entrust a
member of the Bourbon dynasty with unlimited authority.
After the meeting in the rue Saint-Florentin Tsar Alexander ordered a proclama-
tion to be published on behalf of the allied sovereigns announcing that there would
be no more negotiations with Napoleon or a member of his family.²⁴ In this way he
put pressure on the formation of the French national will since the proclamation left
to the French only one choice: Napoleon or peace. If Napoleon was prohibited from
negotiating the bloodshed could only be brought to an end if the nation created a
new government.With his proclamation the Tsar offered Talleyrand and the Senate
his support in their attempt to depose the Emperor.
Talleyrand convened the Senate for the afternoon of 1 April. Actually the
constitution of the Empire had reserved this right to Napoleon himself, but the
office of vice-president gave Talleyrand at least the appearance of a justification
for the move. The most important result of the meeting of the Senate was the cre-
ation of a provisional government under the presidency of Talleyrand. It is true
that in this way the second step preceded the first, since a provisional govern-
ment was needed only after the deposition of Napoleon. It is obvious however
that Talleyrand wanted to make sure that no power vacuum would occur. Only
on the following day the Senate decided to declare Napoleon and his family de-
posed and to absolve the French people and the army from their oaths of alle-
giance. Senator Lambrechts was charged to provide the decree of deposition be-
fore its final deliberation on 3 April with a catalogue of legal justifications. The
 Charles Maurice de Talleyrand-Périgord, duc de Bénévent, Mémoires, ed. duc de Broglie,
vol. 2 (Paris: Lévy, 1891), 165.
 Ibid., 163– 164.
 Le Moniteur universel, 2 April 1814.
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Senate thus placed the act in the tradition of depositions of rulers by their sub-
jects. In the same manner the revolting Dutch had deposed Philipp II of Spain in
1581, the British Parliament had deposed James II in 1688, and the American col-
onists had deposed George III in 1776 and thereby declared themselves inde-
pendent from the mother country.²⁵
In all these cases the charges against the ruler were meant to prove that he
had abused his power and broken the law and thus turned into a tyrant. As a
tyrant, however, he had forfeited his right to rule. The argument was based on
the idea of a contract which obliged the subjects to obedience only as long as
the ruler lent his protection to them. In this sense the deposition served to de-
fend the long-established law against an unjust ruler and appears thus as an es-
sentially conservative measure. The line of reasoning is made explicit in the de-
cree of the Senate. It is said that Napoleon had at first governed firmly and
prudently and had thus given reason to expect further “acts of wisdom and jus-
tice” from him in the future. Instead he had broken “the contract” which had
united him “to the French people.”²⁶ The charges against the Emperor include
the collection of taxes without authorization, waging war without permission
of the legislative bodies and suppressing the freedom of the press. As a violation
of his oath of office was construed the fact that “instead of governing exclusively
in the interest of the benefit, the well-being, and the glory of the French people,”
he had “accomplished the misfortune of the country by his refusal to accept
terms of peace which were in accord with the national interest and did not of-
fend French honour.”²⁷ From these offences the inference is drawn that the im-
perial government had “ceased to exist.” The wording indicates that as a conse-
quence of his unjust dealings Napoleon had already forfeited his government
and did therefore not have to be formally deposed.
The second chamber of the Empire, the Corps législatif, sanctioned the Sen-
atorial decree of deposition on the same 3 April. The decree was justified by the
consideration that Napoleon had “broken the constitutional contract.”²⁸ Obvi-
ously, the charge that the Emperor had disregarded the institutions of the Empire
 Cf. Erich Angermann, “Ständische Rechtstraditionen in der amerikanischen Unabhängigkeit-
serklärung,” Historische Zeitschrift 200 (1965), 61–91.
 Sénatus-consulte portant que Napoléon Bonaparte est déchu du trône, et que le droit d’hér-
édité établi dans sa famille est aboli, 3 April 1814, Bulletin des lois du Royaume de France, 5th
series, vol. 1, no. 1, 7–9; also in Le Moniteur universel, 4 April 1814.
 Ibid.
 Acte par lequel le Corps législatif, adhérant à l’acte du Sénat, reconnaît et déclare la dé-
chéance de Napoléon Bonaparte et des membres de sa famille, 3 April 1814, Bulletin des lois,
5th series, vol. 1, no. 1, 9–11.
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and thereby forfeited his right to rule only confirmed the validity of these insti-
tutions. In this way the Senate’s justification of the deposition made it imperative
that the institutional continuity was preserved beyond Napoleon’s fall from
power. The distinction between Napoleon and the institutions which had been
created during the Revolution and further developed in the Empire made it eas-
ier for the nation to agree with the deposition of the Emperor, but at the same
time it obliged the Senate to institute new government in conformity with the
principles of the Revolution. The institutions of the new regime would therefore,
inevitably, resemble much more the Empire than the ancient monarchy. In this
way, the restoration was only left with limited room to manoeuvre.
On 6 April the Senate approved a new constitution. On the following day the
corps législatif gave its assent. The constitution contained 29 articles. The first
article provided for a constitutional monarchy hereditary by right of primogeni-
ture. The second article confirmed the sovereignty of the people. According to its
wording “the French people freely called” on the throne of France Louis-Stani-
slas-Xavier de France, “brother of the last King” and after him the other members
of the house of Bourbon “according to the ancient order of succession.” Article
29 determined that the constitution was to be submitted to a referendum and
that Louis-Stanislas-Xavier would be proclaimed “King of the French,” as soon
as he had sworn an oath on the constitution and signed it. Louis-Stanislas-Xavier
de France was the real name of the count of Provence. By using this name it was
made clear that it was the constitution alone that would confer royal dignity
upon the candidate and that he did not possess any historical or dynastic
claim to the throne. For this reason emphasis was laid on the fact that the ap-
pointment of the count was a voluntary act and had not been decided upon in
recognition of an inherent right of the dynasty to rule. In agreement with the
democratic character of the constitution article 29 conferred on the ruler the
title of a “King of the French” instead of King of France. The denial of all dynastic
claims is also expressed by calling the count of Provence “brother of the last
King.” From a strictly monarchical point of view the last King had not been
Louis XVI but his son who had died in prison in 1795. The count of Provence
was his uncle and since the royalists counted the dauphin who had never
been on the throne as Louis XVII he styled himself Louis XVIII.
By inserting articles 2 and 29 the Senate aimed at preventing the King from
retracting the achievements of the Revolution and the Empire. Other articles
point in the same direction. Article 24 confirmed the sale of the national do-
mains, article 15 proclaimed equality of taxation, and article 27 proclaimed
equality of admission to the public service. Article 28 confirmed that the existing
legal system and in particular Napoleon’s Code civil would remain in force. A
number of basic rights were guaranteed, but were not assembled in a separate
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catalogue: freedom of religion and of conscience (article 22), freedom of the
press (article 23), the right of petition (article 26) and the guarantee of the public
debt (article 24). Article 25 excluded political purges. It ruled that nobody would
have to answer for his political conduct under any of the preceding regimes. The
constitution accorded parliament great weight. The legislative power was to be
exercised by the King and parliament jointly, and both Houses were to have
the right to initiate legislation (article 5).
Owing to its liberal character the Senatorial constitution was unable to pave
the way for a restoration of the monarchy of the Ancien Régime. If it resurrected
a regime of the past it was the constitutional monarchy under the constitution of
1791. Insofar the Senate aimed at a democratic restoration, the only kind of re-
storation compatible with the principles of the Revolution. However, the Senato-
rial constitution differed considerably from the constitution of 1791. It was much
shorter and omitted details, did not include a catalogue of basic rights, provided
for a two chamber legislature, permitted membership of ministers in one of the
two houses, and contained a good deal of articles aiming directly at preserving
the institutions of the Napoleonic Empire for the new regime. In this way it cre-
ated an entirely new monarchy which shared with the constitutional monarchy
of 1791, apart from its democratic character, the dynasty.
The constitution did not provide for the case that the count of Provence re-
fused his nomination. Obviously, a restoration of the monarchy was considered
feasible only with the Bourbons. This conviction stands in marked contrast to the
principle that the King could claim those rights only which the constitution re-
served for him. It is true that the Bourbons were denied the right to restore the
monarchy on their own. This right was claimed by the nation alone. But if the
nation decided to return to the monarchy, then obviously the Bourbons alone
were considered the rightful candidates for kingship. His invocation of the na-
tional will notwithstanding the Senate could not have chosen any other dynasty
or simply leave the question open. This strengthened the position of the candi-
date which as was soon to be revealed, he would be able to turn to his advant-
age. In her memoirs the duchess of Fleury reports a conversation which she pre-
tends to have had about the future government of France with Talleyrand before
Napoleon was deposed. When Talleyrand proposed the duke of Orléans for the
throne she affirms to have replied that even though the duke would be “a usurp-
er of a better family than any other,” he would nonetheless remain “a usurper.”²⁹
 Aimée de Coigny, duchesse de Fleury, Mémoires, ed. Étienne Lamy (Paris: Calmann-Lévy,
1906), 241.
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Years later Talleyrand used the same argument in his memoirs.³⁰ From this it fol-
lows that not even a referendum on the Senatorial constitution might have ab-
solved a candidate other than the count of Provence from the verdict of being
a usurper. Therefore the choice of the count was after all less arbitrary than
the second article pretended it to be.
It was only under the protection of the coalition armies that the Senate was
safe to proceed to the formation of a provisional government, to the deposition of
the Emperor, and to the elaboration of a new constitution. In the meantime Na-
poleon stayed not far from the capital at Fontainebleau. Though he would have
preferred to prevent the allies from taking Paris, he refused to admit defeat. In-
stead, he made plans for the reconquest of the city. When on the morning of 4
April he revealed this project to his marshals, they refused allegiance. The revolt
of the marshals determined Napoleon to abdicate. At first he tried to preserve the
throne for his son, but after the unintended passage of Marshall Marmont’s corps
to the enemy the Tsar saw no more reason to accommodate him. The only con-
cession Napoleon was able to obtain was a formal treaty of abdication in which
the Isle of Elba was adjudged to him, Parma and Piacenza to Empress Marie-
Louise, and to both of them substantial pensions at the State’s expense.³¹
Talleyrand demonstrated all his political skill when he chose the procedure
of Parliament during the Glorious Revolution of 1688 as a model for the change
of regime in France. However, the concessions the count of Provence was obliged
to make extended far beyond the reforms which Mary Stuart and William of Or-
ange had to confirm before ascending the throne. The count of Provence had
never acknowledged neither the sovereignty of the people which the National
Assembly had for the first time proclaimed in 1789, nor the constitution of
1791. A short time before it was completed he had, unlike his brother, on 21
June 1791 managed to leave the country and seek refuge abroad.³² Therefore it
was entirely unforeseeable whether he would follow the example of Henry IV
and, departing from his convictions for the crown’s sake, adopt the constitution
that had been created for him.
Owing to a gout attack the count’s departure from his exile at Hartwell in
England was delayed. Instead his brother, count Artois, soon announced his ar-
rival in Paris. Following the custom of the Ancien Régime the count of Provence
had appointed him Lieutenant General of the Kingdom and his representative
during his absence. As was to be expected, on his arrival Artois demanded
 Talleyrand, Mémoires, vol. 2, 155.
 Traité dit de Fontainebleau, 11 april 1814, artt. 3 and 5, Angeberg, Congrès, vol. 1, 148– 149; for
the history of Napoleon’s abdication see Sellin, Revolution, 173– 194.
 Philip Mansel, Louis XVIII (London: Blond & Briggs, 1981), 53–55.
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that the government be formally handed over to him. This demand greatly em-
barrassed the Senate. Before the count of Provence had taken an oath on the
constitution, the Senate was not ready to recognize the appointment of his broth-
er. For the time being they regarded Artois merely as a private gentleman and
refused to welcome him solemnly at his entrance into the city on 12 April 1814
at the barrier of Bondy. But when he arrived there amid the cheers of the popu-
lation, riding on horseback and wearing the white cockade of the monarchy, he
was met by the provisional government, the city council and the leading author-
ities. Artois expected the Senate formally to hand over to him the government.
But the Senate hesitated since up to this moment the count of Provence had
not yet declared that he accepted the constitution which had been worked out
for him. Fouché, the former minister of the police, found a way out of the diffi-
culty and proposed that if the Senate could not recognize the powers the count of
Provence had given to his brother, as long as he had not formally accepted the
constitution, the Senate itself should confer authority on Artois. To this proposal
the Senate consented on 14 April.³³ Thus Artois could continue to regard himself
as authorized by his brother, whereas the Senate regarded him as authorized by
themselves. By this compromise the actual conflict was resolved, but the appre-
hension persisted that with a view to the increasing approval of the return of the
Bourbons the authority of the Senate would not be sufficient to extract from the
count of Provence the prescribed oath on the constitution from which the acces-
sion to the throne should depend. A deep conflict was on the verge of breaking
out which at the return of the candidate might easily have degenerated into a
civil war. Tsar Alexander got uneasy to the point that on 17 April he sent a letter
to England to the count of Provence admonishing him to pay respect to the “na-
tional will,” if he wished to spare the country new convulsions. He explained to
the King that he would win every heart if he made room for “liberal ideas” aim-
ing “at the maintenance and confirmation of the specific historical traditions of
France.”³⁴ When talking of the specific traditions of France he at this point nat-
urally alluded to the achievements of the Revolution and the Empire. That of all
people the Tsar demanded the preservation of these achievements is easily ex-
plained. Over the restoration of the ancient constitution the great powers gave
priority to the recovery of political stability. The quest for stability set limits to
every literal desire for restoration.
 Minutes des procès-verbaux du Sénat conservateur, 14 April 1814, Archives nationales Paris,
CC 986.
 Alexander to Louis, 5/17 April 1814, in: A. Polovtsoff, ed., Correspondance diplomatique des
ambassadeurs et ministres de Russie en France et de France en Russie avec leurs gouvernements
de 1814 à 1830, vol. 1, St. Petersburg 1902, 2; also in: Brunov, Aperçu, 411–412.
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On 20 April, the day when Napoleon took leave of his guard and departed for
the Isle of Elba, the count of Provence abandoned his English exile at Hartwell.
On 24 April he disembarked at Calais. Five days later he arrived at Compiègne. To
Compiègne he had invited Napoleon’s marshals with a view to securing the sup-
port of the army. To this day he had not wasted any word about the Senatorial
constitution he was expected to confirm. But since he conquered the hearts of
his subjects wherever he passed it had become entirely unthinkable that he
should be sent back into exile if he refused the oath on the constitution. His
long expected comment was at last drawn up on 2 Mai at Saint-Ouen on the out-
skirts of Paris and published in the capital on the following morning.³⁵
About the Senatorial constitution it was said in the Declaration that “its
foundations were good” but since a great many “of articles displayed the
hurry” with which they had been worded “it could not, in its actual shape, be-
come the fundamental law of the state.” Since, however, he was determined to
create “a liberal constitution,” the King would invite members of the Senate and
the legislative body to form a committee and entrust the necessary revision of the
text to them.³⁶ The wording of the order of revision gave the impression as if the
count of Provence confirmed the constituent power as claimed by the two cham-
bers. If the revision should be limited to the rectification of defects due to the
hurry in which Talleyrand hat forced the text through the Senate, one could ig-
nore the fact that the candidate for the throne was not ready to accept the con-
stitution as it had been presented to him, all the more so since he promised with
few exceptions to guarantee the preservation of essential achievements of the
Revolution and the Empire as listed in the constitution. By its wording the Dec-
laration of Saint-Ouen skillfully obscured the fact that the count of Provence in
reality rejected precisely the “foundations” of the Senatorial constitution. This is
already shown by the very first line of the Declaration. Not the count of Provence
had issued it but “Louis, by the grace of God King of France and of Navarre.”
This was a resounding slap in the face of the Senate and a square rejection of
their claim to commit the King to the recognition of the national will and to
make his elevation on the throne conditional on this recognition. In his own
eyes Louis had been King for 19 years already, that is to say King of France by
the grace of God and not King of the French by the will of the people.
The ideas of legitimacy to which the King on the one hand and the Senate on
the other adhered were entirely incompatible with each other. The Senate had
acted in accordance with the principle contained in the Declaration of the Rights
 On the origins of the Declaration of Saint-Ouen see Sellin, Revolution, 222–223.
 Déclaration du Roi, Saint-Ouen, 2 May 1814, Bulletin des lois, 5th series, vol. 1, no. 8, 75–76.
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of Man and the Citizen of 1789 and since respected by every regime in France, the
principle that no assembly and no individual could claim political authority un-
less expressly empowered by the nation.³⁷ In keeping with this rule the Senate
had deposed Napoleon and voted the restoration of the monarchy under the
Bourbons on behalf of the nation. Another road to the restoration of the monar-
chy was not compatible with the sovereignty of the people. Louis, however, con-
sidered himself superior to the Revolution. In his eyes the monarchy had never
been abolished. He believed that the National Convention of 1792 had not pos-
sessed the right to such a measure. If, however, the monarchy had never ceased
to exist, there was no need for the Senate to restore it, quite apart from the fact
that the very idea of a restoration of kingship was incompatible with monarchi-
cal legitimacy. If the monarchy by divine right had in fact succumbed during the
Revolution, no power on Earth could have restored it, since such a restoration
presupposed a power the legitimacy of which was superior to the legitimacy
of the King. The idea of such a power, however, was incompatible with the con-
cept of divine right monarchy. Therefore, from a monarchical point view what
happened in 1814 was not a restoration of the monarchy, but only the removal
of the impediments which had for more than two decades prevented the King
from effectively taking up his government. In this sense restoration did not
mean the recovery of a right which had been forfeited, but rather the assertion,
by the ancient dynasty, of a claim which had never ceased to remain valid. This
assertion, however, demanded more than the simple return of the King from
exile. Its success depended on the fulfillment of the expectations which had de-
veloped during the Revolution, and on the King’s promise of a liberal govern-
ment. The Declaration of Saint-Ouen shows that Louis XVIII had understood.
His promise “to adopt a liberal constitution” was soon followed, as he had
also announced, by the formation of a committee for the revision of the Senato-
rial constitution. The committee numbered 22 members and on 22 May initiated
their deliberations under the presidency of chancellor Dambray. Following the
King’s instructions they transformed the Senatorial constitution within a week
into the Charte constitutionnelle. The very name of the new constitution demon-
strates that it was not based on the sovereignty of the nation but on the power of
the monarch. The term constitution reminded of the Revolution, whereas charte
was the traditional expression for a document by which under the Ancien Ré-
gime privileges had been accorded by the kings.³⁸
 Déclaration des droits de l‘homme et du citoyen, 26 August 1789, art. 3, in: Jacques Godechot,
ed., Les constitutions de la France depuis 1789 (Paris: Garnier-Flammarion, 1970), 33–34.
 On the origin of the Charte constitutionnelle see Sellin, Revolution, chap. 7, 225–273; Pierre
Simon, L’élaboration de la Charte constitutionnelle de 1814, Paris 1906.
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The proclamation of the Charte constitutionnelle was scheduled on 4 June
1814 at a séance royale, a solemn session of both chambers in the presence of
the King. During the preceding night Jacques-Claude Beugnot, a public servant
who had made his career under Napoleon and meanwhile acted as General Di-
rector of the Police, composed a preamble to the document.³⁹ The historical sig-
nificance of this text derives from the fact that here for the first time the so-called
monarchical principle was enunciated according to which even under a consti-
tution the monarch retained full power, whereas the chambers merely participat-
ed in its exercise. The monarchical principle defined monarchical in contrast to
democratic constitutionalism which was based on the sovereignty of the people
and which had marked both the French constitution of 1791 and the Senatorial
constitution of 1814. The Charte constitutionnelle introduced into history an en-
tirely new type of constitution. The Charte was imposed by the monarch who
claimed to be and remain in full possession of political power. Therefore it ob-
tained force of law without confirmation by the nation or their representatives.
Prior to Louis XVIII only Napoleon had reverted to a similar procedure of consti-
tution-giving, not in France, where every constitution and every revision of a
constitution was confirmed by plebiscite, but in satellite kingdoms such as the
Kingdom of Westphalia in 1807 or of Spain in 1808. By imposing the Charte a
century-old monarchy made concessions to the revolutionary spirit of the
times in order to preserve his traditional monarchical legitimacy. Napoleon, by
contrast, imposed constitutions in the hope of consolidating monarchies of rev-
olutionary origin. The essential mark of distinction of the Charte constitution-
nelle and of all other constitutions which were modeled after it was the associ-
ation of traditional monarchical legitimacy and liberal reforms. The reforms were
carried just far enough to meet the basic expectations of the citizens. Louis XVIII
was determined to preserve as much as possible of his royal prerogative. This is
demonstrated by the dispute within the constitutional committee on the right to
initiate legislation. In the beginning the King had wanted to retain this right, an
“ornament of his crown,” without limits. Since the majority of the committee op-
posed this desire a compromise was sought and the chambers were accorded a
right of petition. Articles 19 and 20 of the Charte gave both Chambers the right to
petition the King for the introduction of a bill and article 21 demanded that the
petition be transmitted to the King only after both Chambers had endorsed it.⁴⁰
 Volker Sellin, “Die Erfindung des monarchischen Prinzips. Jacques-Claude Beugnots Präam-
bel zur Charte constitutionnelle,” in Tour de France. Eine historische Rundreise. Festschrift für
Rainer Hudemann, ed. Armin Heinen and Dietmar Hüser (Stuttgart: Steiner, 2008), 493–497.
 Sellin, Revolution, 254–257.
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Thanks to the imposition of the Charte constitutionnelle Louis XVIII suc-
ceeded in restoring the monarchy in France, not in the sense of a literal restora-
tion of the ancient monarchy, but of a renewal which took into account the spirit
of the times. Not the Senate but the King himself had restored the monarchy. In
this way the achievement of Louis XVIII remained during the whole century the
authoritative model for the renewal of monarchies threatened by revolution. Ev-
erywhere the method followed the same pattern. By imposing constitutions and
thus meeting essential demands of the Revolution without infringing upon the
traditional monarchical legitimacy the greater part of the monarchies could be
preserved until the end of the First World War and beyond.⁴¹ Whereas the con-
stitutions of the Revolution in France had all been abolished again after a few
years only, the Charte constitutionnelle of 1814 remained in force until the July
Revolution of 1830 and after its revision for another eighteen years. It was to a
great extent by the Charte of 1814 that the heritage of the French Revolution
was transmitted to the 19th century. The same is true of the constitutions
which in other monarchies were modeled on the example of the Charte. The lib-
eral principles which had developed since 1789 were transformed into durable
institutions not so much directly by the numerous revolutions but rather indi-
rectly by means of restoration.
Even though the French were not invited formally to confirm the restoration of
1814 by a referendum, they nevertheless consented tacitly and thus informally to the
Charte and to the return of the monarchy. In this way they retracted the abolition of
the monarchy of 1792. This step was made possible by the guarantees contained in
the Charte. Insofar the French restoration of 1814 was based on a contract between
monarchy and nation. Ferdinand VII of Spain and the numerous Italian princes who
returned on their thrones after the fall of Napoleon, did not need a similar contract,
because they had not been expelled by their subjects but by the foreign conqueror.
Therefore they saw no reason to concede constitutions, but resumed government al-
most everywhere in the form of the harshest absolutism.
The monarchy of Louis XVIII was the first French regime since 1789 that was
not based on the national will but on divine right in the style of the Ancien Ré-
gime. The restoration of divine right monarchy rested on the fiction that the an-
cient monarchy had never ceased to exist and that consequently there was no
need to bring her back to life. To this conviction the demeanor of Louis XVIII
after his return from his English exile at the end of April 1814 corresponded per-
fectly. He did not await a formal act of recognition but from the very beginning
 Sellin, Gewalt und Legitimität. Die europäische Monarchie im Zeitalter der Revolutionen (Mu-
nich: Oldenbourg, 2011), in particular chap. 7 (“Verfassung”), 171–216.
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acted as sovereign. Accordingly he did not attribute his return to the invitation
by the Senate. The main reason why he was far from considering the situation
in this light was the fact that he deeply despised the Senate and denied him
every right to deliberate on the future of France. His real opinion is to be
found in a commentary on the Senatorial constitution which he had put down
in writing article by article. On the last article which stated that he could become
King only after having taken an oath on the constitution, he remarked: “Louis
XVIII, by the grace of God King of France and of Navarre, deposes the present
Senate for its complicity in the crimes of Bonaparte and appeals against them
to the French people.”⁴² The remark shows that in his desire to restore divine
right monarchy the King believed to act in accordance with the wishes of the
French people. He regarded the Senatorial constitution simply as a proposal
and not as a condition he was bound to accept. In the last resort, then, to him
it was the royal will alone from which could emanate the new monarchy.
The view of the King differed from the views of the citizens. The majority of
the French seems to have regarded the government of Louis XVIII as a new re-
gime the legitimacy of which did not rest on the dynasty but on the institutions
it had promised to preserve. It was on purpose that in their constitution of 6 April
the Senate had meticulously avoided to construe their scheme of a democratic
monarchy as a restoration of the historical monarchy of France. This strategy re-
veals the prevailing interpretation. To Louis XVIII the restoration was the return
to the ancient monarchy, to the nation it was the renewal of the liberties gained
in 1789. The French restoration of 1814 obviously meant two different things at
the same time: the renewal and consolidation of the monarchy by divine right,
and the reconciliation of that monarchy with fundamental achievements of
the Revolution. It was chiefly this compromise that gave reason to hope for
the durability of the new regime.
 Archives du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, Paris, MD France, vol. 646 (Fonds Bourbon),
fol. 41v; of Louis’ commentary only fragments have been preserved: Sellin, Revolution, 218–219.
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Poland 1815
From 1772 to 1795 Russia, Prussia, and Austria partitioned the aristocratic repub-
lic of Poland (Rzeczpospolita Polska) between them. For twelve years the Polish
nation remained without its own polity. It was only the Prussian defeat in the
war of the fourth coalition that paved the way for the formation of a new, albeit
reduced, Polish state. Through the peace of Tilsit of 1807 King Frederick William
III of Prussia ceded to Napoleon the greater part of the territories his country had
acquired in the course of the second and third partition of Poland. The ceded ter-
ritories were transformed into the Duchy of Warsaw (Księstwo Warszawskie). Na-
poleon gave it a constitution and made King Frederick August I of Saxony King of
Poland, thus binding together Saxony and Poland in a personal union. By the
peace of Schönbrunn of 1809 Emperor Francis I ceded to the King of Saxony
and Poland Western Galicia and other pieces of territory Austria had gained at
the partitions. These acquisitions were annexed to the Duchy of Warsaw which
was simultaneously promoted to the rank of Grand-Duchy. Even though the
Grand-Duchy comprised but a small part of the former Polish Republic, its for-
mation generated among the Poles hopes of recovering unity and independence.
When Napoleon in 1812 opened the war against Russia many Poles joined him.
They sought to take advantage of the opportunity and recover the territories
which the Tsar had annexed during the partitions: Vil’njus, Grodno, Minsk, Mo-
gilev, Vitebsk, Volyn’, Podol’e, and Kiev, the so-called Western governments of
Russia. But the Grande Armée failed. In the wake of Napoleon’s retreat Russian
troops occupied the Grand-Duchy of Warsaw. On 13 March 1813 Tsar Alexander I
installed a military government, the Provisional Supreme Council (Rada Naj-
wyższa Tymczasowa) under General Governor Vasilij S. Lanskoj. Nikolaj N. Novo-
sil’cev was appointed Vice-Governor.¹ Notwithstanding staunch British and Aus-
trian opposition at the congress of Vienna Tsar Alexander transformed the
Grand-Duchy into a Kingdom, gave it a constitution, and tied it to the Russian
Empire by means of a personal union. Most of the territories of the new Kingdom
consisted of former Prussian gains from the partitions of Poland. Prussia con-
tented itself with Danzig and a strip of territory at the Northwestern edge of
the new Polish Kingdom which permitted it to straighten the frontier between Si-
lesia and Eastern Prussia. This territory then became the Grand-Duchy of Pozn-
an. For the loss of its former Polish possessions Prussia was indemnified in Sax-
ony and on the Rhine.
 Józef Bojasiński, Rządi tymczasowe w królestwie polskiem. Maj-grudzień 1815 (Warsaw: Laskau-
er, 1902), 9.
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The foundation of the Kingdom of Poland by Alexander I is an astonishing
occurrence. Of all sovereigns the Russian Tsar was the first to imitate Louis XVIII
by imposing a constitution on Poland. The chief purpose of the imposition was
without doubt the hope of securing the allegiance of his new Polish subjects.
This policy might have been even more successful if the Tsar had transferred
to the new Kingdom those territories as well which Russia had annexed between
1772 and 1795 in the course of the partitions of Poland. One is tempted to suppose
that by founding the Kingdom of Poland Alexander more than anything else
hoped to increase Russian influence in central and Western Europe. If the liberal
institutions of the new state worked it was in fact to be expected that they would
exert a considerable attraction on the Polish subjects of the neighbouring great
powers Prussia and Austria and render more difficult the efforts of these two
countries to integrate their recently acquired Polish territories. The prospect
would increase that at the cost of the two German partitioning powers additional
parts of the former Rzeczpospolita were united with the new Kingdom. The Poles
would hail the Tsar as their liberator and from his position as King of Poland
Alexander could easily extend his influence way into Central Europe. This effect
could not come to pass if the Tsar accepted the proposal of the British Foreign
Secretary Lord Castlereagh to partition the Grand-Duchy of Warsaw among the
three neighbouring great powers as it had already been agreed upon at the con-
gress of Vienna. A formal annexation of the Grand-Duchy by Russia, however,
would in no case have been tolerated by Great Britain and Austria. It was only
on condition that the Grand-Duchy become a separate constitutional state, albeit
in personal union with the Russian Empire, that the great powers finally assent-
ed to Russian dominion over it.
The antecedents of Alexander’s Polish policy go back to 1791. On 3 May of
that year the Polish Diet adopted a modern liberal constitution.² Simultaneously
the ancient elective monarchy was transformed into a hereditary monarchy. This
unexpected consolidation of the instable and weak Polish state induced King
Frederick William II of Prussia and Tsarina Catherine II two years later to pro-
ceed to a second partition of the country. The new act of violence committed
against Poland provoked a rebellion under the lead of Tadeusz Kościuszko in
March 1794. The rebellion was suppressed and the Tsarina had the estates of
those members of the Polish aristocracy confiscated who had taken part in it.
To the magnates concerned belonged Prince Kazimierz Czartoryski who was de-
scended from one of the most eminent noble families of the country. Czartoryski
 Ustawa rządowa z dnia 3-go maja 1791 roku, in: Marceli Handelsman, ed., Konstytucje polskie
1791– 1921 (Warsaw 1922), 1–20.
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was not ready to reconcile himself with the expropriation and strove for the re-
covery of his estates. The Tsarina consented on condition that as pledges for his
future good conduct the prince send his sons Adam and Constantine as hostages
to the court of St. Petersburg where they were to enter Russian services.³ Adam,
the elder of the two, was 25 years of age; Constantine was younger by four years.
On 24 May 1795 the brothers arrived in the Russian capital.⁴ The tasks that would
be assigned to them had not yet been determined. As Adam reports in his mem-
oirs, the two brothers did not care at all about the rank that would be accorded to
them in the services of the Tsarina: “Can a traveler who by mere chance gets to
Japan, to Borneo or to the territories of Central Africa, attribute to the forms, the
distinctions, and the honours which are of use among those barbarians, the least
significance?”⁵ Later on the brothers were appointed officers of the Imperial
Guard. Of historical consequence was the acquaintance with the eighteen-year-
old grand-duke Alexander, the future Tsar Alexander I. Adam Czartoryski and
Alexander became friends. Soon Alexander revealed his repugnance toward
the policies of his grandmother, Tsarina Catherine II. As Czartoryski later
wrote, Alexander “passionately loved justice and freedom, deplored the fate of
Poland and wished to see that country happy!”⁶ An immediate source of the po-
litical opinions of the young Alexander is a letter he directed to his Swiss instruc-
tor La Harpe on 27 September 1797 where he reveals his intention to give to Rus-
sia a “liberal constitution” in order to save it forever from “despotism” and
“tyranny.” This would be, so he judged, “the best kind of revolution, carried
through by a legal government.”⁷ The letter reflects the convictions which the
heir to the throne and Czartoryski shared. As an example of the arbitrary govern-
ment of an unlimited ruler Alexander had before the eyes his father, Tsar Paul I,
whose assassination in March 1801 cleared the way for his accession to the
throne.
At the beginning of his reign the new Tsar drew the friend of his youth into
the innermost circle of his councilors. Together with Viktor Kočubej, Nikolaj No-
vosil’cev, and Pavel Stroganov Czartoryski became a member of Alexander’s Se-
 Marian Kukiel, Czartoryski and European Unity 1770– 1861 (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1955), 15.
 W. H. Zawadzki, A Man of Honour. Adam Czartoryski as a Statesman of Russia and Poland
1795– 1831 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), 7; Adam Czartoryski, Mémoires et correspondance
avec l’empereur Alexandre Ier, vol. 1 (Paris: Plon, 1887), 37.
 Ibid., 76.
 Ibid., 98.
 The letter is printed in: Nikolaj Karlovič Šil’der, Imperator Aleksandr Pervyj. Ego žizn’ i carst-
vovanie, vol. 1 (St. Petersburg: Suvorin, 1897), 280–282.
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cret Committee (neglasnyj komitet).⁸ In the fall of 1802 he was appointed deputy
of the aged foreign minister Voroncov and two years later was himself promoted
to be foreign minister. From 1803 he also served as curator of the University of
Vil’njus. In this capacity he was responsible for education in the eight Western
governments Russia had annexed in the course of the partitions of Poland.
Even in the Russian service Czartoryski remained an ardent Polish patriot.
Since Alexander had more than once confessed his repugnance against the Pol-
ish policies of his grandmother, Czartoryski saw reason to hope that as Alexand-
er’s foreign minister he would sooner or later get the opportunity to reverse the
fate of his home country.
An opportunity seemed to arise in the fall of 1804. After Napoleons’s breach
of the peace of Amiens which had been concluded two years before, the British
government was in search for allies on the continent in the renewed war against
Napoleonic France. Foreign minister Czartoryski took advantage of the situation
and advised the Tsar to send the minister of Justice Novosil’cev as a special
envoy to London to negotiate a long-term British-Russian alliance. The instruc-
tions which Czartoryski drew up on behalf of the Tsar contained nothing less
than the project of a fundamental reform of the political system of Europe.
Great Britain and Russia were assigned the roles of “saviours of Europe” (sau-
veurs de l’Europe).⁹ The proposals were justified with the persisting French men-
ace. In the first paragraphs of the instructions it was pointed out that “the stron-
gest weapon which the French had used so far and with which they continued to
threaten every country,” was their ability to spread the erroneous conviction ev-
erywhere that they fought for the freedom and the welfare of nations. Therefore
“the welfare of mankind and the true interest of the legitimate governments” de-
manded that this powerful weapon be taken from the French and instead turned
against France itself.¹⁰ The precondition of such a step, the instructions contin-
ued, was the universal advocacy of constitutions by every government which
fought against France. By the imposition of constitutions the nations would be
“reconciled to their governments” and make sure that these were striving at
nothing else but “the greatest welfare possible of the peoples subjected to
them.”¹¹ In this way the promise of a liberal constitution should be turned
into an ideological weapon in the war against France. For the post-war period
 Marc Raeff, Michael Speransky, Statesman of Imperial Russia, 1772– 1839 (The Hague: Nijhoff,
1957), 34, n. 1.
 Instructions secrètes à M. de Novosiltzow allant en Angleterre, le 11 septembre 1804, in: Czar-




the Tsar proposed the creation of a system of collective security, of a confedera-
tion which “would grant to the states the highest possible degree of quiet and
safety.”¹² The stability and durability of such a confederation demanded that
the frontiers of the states be drawn in keeping with geography, along mountain
ranges or rivers. To all countries was to be granted access to the international
markets where their citizens could sell their products, and the countries them-
selves ought to be composed of “homogeneous peoples able to communicate
with each other and to adjust to the governments which direct them.”¹³
This was a revolutionary and as well a utopian program. By the argument of
ethnic homogeneity one could easily justify the demand to restore an independ-
ent Polish state. It was doubtful, however, if the Tsar would really be ready to
renounce the Russian acquisitions of Polish territory and agree that the Western
governments of his country be included in the territorial revision. The two other
partitioning powers – Austria and Prussia – were to be indemnified elsewhere
for their losses. The prerequisite of putting into practice these projects was the
defeat of Napoleon. Alexander hoped for victory in the war which was expected
to break out in 1805.
In this war Napoleon suffered a devastating defeat at sea. On 21 October 1805
near Trafalgar off the Southern coast of the Iberian Peninsula not far from Cádiz
the British admiral Nelson destroyed the combined Spanish and French fleets. As
a consequence the Emperor was forced to renounce his plans of an invasion of
the British Isles. By land, however, he achieved the most brilliant victory of his
career. On 2 December he defeated the allied Russian and Austrian armies near
Austerlitz in Moravia. This catastrophe prevented Alexander and Czartoryski
from going straight ahead with their plans of a fundamental reordering of Eu-
rope, quite apart from the fact that the defeat affected the relationship between
the Tsar and his foreign minister. On 1 July 1806 Czartoryski was dismissed, but
remained a member of the Senate and the State Council and Curator of the Uni-
versity of Vil’njus.¹⁴ His personal relations to Alexander were not interrupted ei-
ther. So in December 1806 he could venture to transmit to the Tsar a new mem-
orandum and a plan for the restoration of Poland.¹⁵
The Prussian defeat at Jena and Auerstedt on 14 October had opened up new
opportunities. The battle had not ended the war, since Russia, Prussia’s ally, did
not admit defeat. As Czartoryski asserted in his memorandum, the victory would
 Ibid., 35.
 Ibid., 36.
 Kukiel, Czartoryski, 76, 79; Zawadzki, Man, 159.
 Adam Czartoryski, “Mémoire sur la nécessité de rétablir la Pologne pour prévenir Bonaparte
(5 décembre 1806),” in: id., Mémoires, vol. 2, 148– 158.
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enable Napoleon to transform the Polish provinces of Prussia into a separate
state. The Poles would enthusiastically support such a project and place their re-
sources and their fighting power at the disposition of France, motivated by the
hope that with the help of the victorious Emperor they would soon be able to
liberate those parts of their country as well which had still remained under Rus-
sian domination. Whereas Napoleon would have no difficulty to find comrades-
in-arms among the Poles in his war against Russia, the Russian government
would avoid recruiting soldiers among the Polish population under its domina-
tion because it was afraid they would, once in arms, turn against Russia instead
of France. Therefore Russia would stand passively by and watch the enemy tak-
ing advantage of these human resources.¹⁶ In order to forestall the creation of a
Polish state at the hands of Napoleon, Czartoryski pressed upon Alexander to
proclaim a Polish state with the frontiers of the ancient aristocratic republic
and declare himself hereditary King. In this way the Tsar, not Napoleon,
would obtain the Polish resources and gain the allegiance of the Poles.¹⁷ To be
sure, the Tsar would attain this end only if he gave to the Poles a government
“according to their wishes and in consonance with their former laws.” Every-
thing else would remain a “half-measure” and could “not secure any of the ad-
vantages hoped for.”¹⁸
Czartoryski entered one by one into the objections he expected would be
raised against his proposal. If Poland were restored within its ancient limits
all partitioning powers would have to renounce their acquisitions, and Russia
would have to cede its Western governments to the new Polish monarchy. This
would certainly meet strong resistance in Russia. In point of fact, however, the
Tsar would not incur any loss, because the Polish crown should indissolubly
be tied to the Russian throne. “Far from suffering losses Russia would gain
the entire remainder of Poland.” Another objection Czartoryski foresaw was
that the Tsar would be obliged to break his alliance with Prussia if he wanted
to restore to the future Kingdom of Poland the Polish provinces that Prussia
had acquired at the partitions. To this Czartoryski remarked that it was no longer
Frederick William III who governed in Berlin but Napoleon Bonaparte who by his
victory at Jena and Auerstedt had become the real master of Prussia. Therefore
the Tsar would not seize the possessions of an ally if he contributed to the for-
mation of a greater Poland, but simply snatch the spoils from the enemy. As to





Kingdom of Poland Alexander enter into contact with Vienna and settle the fu-
ture of Austrian Poland through negotiations. Czartoryski was not afraid that the
proclamation of the restoration of Poland would protract the present war. In-
stead he believed that Napoleon would more readily assent to peace negotiations
if the prospect of obtaining the Polish resources had vanished. For this reason
alone the advocated step should not be delayed any further.¹⁹
Alexander did not heed Czartoryski’s advice. Napoleon brought the war to a
victorious end and in July 1807 dictated the peace terms to Prussia and Russia at
Tilsit. Of the provinces Prussia had acquired in 1793 and 1795, he disposed exact-
ly as Czartoryski had foreseen.Whereas he made Danzig a free city, he united the
remaining provinces to become the Duchy of Warsaw and elevated King Freder-
ick August I of Saxony to the dignity of King in the new Napoleonic satellite King-
dom, thus creating a personal union of Poland and Saxony. At the same time he
gave it a constitution, the Statut constitutionnel du duché de Varsovie.²⁰ Russia
obtained the district of Białystok. Through the peace of Schönbrunn concluded
by France and Austria two years later, the duchy of Warsaw was enlarged by
Western Galicia, the city of Cracow and the district of Zamość.²¹ Simultaneously
the Duchy was promoted to Grand-Duchy. The partitioning powers did not permit
that the name of the new Kingdom contained the word Poland, for fear that from
the Polish name would be deduced the right to have the old Commonwealth re-
stored. A short time after the conclusion of the peace of Tilsit Tsar Alexander had
written to his mistress Maria Naryškina: “At least there will be no Poland but a
ridiculous Duchy of Warsaw.”²² Nevertheless, the Poles regarded the Grand-
Duchy as germ-cell of a new all-Polish state.²³
Napoleon presented the agreements of Tilsit to the Tsar as a division of
Europe into a French and a Russian sphere of influence and therefore as an
achievement that would endure. In reality the Tsar felt threatened by the crea-
 Ibid., 153–157.
 Comte d‘Angeberg, ed., Recueil des Traités, Conventions et Actes Diplomatiques concernant la
Pologne 1762– 1862 (Paris: Amyot, 1862), 470–481; the Polish text of the statute in: Handelsman,
Konstytucje, 27–39. Owen Connelly, Napoleon’s Satellite Kingdoms (New York and London: Free
Press, 1965), did not reserve a chapter for the Grand-Duchy of Warsaw on the ground that it was
not governed by a member of the House of Bonaparte; ibid., ix.
 George Frédéric de Martens, ed., Nouveau recueil de traités, vol. 1 (1808– 1814) (Göttingen:
Dieterich, 1817), Traité etc., 15 October 1809, Art. 3, paragraph 4, 212.
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tion of a Polish satellite state of France right on his borders. The reason of this
was not only the geographical and strategic position of the new state but also the
apprehension that it might develop into a focus of unrest and destabilize the for-
mer Polish territories in the Western part of the Russian Empire. The Duchy of
Warsaw made up only a small part of the former Rzeczpospolita that before
the first partition in 1772 had comprehended over 730.000 square kilometers.
The population had numbered about 11 million. By contrast, in 1807 the
Duchy of Warsaw comprised 102.744 square kilometers and a population of
less than 2.6 million. As a consequence of the Austrian cessions of territory in
Galicia in 1809 the surface was to increase to 155.430 square kilometers and
the population to 4.3 million.²⁴ The surface of the Grand-Duchy thus attained
a little more than one fifth of the surface of the ancient Polish elective Kingdom.
As the partitioning powers had apprehended the Poles regarded its foundation
as the beginning of their national revival and, allied to the apparently invincible
Emperor of the French, made strong efforts to liberate and reunite to the Grand-
Duchy also those parts of their country that had been annexed by the neighbour-
ing great powers. The Polish patriots had placed their hopes on Napoleon al-
ready at the period of the Directory, when Polish exiles, organized in legions,
fought in Italy against Austria, one of the three partitioning powers, under the
leadership of the young general Bonaparte in the hope of earning French support
for the liberation of their country. On 20 January 1797 the leader of the Polish le-
gions, General Jan Henrik Dąbrowski, appealed to his compatriots to join him
with a view “to fighting for freedom under the valiant Bonaparte.” The appeal
goes on stating: “The triumph of the French Republic is our only hope left.”²⁵
When Napoleon after his victory at Jena and Auerstedt in November 1806 was
about to invade Prussia’s Polish provinces, the same Dąbrowski together with
Józef Wybicki appealed again to his compatriots and invited them to fight for
their freedom side by side with Napoleon: “Poles! It is in your hand to live
and to possess a fatherland. Your avenger, your creator has arrived.”²⁶
In order to counter the menace at the Western border of his Empire Tsar
Alexander towards the end of the year 1810 considered waging a new war
against France. For such an undertaking he needed the support of the Poles. Na-
poleon had in the meantime strengthened the Grand-Duchy. In May 1811 the Pol-
 Piotr S. Wandycz, The Lands of Partitioned Poland, 1795– 1918 (Seattle and London: Univer-
sity of Washington Press, 1974), 3, 43.
 Proclamation aux Polonais, pour leur annoncer la formation des légions d’Italie, 20 January
1797, in: Angeberg, Recueil Pologne, 423.
 Proclamation de Jean-Henri Dombrowski et Joseph Wybicki aux Polonais, 3 November 1806,
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ish army numbered no less than 60.000 men. With such an enemy in the rear
Alexander could not dare to send his army on the road to France. Therefore he
had no choice but to try to release the Poles from their alliance with Napoleon
and to lure them into the Russian camp. The plan had a chance of success only if
he convinced them that it was him rather than Napoleon who was able to meet
their national aspirations. On 25 December he disclosed his plans to Czartoryski.
The moment had arrived, wrote Alexander, “to prove to the Poles that Russia was
not their enemy,” but “their real and natural friend.” They should realize that it
was from Russia that they could expect the restoration of their Kingdom.
Alexander thought of opening the campaign with a public proclamation of
this war aim.²⁷ In his reply Czartoryski confirmed to the Tsar that all Poles de-
sired the reunification of their country, “the unification of all their parts into a
single nation, under a national and constitutional government.”²⁸ However, it
would not be easy to convince them that this objective was easier to attain
with Russian help than in alliance with Napoleon. The Poles regarded the French
as their friends and the Russians as their inveterate foes, “both for political rea-
sons and from personal aversion.”²⁹ Since Russia had gained the greatest area
increase at the Polish partitions it would not be sufficient for the Tsar to promise
to them the preservation of the Grand-Duchy of Warsaw. If he wanted to secure
the support of the Poles in the war against Napoleon, he had to grant the fulfill-
ment of three conditions: The reintroduction of the Polish constitution of 1791,
the unification of all Poles under one government and sufficient opportunities
for the Poles to sell their products on the international market.³⁰ In principle,
the Tsar assented to these demands and agreed that in the future the rivers
Duna, Beresina, and Dnjepr form the Eastern borders of Poland, but posed
two conditions. On the one hand the Kingdom of Poland was for all times to re-
main tied to Russia in a personal union, on the other hand he requested an un-
equivocal declaration by the Polish nation, presented in writing by the leading
representatives of the country, to the effect that the Poles were ready to join
the Tsar.³¹ This promise Alexander could not obtain. Instead the Polish elite con-
tinued to place their hopes on the Emperor of the French.³²
 L’empereur au prince Adam Czartoryski, 25 December 1810, in: Czartoryski, Mémoires, vol. 2,
250–51.
 Le prince Adam Czartoryski à l’empereur, 18/30 January 1811, ibid., 256.
 Ibid., 258.
 Ibid., 260–61.
 L’empereur au prince Czartoryski, 31 January 1811, ibid., 272.
 Zawadzki, Man, 201.
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In May 1811 the Lithuanian prince Michał Ogiński proposed to the Tsar to
unite the eight provinces of the former Rzeczpospolita which Russia had ac-
quired at the Polish partitions, under the historic name of Lithuania and trans-
form them into an autonomous political entity. The head of this state should be
appointed by the Tsar. Lithuania should get its own court and a parliament. The
ancient Lithuanian laws should remain in force. By such a substantial conces-
sion to the patriotic hopes of the Poles Alexander would, so Ogiński believed,
exert greater attraction on this nation than Napoleon.³³ The proposal was pre-
sented at this moment, because Ogiński was convinced that a war between Rus-
sia and France was impending. As long as the Poles believed, Ogiński continued,
that Napoleon was determined to restore the ancient Polish commonwealth he
would win the sympathy even of those members of that nation who lived
under the Tsar. In case of war this would endanger the Russian cause. Napoleon
had already sent several times delegates into the Russian parts of ancient Poland
ordering them to incite the inhabitants to sedition and to assure them that he
would extend the borders of Poland to the Volga.³⁴ To a powerful Empire it
was easy to conquer new provinces, but it took many years in the conquered ter-
ritories “to win the inhabitants over to its side, to accustom them to the change
and to make them forget their former existence.”³⁵ In this respect Napoleon was a
model. As soon as he had conquered a piece of territory he imposed a constitu-
tion and carried through reforms in order to obtain the assent of the population.
By instituting the Grand-Duchy of Warsaw he had won over not only the citizens
of this state but also the inhabitants of the eight Western governments of Russia
who from now on placed their hope of restoration of an independent Polish state
on Napoleon. Therefore Ogiński recommended to the Tsar to steal a march upon
Napoleon and to employ the Napoleonic method in these governments. As soon
as the war broke out Alexander should declare himself King of Poland. By the
foundation of an autonomous Lithuanian state within the Russian empire the
Tsar would tie “the almost eight million inhabitants of these territories to him-
self” and at the same time secure “the support of the Poles in the Duchy of War-
saw.” Napoleon on the other hand would lose his partisans in the Russian part of
 Michał Ogiński, “Mémoire du prince Michel-Cléophas Ogiński, ancien grand-trésorier de
Lithuanie, adressé à l’empereur Alexandre Ier, sur les intentions de l’empereur Napoléon Ier à l’é-
gard de la Pologne, et sur ce que devrait faire Alexandre Ier à l’égard de la Pologne en général, et
de la Lithuanie en particulier, dans le cas d’une guerre entre la Russie et la France, 3/15 May




Poland and the inhabitants of the Grand-Duchy of Warsaw would share the ad-
miration and gratitude of the Lithuanians towards the Tsar.³⁶
Alexander was impressed by Ogiński’s memorandum and asked him to de-
fine the steps to be taken one after the other for putting into practice his propos-
als. Thereupon in October 1811 Ogiński presented the Tsar with the draught of an
ordinance about the organization of Lithuania. The first article announced the
transformation of the Western governments into a single province by the name
of Grand-Duchy of Lithuania. The capital of the province was to be Vil’njus,
its official language Polish.³⁷
On 1 December 1811 Ogiński transmitted a further memorandum to the Tsar
in which he went beyond the recommendations of May and suggested that the
Tsar immediately adopt the title of King of Poland for the Grand-Duchy of Lith-
uania. This would assure the citizens of the Grand-Duchy of Warsaw that the Tsar
was determined to restore the Kingdom of Poland. Ogiński expected that sooner
or later the Grand-Duchy of Warsaw would be united with Lithuania. In detail he
proposed that the Tsar issue a “proclamation to the Polish nation in which he
promised a constitution” which “comes close to” the constitution of 3 May 1791.³⁸
In an oral comment of 15 December 1811 Tsar Alexander disclosed sympathy
towards Ogiński’s new considerations. The restoration of Poland would not in
the least contradict Russian interests and would not lead to the “alienation of
the conquered provinces” the inhabitants of which would surely be “happy
and satisfied if they received a constitution.” He would be ready to adopt the
name of King of Poland if by this act he “could please all Poles.”³⁹
Less than a year later Napoleon’s Russian campaign ended in failure. When
Russian troops were about to occupy the Grand-Duchy of Warsaw, Czartoryski
asked the Tsar if he now intended to return to his former projects concerning Po-
land.⁴⁰ Alexander replied that he had not departed from his former convictions
but added that a number of difficulties had to be overcome before his ideas
could be put into practice. Since the Poles had invaded Russia in Napoleon’s
company the readiness to restore former Polish territory had declined in his
country. In addition, if he announced the restoration of Poland he would drive
Austria and Prussia into the French camp at the very moment when after the fail-
 Ibid., 526–528.
 Ogiński, “Projet d’oukase sur l‘organisation du grand-duché de Lithuanie, 10/12 October
1811,” ibid., 531–532.
 Id., Mémoire, 19 November/1 December 1811, ibid., 538–540.
 Réponse verbale de l’empereur Alexandre Ier, 15 December 1811, ibid., 540–541.
 Le prince Adam Czartoryski à l’empereur, 6 December 1812, in: Czartoryski, Mémoires, vol. 2,
297.
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ure of the Grande Armée he could hope to persuade them to leave the Napoleon-
ic alliance.⁴¹ Since Alexander was determined to pursue Napoleon all the way to
Paris he was obliged to win over on his side the two German great powers and to
offer them something in exchange. Since Napoleon had not been defeated yet a
change of alliances was not without risks for the two powers. In this situation the
interests of the Polish patriots had to be set aside. Through the treaty of alliance
of Kalisz and Breslau he concluded with King Frederick William III of Prussia at
the end of February 1813, the Tsar promised to the Prussian King the restoration
of part of the former Polish territories he had ceded in the peace of Tilsit. In the
second of the secret articles he inserted an express guarantee of the preservation
of East Prussia including an area that would connect this province with Silesia.⁴²
Since 1807 this area belonged to the Duchy of Warsaw. By these promises the
Tsar succeeded in winning the Prussian King from the French alliance over on
his side in the war against Napoleon. It follows that a complete restoration of
the ancient Polish Rzeczpospolita conflicted even in the eyes of the Tsar with
overall European interests. Notwithstanding the Russian concessions to Prussia
Czartoryski did not abandon his hopes that Alexander would abide by his plans
of giving birth to a greater Polish state including at least the remaining parts of
Polish territory and the Western governments of Russia.⁴³
But even against this project resistance was growing among the elites of the
Empire, even in the very entourage of the Tsar. One of his closest confidants, Karl
Robert von Nesselrode, in early 1813 opposed Czartoryski’s proposals in a mem-
orandum for Alexander.⁴⁴ He reminded the Tsar that ever since 1805 the Russian
government had always offered to the Poles its help for the recovery of the lost
provinces when in exchange it could expect Polish support in the war against
France. The last offer of this kind had been made towards the end of 1810. If Po-
land had consented Russia could have enlarged her forces by 40.000 men and
secured her routes of communication with Germany and France. However, the
restoration of Poland had always been looked upon from the angle of Russian
interests, not as an objective in itself. Today there was nothing left to gain for
Russia in Poland. The army of the Duchy of Warsaw had been reduced to
8.000 men, the treasury was heavily indebted. The restoration of ancient Poland
would drive Austria on Napoleon’s side and Russia would lose valuable provin-
 L’empereur au prince Adam Czartoryski, 13 January 1813, ibid., 303–304.
 Traité de paix, d’amitié et d’alliance conclu entre la Russie et la Prusse, à Kalisch, le 16/
28 février, et à Breslau le 27 février 1813, in: Martens, Nouveau Recueil, vol. 3, 237–238.
 Le prince Adam Czartoryski à l’empereur, 23 April/4 May 1813, in: Czartoryski, Mémoires,
vol. 2, 309–315; id. to id., 27 April 1813, ibid., 315–325.
 For the date see Zawadzki, Man, 214, n. 20.
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ces. Even if at first they lived under the same monarch, Poland would make every
effort to obtain complete independence. The tsar could not be expected to recon-
cile the roles of an autocrat in Russia and a constitutional king in Poland. Nes-
selrode’s last argument against the restoration of Poland was the “extreme re-
pugnance” every Russian would feel. The nation had “declared itself strongly
opposed to the restoration of Poland.” Its sacrifices had decisively contributed
to the defeat of Napoleon by the Tsar. Therefore it would be “neither just nor
wise” to disregard its opinions. The nation would consider the restoration of Po-
land as “a reward” precisely of those provinces of the Empire “that deserved it
the least,” and an award for those among Napoleons auxiliaries who “during the
invasion had committed worse acts of cruelty and barbarism than the French
themselves.”⁴⁵
In a memorandum of 20 October 1814 another advisor of the Tsar, the Corsi-
can count Carlo Andrea Pozzo di Borgo, argued similarly.⁴⁶ He warned against
renouncing the Western governments the acquisition of which had been recog-
nized by all countries. Pozzo di Borgo also thought that the title of constitutional
King of Poland was incompatible with the title of Emperor and autocrat of all the
Russians. The Russians who were conscious of their force and power would be
condemned “to an existence without freedom”; the “weak and humiliated”
Poles, however, would be permitted “to govern themselves in liberty.”⁴⁷ In a
memorandum of 6 October 1814 Freiherr vom Stein also warned of the unavoid-
able conflicts between despotic Russia and constitutional Poland. The Poles
under Russian dominion would try to attain full independence and the Poles
in Austria and Prussia would strive towards union with the remaining parts of
their nation.⁴⁸
The opposition to Alexander’s plans of Polish restoration referred in the first
place to the separation from Russia of the eight “Western governments,” an-
nexed by Catherine II, whereas the future of the Grand-Duchy of Warsaw aroused
much less criticism at court. This part of Poland had never belonged to Russia.
Therefore the Empire would not suffer a loss if it was transformed into a separate
 Copie du mémoire remis à l’empereur Alexandre Ier par le comte Ch. de Nesselrode en 1812 à
la suite d’une communication du prince Czartoryski, envoyée de Galicie, et demandant le réta-
blissement de la Pologne, in: A. de Nesselrode, ed., Lettres et papiers du chancelier comte de
Nesselrode 1760– 1850. Extrait de ses archives, vol. 4: 1812 (Paris: Lahure, 1905), 313–20, 319.
 Zapiska predstavlennaja imperatoru g-nom Pocco di Borgo, in: Nikolaj Turgenev, Rossija i
russkie, translated from the French by S. V. Žitomirskij (Moscow 2001), 493–500.
 Ibid., 496.
 Denkschrift Steins, 6 October 1814, in: Karl vom Stein, Briefe und amtliche Schriften, vol. 5,
new ed. by Manfred Botzenhart (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer 1964), 158– 159.
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Kingdom. Though his advisers prevailed on him seriously to envisage this re-
stricted solution of the Polish question it appears that Alexander at first did
not take it into consideration. When in October 1814 he arrived at the great con-
gress of the powers at Vienna which was supposed to reorder Europe, he persis-
tently pursued his original plans to unite the Grand-Duchy of Warsaw with the
Western governments of the Russian Empire to form a Polish Kingdom under
his rule. On 2 October 1814 the British Foreign Secretary Castlereagh reported
to Prime Minister Liverpool from Vienna a conversation of two and a half
hours with Alexander and his futile attempts to dissuade the Tsar from these
plans.⁴⁹ In a detailed memorandum to Alexander he after the meeting explained
once more the reasons of his opposition to the Russian ideas. Before all he point-
ed to the menace the new expansion of Russia towards the West would involve
for Central Europe and especially for the two German great powers. The pro-
posed frontier was militarily untenable and would for this reason alone under-
mine the hopes of a durable peace settlement on the continent.⁵⁰ At last the
Tsar gave in. The final act of the congress provided only for the restricted solu-
tion of the Polish question.With the exception of a number of enumerated border
provinces and of the district of Cracow the Grand-Duchy of Warsaw was for all
times “united to the Russian Empire.” The Tsar added to his other titles the dig-
nity of a “King of Poland.” The opposition the Tsar had a long time put up
against this solution is reflected in the regulation that the Tsar “reserved to him-
self the right to give to this state which possessed an administration of its own,
the interior extension he deemed appropriate.”⁵¹ The wording left room to expect
that the Tsar would in due course revert to his plans for the restoration of Poland
in its original extension.
The constitution of the Kingdom of Poland was proclaimed on 27 November
1815.⁵² It was an imposed constitution and resembled in many respects the
French Charte constitutionnelle of 4 June 1814. As in France the ruler’s posses-
sion of undivided sovereignty is not prescribed by the constitution but implied.
Accordingly article 4 states that the purpose of the constitution is the definition
 Castlereagh to Liverpool, 2 October 1814, in: Charles K.Webster, ed., British Diplomacy 1813–
1815 (London: Bell, 1921), 197–99.
 Memorandum de Lord Castlereagh, au sujet des traités entre les alliés relatifs au duché de
Varsovie, 4 October 1814, in: Comte d’Angeberg, ed., Le congrès de Vienne et les traités de 1815,
précédé et suivi des actes diplomatiques qui s’y rattachent, vol. 1 (Paris: Amyot, 1863), 265–270.
 Acte final du Congrès de Vienne, Art. 1, in: Angeberg, Congrès, vol. 2, 1389: “S. M. Impériale
se réserve de donner à cet État, jouissant d’une administration distincte, l’extension intérieure
qu’elle jugera convenable.”
 Charte constitutionnelle du royaume de Pologne de 1815, Varsovie, le 15/27 novembre 1815,
in: Angeberg, Recueil Pologne, 707–24.
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of “the kind” and “the principle” of the “exercise of sovereignty.” The article
thus reflects the distinction between possession and exercise of the supreme
power, characteristic of the monarchical principle. Article 31 provides for the for-
mation of a national representation (reprezentacja narodowa) in a Sejm which
was to consist of the King and two chambers, the chamber of deputies (Izba pos-
elska) and the Senate (Senat). The lower chamber is composed of 77 deputies to
be delegated by the provincial assemblies of the aristocracy, and of 51 delegates
of the towns (Article 118). The number of Senators must not exceed one half of
the number of deputies (Article 109). The right to vote depends on the payment
of 100 złoty of taxes per year. The minimum age of a deputy is fixed at 30 years
(Article 121). By these provisions approximately 100.000 citizens were given the
right to vote, a remarkable number if one takes into consideration that in con-
temporary France with a population of ten times the size, only 80.000 citizens
were enfranchised.⁵³ Article 86 attributes the legislative power to the King and
the two chambers. The right to initiate law is reserved to the monarch alone (Ar-
ticles 90, 94). There is no mention of a right of the chambers to petition the King
for the introduction of a bill as in articles 19 to 21 of the French Charte. The Sejm
assembles every two years in Warsaw (Article 87). In addition the King is empow-
ered to summon extraordinary diets (Article 88). Under the heading of general
guarantees (zaręczenia ogólne) in the articles 11 to 34 the constitution contained
a catalogue of fundamental rights, among them the freedom of religion (Article
11), the liberty of the press (Article 16), the equality before the law (Article 17), the
principle of habeas corpus (Articles 20 and 21), the right of property (Article 26),
and the use of the Polish language in the public administration, at court, and in
the army (Article 28). Article 29 states that only Poles were admitted in the public
service.
A unique provision of the constitution of Congress Poland in comparison to
other constitutions of the period is the connection of the Kingdom with Russia.
The first article stated: “The Kingdom of Poland is forever connected with the
Russian Empire” (Królestwo Polskie jest na zawsze połączone z Cesarstwem Rosyj-
skiem).⁵⁴ Conferring the dignities of Emperor of Russia and of King of Poland
upon the same person made it imperative to appoint a viceroy in the Kingdom
 Angela T. Pienkos, The Imperfect Autocrat. Grand Duke Constantine Pavlovich and the Polish
Congress Kingdom (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987), 30.
 Charte constitutionnelle du royaume de Pologne, Art. 1, 707: “Le royaume de Pologne est à
jamais réuni à l’empire de Russie”; see also Acte final du Congrès de Vienne, Art. 1: “Le duché de
Varsovie […] est réuni à l’Empire de Russie. Il y sera lié irrévocablement par sa constitution, pour
être possédé par S. M. l’empereur de toutes les Russies, ses héritiers et ses successeurs à perpé-
tuité.”
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of Poland. The right of appointment belonged to the King. The viceroy was ob-
liged to take residence in the Kingdom and possess Polish citizenship, unless
he was a member of the imperial family (Articles 5 and 6). Tsar Alexander ap-
pointed viceroy general Zajączek, not, as many had expected, prince Czartoryski.
The Russian Empire itself remained without constitution. Unlike Louis XVIII and
Charles X, his successor on the French throne, Alexander’s political existence
did not depend on the consensus of the population of the Kingdom of Poland.
As long as his position as autocrat of the Russian Empire remained undisputed,
the Tsar remained at any time in the position to suppress eventual Polish resist-
ance with the overwhelming military power of Russia, as in the course of the
century was to be demonstrated by the suppression of the November uprising
of 1830 and the January revolt of 1863. For this reason Congress Poland was
placed under special conditions, different from other constitutional states of
the period. In fact constitutional practice soon demonstrated that the foreign
King did not make great efforts to meet the aspirations of the citizens.⁵⁵
At the very beginning of his reign the King and Tsar provoked the citizens by
two appointments. At first he appointed his brutal and undisciplined brother,
Grand-Duke Constantine, supreme commander of the Polish army. In numerous
letters to the Tsar Czartoryski lamented Constantine’s repeated illegal conduct.
In the spring of 1816 he reported an incident when the Grand-Duke illegally
acted as judge of a citizen, and added that acts of this kind destroyed “public
security” and “annihilated” all benefits of the Tsar. He appealed to the Tsar to
remove Constantine.⁵⁶ A few weeks later Czartoryski wrote that Constantine’s
conduct obstructed the beneficial policies of the Tsar in Poland and prevented
them from bearing fruit as he had hoped.⁵⁷ This was a devastating assessment
of Alexander’s constitutional policies in Poland. His second provocation was
the appointment of Nikolaj N. Novosil’cev as his “delegate and plenipotentiary”
in Poland.⁵⁸ During the following 15 years Novosil’cev intervened at liberty in all
sections of the interior administration of the Kingdom and thereby gained con-
siderable influence. His position had not been provided for in the constitution
and clearly contradicted its article 29 which stated that the public service was
reserved to Poles alone.
 Frank W. Thackeray, Antecedents of Revolution: Alexander I and the Polish Kingdom, 1815–
1825 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980), 21: “In fact, the constitution was breached
in substance and spirit even before its promulgation.”
 Czartoryski to Tsar Alexander, 24 March/5 April 1816, in: id., Mémoires, vol.2, 358.
 Czartoryski to Tsar Alexander, 1/13 May 1816, ibid., 366.
 Thackeray, Antecedents, 26
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Formally, the imposition of the Charte constitutionnelle for Poland resem-
bled the impositions in other monarchies of the continent in the course of the
century. It was different, however, in that the imposing monarch was a foreign
conqueror. The purpose of the imposition was, as everywhere, restoration in
the sense of an enduring consolidation of monarchical rule. However, in the Pol-
ish case the restoration did not concern an ancient monarchy that had become
fragile. Instead it aimed at the acquisition of consent on the part of the citizens
to a recent military conquest which at the congress of Vienna had obtained the
sanction of the law of nations. Alexander believed that the government of a new
ruler could be stabilized by a constitution and that in this way peace would be
secured as well.⁵⁹ By the same method Napoleon had already tried everywhere in
Europe to render his conquests permanent. In Poland he had, as has been
shown, in 1807 and 1809 founded the Grand-Duchy of Warsaw and provided it
with a constitution. An essential difference between the restorations in France
and in Poland is to be seen in the fact that in Poland the Tsar not only restored
the monarchy, but accorded the nation a new Polish state with a Polish name,
after an interruption of twenty years. He was a foreign sovereign belonging to
a foreign dynasty, to be sure, but this disadvantage was doubly offset by consti-
tutional law and through national policy, and the citizens of Poland had twofold
reason to put their trust in the new ruler. Admittedly the national legitimacy of
the new Kingdom depended, for the time being, more on the vague hopes of the
citizens than on the actual fulfillment of their aspirations which extended far be-
yond the borders of the Kingdom.
The correspondence between Tsar Alexander and prince Czartoryski that fol-
lowed Napoleon’s debacle in Russia reveals how between Napoleon and
Alexander a downright competition had arisen for the most efficient concept
of restoration and for the consent of the citizens of the Kingdom. From the be-
ginning a twofold objective was at the center of all considerations: the creation
of a separate state and the concession of a constitution. At the bottom of this
competition was the struggle for power on the continent. If, however, restoration
is tied so narrowly to actual requirements of power politics, the sincerity of a
concession may appear doubtful. Louis XVIII had in 1814 acted from the insight
that if the Bourbon monarchy wanted once more to take root in France, he had to
meet the expectations of the nation as they had developed during the Revolution
and under Napoleon. His brother and successor Charles X did not respect this
 Janet M. Hartley, “The ‘Constitutions’ of Finland and Poland in the Reign of Alexander I:
Blueprints for Reform in Russia?”, in: Michael Branch, Janet Hartley, and Antoni Mączak,
eds., Finland and Poland in the Russian Empire. A Comparative Study (London: School of Slavon-
ic and East European Studies, University of London, 1995), 49.
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requirement. The consequence was the fall of the regime only six years after his
accession to the throne. If the Tsar had given to the Poles a liberal constitution
only because he had to outmatch Napoleon in order to win over the Poles, his
generosity would certainly have declined as soon as Napoleon was overthrown.
From a constitutional point of view Alexander’s persistent search for a great-
er Polish solution was consistent. If the imposition of a liberal constitution
should permanently reconcile the subjects of the Kingdom with their foreign
ruler the whole nation had to partake of its benefits as in France in 1814 and
in Spain in 1834 and not only a segment of the nation which had been carved
out of the whole more or less arbitrarily by the vicissitudes of European
power politics. The connection of the new Polish state with the Russian Empire
by personal union was a source of distrust on all sides.Whereas Metternich and
Castlereagh saw in the creation of the Kingdom of Poland nothing but the veiling
of the factual Western expansion of the Russian Empire, the Russian opponents
of a greater Polish solution were afraid that the unification of the Western gov-
ernments with the new Kingdom of Poland would only be the first step towards
their separation from Russia.
At first sight it may have appeared strange to place the imposition of the Pol-
ish constitution on the same level as the imposition of the Charte constitution-
nelle in France, since the Kingdom of Poland of 1815 was a new creation and
the Houses Romanov had never before occupied the Polish throne. Nevertheless,
the Polish constitution was imposed no less than the French one with a view to
stabilizing a monarchy the future of which appeared uncertain in the face of the
revolutionary menace. In this sense here as elsewhere an attempt was made to
restore monarchical legitimacy.
In 1825 Alexander I unexpectedly died in Taganrog on the Sea of Azov. His
brother and successor Nicholas I at first retained the Polish constitution but was
unable to gain the confidence of the citizens of the Kingdom. The revolutions of
1830 in France and in Belgium extended to East-Central Europe. On 29 November
an uprising occurred in Warsaw, and on 25 January 1831 the Sejm deposed King
Nicholas. On 30 January Adam Czartoryski was elected president of a national
government. By law of 8 February Poland was again defined as a constitutional
monarchy and the Sejm was obliged soon to elect a new King.⁶⁰ But the Russian
government refused to release the Kingdom of Poland into independence. In
September 1831 Warsaw surrendered. The constitution of 1815 was abolished
and former Congress Poland became part of the Russian Empire.
 Wandycz, Lands, 105–109; Zawadzki, Man, 300–307.
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Germany 1818– 1848
In the person of Louis XVIII the dynasty returned to France which had governed
the country since the 16th century. Through the peace of Paris of May 1814 the
great powers confirmed the territorial extension the monarchy had possessed
at its fall in 1792. The King himself emphasized the uninterrupted existence of
the monarchy since Saint-Louis, and Jacques-Claude Beugnot equated the impo-
sition of the Charte constitutionnelle with the bestowal of privileges by the French
Kings of the Middle Ages. As to the restoration in Germany the contemporaries
could scarcely have found adequate parallels in history and only in a small num-
ber of cases was there a question of reinstatement of dynasties. There had been
no revolution and if monarchies had disappeared, it was due to the influence of
Napoleon and was carried through by way of international treaties and Imperial
legislation. The imposition of constitutions since 1814 served to consolidate mo-
narchies which in many cases had greatly expanded at the Napoleonic period. To
the majority of the citizens of Baden, for example, Grand Duke Charles Frederick
was a new monarch. The same is true for a great many citizens of Bavaria and
Württemberg and their rulers. The inhabitants of the former ecclesiastical terri-
tories on the Rhine were, in one blow, transformed into subjects of the protestant
house of Hohenzollern. In the German states restoration aimed less at a return to
the past than at the consolidation of divine right monarchy in the present. Not-
withstanding the undeniable attempts at ceremonial and ideological revival of
historical memories the policy of restoration sought in the first place to meet
the requirements of the future. After the fall of Napoleon, Europe was in need
of political stability and of securities against a continuation of war and revolu-
tion. A policy of restoration in this sense was pursued not only by ancient dynas-
ties, but in new monarchies and under new dynasties as well.
Germany resembled France in that the age of Napoleon was followed by an
era of monarchical constitutionalism. Whereas during the early modern period
France had developed into a centralized monarchy with the royal court at its
summit, the German Empire at the outbreak of the French Revolution was frag-
mented into a great number of single territories.¹ On the European stage the Ger-
man Emperor’s standing was based exclusively on the power he derived from the
lands of his crown. Within the Empire itself his influence was limited. At the
hands of Napoleon between 1801 and 1806 the territorial fragmentation of the
Empire was reduced to approximately forty units, both by the secularization of
 Ingo Knecht, Der Reichsdeputationshauptschluß vom 25. Februar 1803. Rechtmäßigkeit, Rechts-
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the ecclesiastical and by the mediatization of many small and medium-sized sec-
ular estates. The ecclesiastical estates, the knighthoods and almost the totality of
the numerous Imperial cities, not mentioning a great number of principalities
and counties, were annexed by their more powerful neighbours. This far-reach-
ing transformation of Germany had originated from the cession in 1801 of the left
bank of the Rhine to France through the peace treaty of Lunéville. Under article
seven of this treaty the Empire was obliged to indemnify those hereditary princes
on the right bank of the Rhine whose territories had been located in part or as a
whole to the left of the Rhine. In preparation of the indemnification process the
Imperial Diet of Regensburg formed a Reichsdeputation, a committee composed
of plenipotentiaries of several Imperial estates. The committee based its deliber-
ations on a comprehensive outline which France and Russia had agreed upon
beforehand. On 25 February 1803 the committee voted a draught resolution for
the Diet. This draught resolution (Reichsdeputationshauptschluß) was adopted
by the Diet as a fundamental law of the Empire (Reichsgrundgesetz) on 24
March.² The territorial shifts provided for by the law went far beyond the neces-
sities of indemnifying. The secular territories located west of the Rhine the ces-
sion of which to France entitled to indemnities, comprised 463 square miles. The
ecclesiastical territories east of the Rhine which were subject to secularization
with only one exception, comprised as many as 1.131 square miles.³ Even if
only ecclesiastical territories had been used for indemnification, the greater
part of them could have been preserved. The mediatization of the 41 imperial cit-
ies east of the Rhine, as prescribed by paragraph 27 of the Reichs-
deputationshauptschluß, could well have been left undone. This shows that
the principle of indemnification was only a pretext for a general restructuring
of Central Europe. Similarly, the arbitrary annexation of the Imperial knights’ ter-
ritories by their neighbors in the following years and the mediatization of numer-
ous principalities and counties by the peace treaty of Preßburg of 1805 and the
Act of the Confederation of the Rhine (Rheinbundakte) of 1806 exclusively sprang
from the political interests of the French Empire and the expansionist tendencies
of many German princes. In the course of the territorial reorganization of Germa-
ny a great many of them not only were accorded considerable territorial accre-
tions but also an upgrading of ranks. In Southern Germany the Elector of Bavaria
and the Duke of Württemberg were promoted to the rank of Kings and the Mar-
grave of Baden was made a Grand Duke. In the course of these developments the
 Ibid., 50, 109; the text in: Ernst Rudolf Huber, ed., Dokumente zur deutschen Verfassungsge-
schichte, vol. 1, 3rd ed. (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1978), 1–28.
 Knecht, Reichsdeputationshauptschluß, 190.
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German princes became partisans of Napoleon because it was to him that they
owed the unprecedented growth of power and status. Napoleon alone could
guarantee their new dignities and the permanent possession of their territorial
acquisitions in the face of the great powers. The Empire itself succumbed in
this process. On 6 August 1806 Emperor Francis II deposed the Imperial crown
and thereby formally dissolved the Empire, after he had already in 1804, contrary
to Imperial law, arbitrarily adopted the dignity of Emperor of Austria. For two
years he had simultaneously possessed two Imperial crowns – the ancient Ger-
man and the new Austrian one. By the dissolution of the Empire the former Im-
perial estates were turned into sovereign states.
After the fall of Napoleon in April 1814 the German Empire was not restored.
The German princes clung to their only recently acquired sovereignty and re-
fused to renounce their territorial acquisitions. In the interest of their external
security and of the general peace in Europe the German states were bound to-
gether in the German Confederation (Deutscher Bund). Between the congress
of Vienna and the outbreak of the revolution of 1848 in all German states with
the exception of Austria and Prussia constitutions were imposed. Only in Würt-
temberg the constitution of 1819 was the result of a convention between King and
diet. Nevertheless, here as well, the King claimed unlimited sovereignty for the
crown. According to § 4 of the constitution of Württemberg the King “united
in himself full public power” and “exercised it in accordance with the constitu-
tion.”⁴ Prussia and Austria received constitutions only in the revolution of 1848
and 1849. The Austrian emperor Francis Joseph, however, repealed the constitu-
tion he had imposed under the pressure of revolution, as early as 1851.
As in France in 1814 constitutions were imposed in Germany with a view to
consolidating divine right monarchy. But the circumstances were different. The
German states had never before possessed modern representative constitutions
and unlike the Bourbons of France no German dynasty had been deposed in a
revolution. Nevertheless, in the German states as well the imposition of consti-
tutions was a compromise between monarch and subject. In the course of the
territorial restructuring of Germany and the far-reaching reforms of the Napo-
leonic period many ancient rights had been violated and almost all those insti-
tutions had disappeared upon which in the Holy Roman Empire security and lib-
erty of the subjects had depended. The intermediate powers which to
Montesquieu had been the safe-guards of liberty in a monarchy had largely
been abolished. By the recent reforms the German princes had gained a degree
 Verfassungsurkunde für das Königreich Württemberg vom 25. September 1819, in: Huber, Do-
kumente, vol. 1, 188.
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of power without precedent, all the more so since with the Imperial Privy Council
(Reichshofrat), the Imperial Chamber Court (Reichskammergericht), and the Em-
peror himself all those institutions had disappeared to which in the Ancien Ré-
gime citizens and estates could appeal against their superiors. The most vehe-
ment criticism of the despotism of the member princes of the Confederation of
the Rhine was pronounced by Karl Freiherr vom Stein who in 1812 had entered
the service of Tsar Alexander. He demanded that after the banishment of Napo-
leon in the German states be restored a state of things which granted to the sin-
gle citizen “the safety of his person and his property.”⁵ The guarantors were to be
the territorial estates (Landstände). Stein demanded that in the course of the re-
organization of Germany estates should be introduced in every state.⁶ From the
experience of 1789 Stein had learned the lesson that political suppression sooner
or later ends up in revolution. Therefore Bernd Wunder identified his call for a
state under the rule of law (Rechtsstaat) to protect the subjects from arbitrary
power, as “part of an antirevolutionary policy of restoration.”⁷ Stein was not
alone in arguing along these lines. The envoy of Hesse-Darmstadt, Türckheim,
reported on 21 September from Vienna, “the general tendency” at the congress
was the conviction “that it was imperative to provide for the liberty of the Ger-
man citizen and for security against arbitrary power and in this way effectively
to prevent future revolutions.”⁸ Accordingly into the German Federal Act (Deut-
sche Bundesakte) was inserted article 13 which obliged every member state to in-
troduce a constitution providing for “territorial estates” (landständische Verfas-
sungen).⁹
Estates had existed in most territories of the ancient Empire. But Stein did
not propose the restoration of the historical bodies. Such an attempt would
have met with a number of difficulties. In states which at the time of Napoleon
had expanded through annexation of neighboring territories the estates would
have to be created anew with a competence for the enlarged state as a whole.
In territories that had never possessed estates, they would have to be introduced
for the first time. Unlike the estates of the Old Regime all estates should from
now on be given not an imperative but a free mandate. It follows that for a vari-
 Karl vom Stein, “Verfassungsdenkschrift,” Prague, end of August 1813, in: idem, Briefe und
amtliche Schriften, vol. 4, new edition by Walther Hubatsch (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1963), 239.
 Bernd Wunder, “Landstände und Rechtsstaat. Zur Entstehung und Verwirklichung des Art. 13
DBA,” Zeitschrift für Historische Forschung 5 (1978), 144– 150.
 Ibid., 153.
 Quoted from ibid., 161.
 “Deutsche Bundesakte,” 8 June 1815, art. 13, in: Huber, Dokumente, vol. 1, 88: “In every federal
state a territorial constitution will take place.”
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ety of reasons article 13 of the German Federal Act of 1815 did not aim at the re-
turn to the institutions of the ancient Empire. Not in this sense it was meant to
promote restoration, but by stabilizing the German monarchies and in this way
rendering them secure from future revolutions. If by restoration something had
to be confirmed, it was divine right monarchy regardless whether a monarch had
governed his present territory already before the Revolution or not.
By inserting article 13 in the Federal Act and the Federal Act in the Final Act
of the congress of Vienna the policy of restoration was made a concern of Europe
as a whole. The same objective is already visible in the second peace treaty of
Paris of 1815 in which the great powers obliged Louis XVIII to stabilize “the hap-
pily restored political order in France” by preserving royal authority” and by “re-
storing the Charte constitutionnelle.”¹⁰ After his return from the island of Elba,
Napoleon had replaced the charte by the Acte additionnel aux constitutions de
l’Empire.
The constitutional history of Germany between the fall of Napoleon and the
revolution of 1848 may be studied by way of example in Bavaria, Württemberg,
and Baden. In these three South German states constitutions were introduced
only a few years after the congress of Vienna. As far as the two German great
powers are concerned special attention is due to Prussia, since the constitution
which had been imposed in the revolution of 1848 was afterwards revised, it is
true, but not abrogated again as in Austria.
Unlike many other estates of the former German Empire the Electorate of Ba-
varia, the Duchy of Württemberg, and the Margraviate of Baden were preserved
from annihilation in the age of Napoleon. They formed part of the so-called Third
Germany, that is to say, of Germany other than the great powers Austria and
Prussia. However, they were transformed to a degree that to all intents and pur-
poses they were founded anew. The annexation of neighboring ecclesiastical and
secular dominions, Imperial knighthoods, and Imperial cities bestowed upon
them enormous accretions of territory. The reforms of the Napoleonic period
aimed essentially at integrating the new provinces and subjects into the enlarged
states. In July 1806 the new Kingdoms of Württemberg and Bavaria, the Grand
Duchy of Baden, and the remaining small and medium-sized states the existence
of which had been preserved by Napoleon, were bound together to form the Con-
federation of the Rhine (Rheinbund). Simultaneously they resigned membership
in the German Empire.
 Second Peace of Paris, 20 November 1815, in: Comte d’Angeberg (Leonard Jakob Borejko
Chod’zko), ed., Le congrès de Vienne et les traités de 1815, vol. 2 (Paris: Amyot, 1863), 1596; Vol-
ker Sellin, Die geraubte Revolution. Der Sturz Napoleons und die Restauration in Europa (Göttin-
gen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2001), 285–286.
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Government in the member states of the Confederation of the Rhine was cen-
tralized, modern, efficient, and practically unlimited. Doubtful was its legitima-
cy. Both the destruction of the German Empire and the expansion and restructur-
ing of the single states were the result of violent and unlawful usurpations. For
the time being Napoleon watched over the maintenance of the new political sys-
tem.When his power began to decline the member princes of the Confederation
became afraid that they would have to return at least part of their acquisitions.
In order to avoid this eventuality they entered into negotiations with the powers
of the anti-Napoleonic coalition asking for a guarantee of their possessions. King
Maximilian of Bavaria took the lead. On 8 October 1813 he concluded the treaty
of Ried with Austria. Other treaties between Austria and the medium-sized Ger-
man states followed. As long as France had not been defeated the Austrian for-
eign minister Clemens Metternich deemed it more important to win over Napo-
leon’s German allies than to contest their acquisitions. This did not prevent the
victims of the political reorganization of Germany from fighting for the recovery
of their former rights as before. As late as the congress of Vienna the princes who
had once been directly subject to the Empire and had since by force been sub-
jected to a more powerful neighbor, tried to recover at least a certain measure
of independence. Conflicts arose also when territories subject to mediatization
were claimed by more than one neighboring prince. Long after the congress of
Vienna the King of Bavaria continued to claim the territories of the former Elec-
torate Palatine located east of the Rhine including Heidelberg and Mannheim. In
1802 they had been accorded to the Grand Duke of Baden. The vast and to a great
extent arbitrary territorial reorganization of the period impaired, in the eyes of
many contemporary observers, the binding force of existing sovereign rights.
In several territories of the Empire the governing personnel had changed more
than once during the period. A telling example is the prince-bishopric of Salz-
burg. In 1803 it was secularized and became a principality. In 1805 it was handed
over to Austria. In 1810 it became part of Bavaria and in 1816 it was again accord-
ed to Austria. The bishopric of Würzburg was likewise secularized in 1803 and
handed over to the Elector of Bavaria. In 1806 it gained independence under
the government of Grand Duke Ferdinand of Tuscany of the house of Habs-
burg-Lorraine. In 1814 it was again handed over to Bavaria. The Breisgau and
Freiburg were in 1803 accorded to the Duke of Modena. Two years later the ter-
ritory was given to the Grand Duke of Baden. There were many more cases of this
kind. It is easy to figure out the consequences that these repeated changes of
government must have had on the legitimacy of power. The largest coherent ter-
ritory to be distributed anew after the fall of Napoleon was the left bank of the
Rhine. By the first peace of Paris of 30 May 1814 Louis XVIII had returned it to
Germany after 20 years. Since the secular princes who had resided there before
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the revolutionary wars, had been indemnified by the Reichsdeputationshaupt-
schluß, and since the ecclesiastical states had been secularized in the whole
of the Empire, there was nobody left who could of right have put in a claim
on these territories. The impression that the abandonment of such a vast territory
made on the contemporaries, is revealed by a private letter of the former Jacobin
and actual judge at the court of appeal at Kaiserslautern Andreas Georg Friedrich
Rebmann of 4 September 1815:
“The gods know if and when our souls in this country will be transferred to Baden, to
Darmstadt, to Prussia, or to Austria. If only we remain together and are not subjected to
a miniature prince, we might tolerate everything, but unfortunately it is all too probable,
that on the Donnersberg not eagles, but crows and magpies make their nests, and that
our souls will be used as tokens for balancing and filling up.”¹¹
In order to restore and strengthen the bonds between sovereigns and subjects,
adequate strategies of legitimation had to be implemented. In the course of
French imperial expansion Napoleon himself had been confronted with the
task of gaining assent among the new subjects and of winning political legitima-
cy on foreign soil. He put his trust on constitution-making and on the Code civil.
In Germany he employed this method for the first time in 1807 after the peace of
Tilsit in the Kingdom of Westphalia which he had artificially composed of Prus-
sian and other territories such as the Landgraviate of Hessen-Kassel and the
Principality of Braunschweig-Wolfenbüttel. Appointed King of Westphalia was
his younger brother Jérôme. Napoleon’s methods of winning legitimacy are re-
vealed in a letter of 15 November 1807 by which he transmitted to Jérôme a con-
stitution for the new Kingdom. He reminded his brother that there was no safety
for his throne but “the trust and the love of the population.” Trust and love, how-
ever, he would only obtain by securing freedom and the rule of law as promised
in the constitution. Once the former Prussian subjects in the Kingdom of West-
phalia enjoyed the benefits of a wise and liberal government, they would
never want to return under the arbitrary regime they had abandoned.¹² One
 Rebmann to Hermes, Kaiserslautern, 4 September 1815, in: Günther Volz (ed.), “Briefe An-
dreas Georg Friedrich Rebmanns an Johann Peter Job Hermes aus den Jahren 1815 und 1816,”
Mitteilungen des Historischen Vereins der Pfalz 57 (1959), 178; Volker Sellin, “’Heute ist die Rev-
olution monarchisch’. Legitimität und Legitimierungspolitik im Zeitalter des Wiener Kongress-
es,” Quellen und Forschungen aus italienischen Archiven und Bibliotheken 76 (1996), 348; idem,
Gewalt und Legitimität. Die europäische Monarchie im Zeitalter der Revolutionen (Munich: Olden-
bourg 2011), 210–211.
 Napoléon Bonaparte to Jérôme Bonaparte, 15 November 1807, in: Napoléon Ier, Correspond-
ance, vol. 16, Paris 1864, no. 13361, 166; a survey of the history of the Kingdom of Westphalia
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year later, under the pressure of Napoleon, Bavaria also received a constitution
which, however, was never put into practice.
Among the most important addressees of Napoleon’s policy of legitimization
were the Standesherren. By the Act of the Confederation of the Rhine of 1806 the
former imperial princes and counts who under the Ancien Régime had known no
superior but the Emperor, were subjected to the middle-sized states which had
been enlarged in 1803. They only reluctantly resigned themselves to the subjec-
tion to other princes who were their equals in rank. In a petition directed to King
Frederick I in the spring of 1816 the Standesherren of Württemberg argued that
they had never assented to the Act of the Confederation of the Rhine. Therefore
they had been incorporated into the Kingdom of Württemberg only in fact, not of
right. After the dissolution of the Confederation in 1813 they had ipso facto re-
turned to their previous legal situation. Since, however, the German Empire
had ceased to exist they had by now attained full sovereignty.¹³ The King of
Württemberg did not agree. But like the other German princes he sought to com-
pensate the Standesherren for the loss of their legal position under the ancient
Empire by granting special privileges to them. These privileges were inserted in
the constitutions that were imposed one after the other during the period follow-
ing the congress of Vienna. The policy of satisfying the Standesherren shows that
one of the purposes of the early German constitutions was compensating for the
loss of ancient political rights. The most important concession by the recently
created sovereigns was the paragraph, as may be exemplified by the constitution
of Bavaria (title VI, § 2, no. 4), that to “the heads of families of former Imperial
princes and counts was granted” a seat and a vote in the First Chamber. In Baden
as well the heads of the families of the Standesherren were made hereditary
members of the Upper Chamber (§ 27, no. 2). In Württemberg the First Chamber
was precisely named “Chamber of the Standesherren” (§ 129). At least some of
the Standesherren acknowledged these privileges as a compensation for the
loss of former political rights. This is demonstrated by Leo von Klenze’s consti-
tution column (Konstitutionssäule) that Franz Erwein count of Schönborn-Wie-
sentheid who had been forced by the Act of the Confederation of the Rhine to
cede his sovereign rights to the King of Bavaria, had erected between 1821 and
is offered in Owen Connelly, Napoleon’s Satellite Kingdoms (New York: The Free Press/London:
Macmillan, 1965), 176–222.
 Joachim Gerner, Vorgeschichte und Entstehung der württembergischen Verfassung im Spiegel
der Quellen (1815– 1819) (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1989), 336.
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1828 near Gaibach in the lower Main district for the glory of the Bavarian consti-
tution.¹⁴
Accumulation and division of territories had occurred in Germany already
under the Ancien Régime. The latest transfers of territory, however, differed in
more than one respect from this tradition. The dimension of the process was
without precedent and added to the impression of arbitrary violence. At the
same time it rendered difficult the integration of the subjects who had in great
numbers been assigned to rulers foreign to them. In the Grand Duchy of
Baden, every second citizen was a new citizen. Therefore great efforts were re-
quired to help create among the newcomers the conviction that they from now
on belonged to the new state and to its head. Under the Ancien Régime a
ruler who acquired a foreign territory had as a rule left untouched its institutions
as they had developed in history. Where there were estates he was obliged to
swear an oath that he would respect their privileges and preserve the constitu-
tion and the customs of the country. New provinces were simply added to the
previous possessions of the acquiring monarch and thus permitted to preserve
their identity. The princes of the Confederation of the Rhine, however, adopted
the principles that had triumphed in the French Revolution, and subjected
their new provinces to a rational and centralized administration with no regard
for their historical traditions and borders. The territories which were received
into the new states lost their historical identity. At the same time all local instan-
ces that had possessed political functions of their own right, were deprived of
their powers.Whereas changes of rule or dynasty had in the past occurred in sec-
ular territories only, it now happened that ecclesiastical elective monarchies and
free cities were subjected to hereditary monarchies and in this way to a form of
rule they had not experienced for centuries. Taken together these massive inter-
ventions in traditional social relations and rights of possession jeopardized the
legitimacy of sovereignty as such and thereby endangered the political stability
of the new states.
A solution to the crisis was expected from the imposition of constitutions on
the French model. In the Kingdom of Westphalia Napoleon had demonstrated, at
least on the programmatic level, how a group of heterogeneous subjects of var-
ious origin could by the introduction of a constitution be transformed into a po-
litical nation, and after the fall of Napoleon Louis XVIII had shown that a mon-
arch could adopt a constitution without being obliged to let others partake of his
 Sellin, Gewalt, 212–215; ibid. a photograph of the constitution column and a reproduction of
the painting by Peter von Heß of the laying of the foundation stone of the column on 26 May
1821.
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political power. The congress of Vienna had imposed upon the German princes
to introduce representative constitutions. Several of them complied with this ob-
ligation, among others for the simple reason that they wanted to avoid interven-
tion of the great powers in their interior relations. In the three South German
states the elaboration of constitutions began immediately after the breakdown
of the French Empire, in obvious continuity to the period of the Confederation
of the Rhine. In Bavaria the elaboration of a draught constitution was entrusted
to a special committee. Its commission was the “revision of the constitution of
1808.”¹⁵ Similarly in Baden the plans of creating a constitution went back to
the elevation of the Margraviates to Grand Duchy in 1806.¹⁶ There is another rea-
son why the transition to constitutionalism must be understood as a conse-
quence of confederation politics. The territorial expansion, the implementation
of reforms and the never ending wars had in all member states caused a stagger-
ing increase of the public debt.¹⁷ In this situation the introduction of representa-
tive assemblies was welcome for the simple reason that in this way public fi-
nance was subjected to control and the public credit was based on the
guarantee of the country.¹⁸
The first constitution was proclaimed on 26 May 1818 by Maximilian Joseph
of Bavaria.¹⁹ Like Louis XVIII at the imposition of the charte the King of Bavaria
emphasized two times in the preamble of the document that he had bestowed
the constitution of his free will. In this way he underscored his claim to full pos-
session of political power. The claim is repeated elsewhere in the constitution. In
the first paragraph of the second title it says that the King is “Head of State” and
“assembles in him the totality of public power.” Obviously Maximilian sought to
counter the impression as if he imposed the constitution for the sole reason to
 Eberhard Weis, “Die Begründung des modernen bayerischen Staates unter König Max I.
(1799– 1825),” in: Max Spindler and Alois Schmid, eds., Handbuch der bayerischen Geschichte,
vol. 4: Das neue Bayern. Von 1800 bis zur Gegenwart, part 1: Staat und Politik (Munich: Beck,
2003), 113.
 Hans-Peter Ullmann, “Baden 1800–1830,” in: Hansmartin Schwarzmaier, ed., Handbuch der
baden-württembergischen Geschichte, vol. 3:Vom Ende des Alten Reiches bis zum Ende der Monar-
chien (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1992), 59–61.
 Hans-Peter Ullmann, “Die öffentlichen Schulden in Bayern und Baden 1780– 1820,” Histori-
sche Zeitschrift 242 (1986), 34.
 Hans-Peter Ullmann, Staatsschulden und Reformpolitik. Die Entstehung moderner öffentlicher
Schulden in Bayern und Baden 170– 1820, part 1 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1986),
230.
 For a comparative analysis of the constitutions of Bavaria and Baden of 1818 on the back-
ground of the Charte constitutionnelle see Markus J. Prutsch,Making Sense of Constitutional Mon-
archism in Post-Napoleonic France and Germany (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013).
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comply with article 13 of the Federal Act. Accordingly the first article of the con-
stitution states that the Kingdom of Bavaria was a sovereign monarchy. An essen-
tial function of a monarchical constitution is the determination of the succes-
sion. This was of primary importance in the Grand Duchy of Baden where the
succession in the Hochberg line of the House of Zähringen was contested. The
King of Bavaria claimed the territories of the former Electorate Palatine on the
right bank of the Rhine, including Heidelberg and Mannheim. He based these
claims on the doubtful legitimacy of the Hochberg line. Therefore the Baden con-
stitution of 1818 expressly stated its right of succession. In defense of territorial
claims of the neighbors § 3 of the constitution confirmed that the Grand Duchy
was “indivisible and inalienable in all its parts.” Similar regulations are to be
found in the constitutions of Bavaria and Württemberg. The significance of
these norms must be seen against the background of the territorial revolutions
of the preceding years. It was only through the constitutions that the three mon-
archs obtained a durable guarantee of their possessions. All the South German
constitutions were imposed on the citizens. In the preamble to the Bavarian con-
stitution King Maximilian addresses the citizens as “his people,” and he alludes
to “the happiness of the fatherland” which he intended to promote by the con-
stitution.²⁰ Grand Duke Charles of Baden hoped by means of the constitution to
render closer and closer “the ties of trust that existed between Us and Our peo-
ple.”²¹ The constitutions were indeed expected to increase the devotion of every
single citizen towards the monarch. At the same time they were meant to melt
the great number of citizens of vastly different origin into one nation with a com-
mon political conscience. Insofar the talk of a Bavarian or Baden nation went
ahead of the actual development. The one nation was imagined as an effect of
the constitution. Political and civil liberty were to bring about the political inte-
gration of the respective country into a universally accepted community under
the monarchy.
Contemporaries emphasized the integrationist effect of the constitutions.
Anselm Feuerbach, First President of the court of appeal in formerly Prussian
Ansbach, in March 1819 wrote about the Bavarian constitution: “It is hard to be-
lieve what a great royal pronouncement such as our constitution can achieve
within a short period of time. It was only through this constitution that our
King has acquired Ansbach and Bayreuth, Würzburg, Bamberg, and so forth. It
has become unthinkable by now that somebody should stand up and suggest
 Verfassungsurkunde für das Königreich Bayern vom 26. Mai 1818, in: Huber, Dokumente,
vol. 1, 156.
 Verfassungsurkunde für das Großherzogtum Baden vom 22. August 1818, ibid., 172.
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that we adopt other colours than blue and white”!²² Since the proclamation of
the constitution only ten months had passed. If Feuerbach expressly emphasizes
the shortness of this space of time, the conclusion is permitted that he was al-
ready aware of the changing political consciousness, and if he points out that
from now on no subject of the King of Bavaria wants to be anything but a Bavar-
ian, regardless under which sovereigns he had lived before, he underlines the
integrating and stabilizing effect of this change of consciousness. In the same
sense the professor of public law at Freiburg university, Carl von Rotteck, had al-
ready in 1818 given his opinion on the constitution of Baden, writing: “We have
received a corporate constitution, a political life as a people […]. We were sub-
jects of Baden-Baden, Baden-Durlach, the Breisgau, the Palatinate, the Landgra-
viate of Nellenburg, and the Principality of Fürstenberg; we were citizens of Frei-
burg, of Konstanz, of Mannheim; a people of Baden we were not. But from now
on we are a people possessing a common will, an acknowledged common inter-
est, in other words, a common life and a common law. Only now we enter into
history and play our own part.”²³ There is no doubt: With these words Rotteck
described the birth of a new nation. To a monarch who achieved this, a new
source of legitimacy was inevitably disclosed. In this sense the constitutional
policies of the German medium-sized states served the renewal and consolida-
tion, in short, the restoration of monarchy, restoration not to be understood as
a new creation after some kind of disappearance, because it had never been ab-
rogated, but as a process of recovering strength and solidity.
After the crushing defeat at Jena and Auerstedt in October 1806 and the con-
clusion of the humiliating peace treaty of Tilsit in June 1807 Prussia also initiated
a period of social and political reforms to be crowned by a constitution, as King
Frederick William III had publicly announced several times. However, it was
only during the revolution of 1848 under entirely different circumstances that
the promise was fulfilled. There were various reasons for the delay. An essential
aim of the Prussian reforms had been the desire to strengthen the state from
within and enable it to liberate itself from Napoleonic domination and recover
the lost provinces. With the fall of Napoleon and the victory of the coalition
over France the objective was accomplished. Another reason for the delay in im-
posing a constitution was the heterogeneity of Prussian social structure.Whereas
the east was agrarian and dominated by the landed aristocracy, in Berlin, on the
Rhine and in Westphalia there was already a developed bourgeoisie, active in
commerce and industry. Owing to the strong position of the landed aristocracy
 Quoted from Sellin, Gewalt, 228.
 Quoted ibid., 228–229.
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east of the Elbe, in a chamber elected by census the conservative forces would
easily have obtained the majority. On the other hand, even without a modern
constitution, the state of Prussia was solid and powerful enough not to fear,
like Baden and Württemberg, disintegration of its enlarged territory. As a conse-
quence the country preserved the system of bureaucratic absolutism until the
revolution of 1848.
Whereas the King of Naples, the Pope in his capacity as head of the States of
the Church, the Grand-Duke of Tuscany, and the King of Sardinia after the out-
break of the revolution in Palermo had imposed constitutions in due time and
thereby formally preserved full power, Frederick William IV of Prussia missed
the chance to counter the revolutionary movement before it seriously endan-
gered his position. When the revolution reached Berlin in March 1848, he had
no choice but to call the meeting of an “assembly for the agreement of the Prus-
sian constitution.” In a series of proclamations the King simultaneously prom-
ised to fulfill essential demands of the revolution such as the guarantee of the
elementary rights of man, ministerial responsibility and the oath of the standing
army on the constitution.²⁴ The Prussian National Assembly met on 22 May 1848
in Berlin. The government presented a draft constitution which a committee of
the department of the Prime Minister had elaborated on the model of the Belgian
constitution of 1831.²⁵ By agreement in practice was understood a procedure by
which the Crown reserved to itself adoption or rejection of the constitution which
the assembly had worked out. In addition it meant that the assembly was expect-
ed to avoid resolutions the Crown could not ratify. On 17 June 1848 the constitu-
tional committee of the national assembly initiated the debate on the draft con-
stitution of the government. On 26 July the committee laid its own draft before
the assembly.²⁶ In the following months the decisions of the assembly became
more and more radical. A motion of the Left to renounce the principle of agree-
ment and to claim undivided constituent power for the national assembly in its
place, was rejected on 16 October, however. On 12 October after a prolonged de-
bate the reference to divine right was removed from the royal title.²⁷ The deputy
Borchardt reminded the assembly that in the March revolution it had depended
 Proklamation des Königs über die Einführung einer konstitutionellen Verfassung, 22 March
1848, in: Huber (ed.), Dokumente, vol. 1, 449–450.
 Gerhard Anschütz, Die Verfassungs-Urkunde für den Preußischen Staat vom 31. Januar 1850.
Ein Kommentar für Wissenschaft und Praxis, vol. 1 (Berlin: Häring, 1912), 36–37; the text of
the draft ibid., 608–614; Sellin, Revolution, 314–320.
 Anschütz, Verfassungs-Urkunde, 42; text of the draft ibid., 614–623.
 Verhandlungen der constituirenden Versammlung für Preußen 1848, vol. 6 (Leipzig: Thomas,
1848), session 73, 12 October 1848, 3920–3953; Sellin, Gewalt, 85–86.
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“on the will of the people,” whether or not “it wanted further to be governed by a
King.” Therefore the Prussians no longer possessed a “King by divine right,” but
“a King by the free will of the sovereign nation.”²⁸ Hermann Schulze from De-
litzsch asserted that “when a commercial enterprise had run bankrupt,” it was
not customary to take its name “over to the new business.” Since absolutism
had run completely bankrupt under the old firm “by divine right,” he warned
from its continuation.²⁹ On 31 October the National Assembly abolished the aris-
tocracy.³⁰
In anticipation of the development Frederick William IV had already during
the summer excogitated scenarios in which he would send the assembly pack-
ing. As early as 21 May on the eve of the first session of the assembly he had writ-
ten to Joseph von Radowitz that one of three cases he was not prepared to toler-
ate, was the proclamation of national sovereignty by the National Assembly.³¹
The question of how to react if the assembly adopted inacceptable resolutions
continued to trouble him. On 19 June he again wrote to Radowitz that if the as-
sembly denied him the right to dissolve it and arrogated to themselves the right
to present him with “a constitution of their own making” and “vote” it, he would
be forced to dissolve it.³² The King’s anxiety for the maintenance of the throne
and his claim to monarchical sovereignty was steadily growing. On 15 September
a memorandum of his began by the remark that this was “the last chance for sav-
ing the throne, Prussia, Germany, and the concept of divine right in Europe.”³³
His surroundings partook of his apprehensions. The general adjutant Leopold
von Gerlach wrote on 21 October to count Friedrich Wilhelm von Brandenburg
who six days later was to be charged with the formation of a new government
as successor of Ernst von Pfuel:
“The King, our sovereign, is in a morass, he feels that he is sinking, he calls for help, but
nobody tears him out. Some people shout to him that he was making such inappropriate
movements that he would sink even deeper, others that his body was too heavy, one
couldn’t lift this burden, others affirm they had not placed him there (which is not entirely
true as far as the ministers are concerned), still others he should just wait, perhaps he
 Verhandlungen, vol. 6, 3930.
 Ibid., 946.
 Ibid., vol. 8, Berlin 1848, session 90, 31 October 1848, 5023.
 Frederick William IV to Radowitz 21 May 1848, in: Joseph von Radowitz, Nachgelassene
Briefe und Aufzeichnungen zur Geschichte der Jahre 1848– 1853, ed. Walter Möring (Stuttgart
and Berlin: Deutsche Verlagsanstalt, 1922), 47.
 Frederick William IV to Radowitz, 19 June 1848, ibid., 56.
 Promemoria of King Frederick William IV concerning the constitution, 15 September 1848, in:
Huber, Dokumente, vol. 1, 460.
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could find solid ground before the water would close over his head. But nobody wants to
act.”³⁴
The growing radicalization of the National Assembly at last drove the King to ac-
tion. Under the pretext of liberating it from the pressures from the streets of Ber-
lin, by decree of 8 November 1848 the assembly was transferred to Brandenburg
and simultaneously adjourned till 27 November. The deputies reacted by voting a
tax boycott. The government regarded this move as proof that with the assembly
an agreement about the constitution was unattainable. Since public opinion also
distanced itself more and more from the assembly the government proceeded to
a coup d’état. On 5 December the King dissolved the assembly and imposed a
constitution which left the royal prerogative unimpaired. By the imposition the
government preserved the monarchical principle and prevented the national as-
sembly from usurping the constituent power. But the King broke his promise of
March to agree the constitution with the representatives of the nation. The en-
tourage of Frederick William was divided in its judgment on the wisdom of
this action. Joseph von Radowitz wrote to him from Frankfurt on 21 November:
“Independently of its material contents the imposed constitution will always be regarded as
a breach of all legal foundations and promises, place the Crown in the air and perpetuate
the revolution.”³⁵
Obviously the government knew perfectly well that the dissolution of the cham-
ber and the imposition of the constitution were unconstitutional. It tried to bal-
ance this deficiency by rendering the imposed constitution as liberal as possible.
In this way it acceded to a demand the fulfillment of which had been judged un-
avoidable by many observers. Count Bülow, under-secretary of state in the for-
eign department of Prussia, for example, had admonished as early as 15 Novem-
ber that a dissolution of the National Assembly “would have to be combined
with the imposition of a provisional charte, and that this charte would have to
be of the most liberal kind.”³⁶ In keeping with this advice the government did
not revert to its original draft of 20 May, but to the version which on 26 July
had been adopted by the constitutional committee of the National Assembly.
However, it made a number of by no means insignificant changes in the commit-
tee draft. Among the changes were the replacement of the suspensive veto of the
 Leopold von Gerlach, Denkwürdigkeiten, ed. by his daughter, vol. 1 (Berlin: Hertz, 1891), 224.
 Joseph von Radowitz to Frederick William IV, 21 November 1848, in: Radowitz, Briefe, 65.
 Graf Bülow to Ludolf Camphausen, 15 November 1848, in: Erich Brandenburg, Untersuchun-
gen und Aktenstücke zur Geschichte der Reichsgründung (Leipzig: Quelle & Meyer, 1916), 277.
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King by the absolute veto and a provision for emergency decrees. The opposition
was to be assuaged by article 112 in connection with article 106. Article 106 per-
mitted constitutional amendments by normal legislation. Article 112 stated that
the “present constitution” should “be subjected to a revision by way of ordinary
legislation immediately after the first meeting of the chambers.”³⁷ By this article
the constitution was from the outset declared provisional. From a political point
of view the imposition of the constitution must indeed be understood as a device
to overcome the stalemate in the relationship between Crown and assembly. It
was an expedient by which the government of count Brandenburg sought for
the time being to relieve the monarchy from the pressing dangers into which it
had fallen. The King would have preferred to do without the imposition of the
constitution and not to combine it with the dissolution of the National Assembly.
On 23 November he wrote to Otto von Manteuffel:
“The proclamation of the constitution immediately after the unavoidable dissolution looks,
I would like to pronounce it with a voice of thunder, like a studied piece (of comedy) and
smells, as wide and as broad as the State of Prussia is, of mauvaise foi.”³⁸
The solution that was chosen, clarifies why count Bülow had spoken of the im-
position of a “provisional” charte. Obviously the illegality of the imposition
should be smoothed over after the event by the application of article 112 that per-
mitted revision. In other words: Unlike the Charte constitutionnelle in France the
Prussian constitution was imposed pending the consent of the Chambers. The re-
vision was prescribed because Frederick William IV saw himself bound by the
promise to concert the constitution with the elected representatives of the nation,
a promise Louis XVIII had never given.
Articles 106 and 112 should render the imposition acceptable to the public by
providing space for the inclusion of demands that had not been taken into ac-
count. As Günther Grünthal rightly observes, if the reservation of revision
could “not legalize the King’s actions in public law, it could – so it was calculat-
ed – justify it from a political point of view.”³⁹ On the other hand, the Crown had
also reserved for itself a loophole in case of unwelcome developments in the fu-
 Verfassungs-Urkunde für den preußischen Staat vom 5. Dezember 1848, in: Anschütz, Ver-
fassungs-Urkunde, 632.
 Frederick William IV to Otto von Manteuffel, 23 November 1848, in: Otto von Manteuffel,
Unter Friedrich Wilhelm IV. Denkwürdigkeiten, ed. Heinrich von Poschinger, vol. 1: 1848– 1851
(Berlin: Mittler, 1901), 47.
 Günther Grünthal, Parlamentarismus in Preußen 1848/49– 1857/58. Preußischer Konstitutio-
nalismus – Parlament und Regierung in der Reaktionsära (Düsseldorf: Droste, 1982), 57.
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ture. According to article 105, 2, the government could, “if the Chambers were
not assembled,” “in cases of urgency, under the responsibility of the entire de-
partment of the prime minister, issue decrees with force of law” which, however,
had to be presented to the Chambers “for approval immediately at their next
meeting.”⁴⁰ It is obvious that this article accorded to the executive an almost un-
limited power to legislate by decree. Urgency was not defined. The prerequisite of
the application of the article, namely that the Chambers were not assembled,
could be brought about by the King himself since article 49 conferred upon
him the right to dissolve the Chambers.⁴¹
After the Chambers had in March 1849 confirmed the legality of the imposi-
tion they initiated a comprehensive revision of the constitution.⁴² Every article
was separately examined and put to the vote. In this way the principle of nego-
tiating the constitution was after all applied, even if subject to negotiation were
at this stage only eventual changes and amendments. Wherever there was no
agreement between Crown and Chambers the imposed version was maintained.
A conflict over the revision arose in fact between the King and the democratically
elected Second Chamber. Thereupon the King dissolved the Chamber on 27 April
1849 and on 30 May he imposed a new electoral law having recourse to the emer-
gency article 105. The government introduced a universal but unequal and not
secret electoral law of men by which the electorate was divided into three
classes, with the consequence that at the next elections the radical democrats
would remain in a hopeless minority position (Dreiklassenwahlrecht). By the
new electoral law the totality of electors was divided top-down into three classes
in such a way that the amount of direct taxes paid was equal in every class. The
three classes sent the same number of representatives to the Second Chamber. As
compared to the modestly taxed citizens in the third class the highly taxed mem-
bers of the first class thus disposed of many times the political weight. The Prus-
sian Dreiklassenwahlrecht remained in force until the fall of the monarchy in No-
vember 1918.
The dissolution and reelection of the Second Chamber had interrupted the
revision of the imposed constitution. The First Chamber had been adjourned.
Only on 7 August 1849 the Chambers were opened again. One of their first deci-
sions was the approval of the royal ordinance of 30 May by which the new elec-
toral law had been introduced. Afterwards the examination of the revised consti-
tution was continued and concluded in December 1849. Since both Chambers
 Anschütz, Verfassungs-Urkunde, 632.
 Grünthal, Parlamentarismus, 54.
 Anschütz, Verfassungs-Urkunde, 54.
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had incessantly been in contact with each other, they could present to the King a
text in common. But the King hesitated to sanction it and to take the oath pre-
scribed by article 52. Instead he ordered the government to present to the Cham-
bers on 7 January 1850 15 propositions for revision of the constitution. The Cham-
bers gave their assent to the greater part of the proposals. Frederick William IV
sanctioned the constitution on 31 January and on 6 February he took the oath on
it.⁴³
The policy of Frederick William IV towards the Prussian National Assembly
calls to mind the policy of Louis XVIII towards the Napoleonic Senate. Both mon-
archs had on behalf of the nation been presented with draft constitutions that
infringed seriously upon their sovereign rights. Frederick William’s situation
was even more delicate than Louis XVIII’s since the Prussian National Assembly
had been called by the King himself and democratically elected by the nation.
The French Senate, by contrast, had not been elected, and nobody had charged
them to elaborate a constitution. It is true that the Senatorial constitution should
in due course be subjected to a referendum. Thus far a democratic legitimation
was envisaged. The Senate had referred to the same legitimacy when he formally
deposed Emperor Napoleon who had himself based his rule on the national will.
The two impositions of 1814 and 1848 resembled each other also in that they
were carried through by coups d’état and aimed at replacing the democratic
by the monarchical principle. Even the contemporaries had pointed to the sim-
ilarities of the impositions of 1814 in France and in Prussia. Karl August Varnha-
gen von Ense commented the Prussian imposition of 5 December 1848 in his
diary by writing: “The thing reminds me of the Charte of Louis the Eighteenth,
but will scarcely play that long.”⁴⁴ The prognosis was wrong. The Charte re-
mained in force, if one includes its revision in the July Revolution, for a duration
of altogether 34 years. The Prussian constitution, however, held its own, after the
revision of 1850, to the end of the monarchy in 1918.
The resolves of the Prussian National Assembly of October 1848 by which
the aristocracy and divine right were to be abolished, provoked a crisis of the
monarchy. It was short of being transformed from a monarchy by divine right
into a democratically legitimized monarchy on the model of the French constitu-
tion of 1791. Since the public continued to expect that the Crown would fulfill its
promises of the spring, a return to bureaucratic absolutism of the pre-March era
was out of the question. If the government did not want to cede to the demands
of the National Assembly it had no choice but to recover the initiative. By the
 Ibid., 58–60.
 Karl August Varnhagen von Ense, Tagebücher, vol. 5 (Leipzig: Brockhaus, 1862), 327.
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coup d’état of 5 December Frederick William IV restored the monarchical princi-
ple and consolidated monarchical legitimacy by imposing a constitution which
highly corresponded to the aspirations of the country. Thus the Prussian consti-
tution of 1850 belongs to the great number of constitutions of the 19th century in
monarchies that were not elaborated by democratically elected constituent as-
semblies but imposed from above. The imposition consolidated the monarchy
because it fulfilled essential demands of the revolution without infringing
upon monarchical sovereignty. Therefore in Prussia as well, the transition to con-
stitutionalism ended up in a long-term restoration of a monarchy shattered by
revolution. It was only the crisis of the First World War to which it finally suc-
cumbed.
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The urgency of constitutional restorations depended on the magnitude of the
menace to which the legitimacy of a monarchy was exposed. Since the French
Revolution, monarchy was threatened everywhere. The breakthrough of popular
sovereignty in the summer of 1789 and Napoleon’s interferences in the structure
of the European states system had shattered the safety of every monarchy. Mon-
archs did not always recognize the gravity of the menace and some of them de-
layed the necessary restorations. After the overthrow of Napoleon a constitution-
al or “organic” restoration took place in France only. In other countries similar
measures were inaugurated only years later. However, a restoration remains
no less a restoration, if it is carried through only gradually or a long time after
the event that had rendered it necessary. On the other hand by repeated refusals
of constitutional restoration it could also happen that the moment was missed at
which consolidation of monarchical legitimacy was still feasible.
The best example of such neglect is Spain. Even before Napoleon’s interven-
tion the undignified conduct of King Charles IV had jeopardized the authority of
the monarchy. In 1788 Charles had succeeded his father on the throne. The new
King loved hunting but neglected his office and subjected himself uncondition-
ally to his wife, Luisa of Bourbon-Parma. It was due to Luisa’s influence that for
almost two decades the government was in the hands of her favourite Manuel de
Godoy. Godoy had been a member of the royal body-guard and was 21 when the
Queen happened to make his acquaintance in 1788.¹ Before long the royal couple
regarded him as their common friend. In 1792 he was appointed prime minister.
The conclusion of the peace treaty that ended the Spanish-French war in 1795,
earned him the title of “Prince of the peace” (Principe de la Paz). Three years
later he lost the position of first minister but his decisive influence on the
royal couple persisted until his inglorious fall in 1808. Contemporaries agreed
that Godoy was hated in all classes of the population, albeit a little less than
the Queen herself.² Spain had since 1796 been an ally of France and remained
such under the Consulate and the Empire. But Napoleon did not trust the gov-
ernment in Madrid and in the course of the year 1807 he decided to dethrone
the house of Bourbon and appoint a Bonaparte King of Spain. A pretext for send-
ing troops into Spain was offered by the conflict of France with Portugal. Since
the government of Portugal refused to participate in the continental blockade
 Gabriel H. Lovett, Napoleon and the Birth of Modern Spain, vol. 1: The Challenge to the Old
Order (New York: University Press, 1965), 8.
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and to banish British ships from its ports, Napoleon by the treaty of Fontaine-
bleau secured from the government in Madrid the permission to march to Lisbon
through Spanish territory. A French army under general Junot had already invad-
ed Spain by that time. Further armies followed, and by March 1808 more than
100.000 French soldiers had assembled on the Iberian Peninsula. The French
took one fortress after the other and treated Spain as if it were an occupied coun-
try.³ As early as 20 February 1808 Napoleon had appointed his brother-in-law
Joachim Murat as his lieutenant in Spain. While Charles IV made preparations
for the flight into the Southern parts of the country, the hatred against Godoy ex-
ploded during the night of 17 March in Aranjuez. A mob took his house by as-
sault, and if Godoy had not hidden in a garret he would scarcely have survived.
To save his life the King ordered his arrest and deprived him of all his duties. On
the following day new disturbances occurred. In the streets the abdication of the
King was openly demanded. Charles IV was terrified. On 19 March in the evening
he abdicated.⁴ All hopes were now built on his son, Ferdinand VII. But Napoleon
refused to acknowledge the new sovereign. He had announced his visit to the
Spanish capital and Ferdinand hoped that on this occasion he would express
the missing recognition. In the meantime, at French insistence, Charles IV re-
tracted his abdication pretending that he had acted under pressure. In reality,
however, he did not wish to recover the throne. Instead, he and his wife pressed
upon the French Emperor in numerous letters to ensure that Godoy was released
from prison and to procure to all three of them in common a peaceful homestead
abroad.⁵
The further course of events placed several trumps into Napoleon’s hands.
Both Charles IV and his son laid claim to the Spanish throne, Charles if not in
earnest, at least in appearance. Both expected the solution of their conflict
from the French Emperor at the visit he had announced several times. Unexpect-
edly Napoleon gained the role of an umpire between the quarrelling Kings, but
he did not intend to go to Spain.When on 2 April 1808 he made for the South, he
was not headed for Madrid but for Bayonne near the Spanish border. There, on
French soil, he desired to receive the Spanish monarchs. Charles and Luisa read-
ily followed his invitation. Ferdinand however at first harbored misgivings. Hop-
ing that Napoleon would cross the border after all he left his capital on 10 April
in the intention to meet the Emperor in Northern Spain. When he couldn’t find
Napoleon anywhere, two choices were left to him: to return to Madrid or to over-
 Ibid., 89–90.
 Ibid., 98–99.
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come his misgivings and proceed to Bayonne. At Vitoria he still hesitated but
then decided to go ahead. On 21 April he arrived in Bayonne. Before long the Em-
peror disclosed his real intentions. Instead of acknowledging Ferdinand as King
of Spain he demanded his resignation in favor of the Bonaparte dynasty. For days
Ferdinand resisted the pressure. When Ferdinand’s parents arrived at Bayonne
Charles IV demanded that he return the crown to him. After a few days of fruit-
less confrontation Ferdinand gave in. By a letter of 6 May he returned the crown
to his father, not knowing that Charles had, on the previous day, already re-
nounced his rights to the Spanish throne in favour of Napoleon. The Emperor
had attained his goal. Adding deceit to pressure he had succeeded in ousting
the Spanish Bourbons from the throne. A few days later the two former Kings is-
sued a proclamation to the Spanish people from Bordeaux and released them
from their duties of obedience. The two monarchs were placed under confine-
ment in France, Charles IV and his consort Luisa at the castle of Compiègne
near Paris, Ferdinand VII at the castle of Valençay on the Loire.⁶ The Spanish
throne was handed over to Napoleon’s brother Joseph who had since 1806
been King of Naples.
While at Bayonne negotiations were held on the future of the Spanish mon-
archy, heavy fighting was on the way in Madrid. On 2 May the population of the
capital rose against the French army of occupation. Murat had the revolt bloodily
suppressed. Hundreds of insurgents were arrested and shot overnight in Madrid
and on the surrounding mountains by firing squads. Six years later both the re-
volt and the ensuing executions were captured in two large paintings by Francis-
co de Goya. The Dos de Mayo has remained till today a national day of remem-
brance. It marks the beginning of the Spanish War of Independence against
Napoleon. During almost six years the Spanish people offered resistance against
King Joseph who had been forced upon them. With a view to safeguarding the
sovereignty of his brother Napoleon was incessantly obliged to station a substan-
tial part of his forces in the country.When general Masséna in 1810 invaded Por-
tugal the Imperial armies on the Iberian Peninsula numbered not less than
325.000 soldiers.⁷ In their revolt against the superior French forces the insurgents
developed the tactics of the “small war” (guerilla). They were supported by Brit-
ish forces under the command of Sir Arthur Wellesley, later Duke of Wellington.
In no other country Napoleon met such fierce resistance as in Spain.
 Ibid., 118– 120; Charles and Luisa later proceeded via Marseille to Italy where they died almost
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Even though Ferdinand had thoughtlessly given away his throne at Bayonne
the Spanish nation adhered to him. The insurgents even interpreted their resist-
ance as a fight for their imprisoned, their longed-for King (el Rey deseado). The
political direction of the resistance was at first entrusted to a Junta Suprema Cen-
tral y Gubernativa del Reino. On 31 January 1810 the Junta transferred power to
another governing body, the Regency council (Consejo de Regencia del Reino).
The chair was taken by general Francisco Javier Castaños, victor in the battle
of Bailén in July 1808.⁸ Not later than 5 May, Ferdinand had issued a decree
from Bayonne convoking the Spanish estates (Cortes) in the intent of having
them organize the resistance against the foreign occupants.⁹ The Junta repeated
the convocation in 1810. The Cortes assembled on 24 September 1810 on the Isle
of León before Cádiz, but went far beyond the instructions of the King. They pro-
claimed national sovereignty and arrogated to themselves the constituent power
(poder constituyente). They fought for the reform of the monarchy on democratic
principles.¹⁰ Thus far their efforts resembled the work of the French National As-
sembly in the summer of 1789. According to the preamble Ferdinand was expect-
ed to proclaim the constitution at his return as King of Spain “by the grace of
God and on behalf of the constitution of the Spanish monarchy.” The wording
was a commitment to divine right, but it is obvious that the twofold foundation
of monarchical authority deprived divine right of any significance in public law.
As is demonstrated by the articles about the position of the King, he had been
transformed, not unlike Louis XVI by the French constitution of 1791, from sov-
ereign to a merely executive organ of the state. According to article 170 his essen-
tial task was to “provide for the execution of the laws,” and his power extended
“to everything that refers to the maintenance of order on the interior and to the
safety of the state on the exterior, in line with the constitution and the laws.”¹¹
On account of his detention in France Ferdinand had not been able to participate
in the deliberation of the constitution, and when on 19 March 1812 the constitu-
 Miguel Artola Gallego, L’España de Fernando VII, vol. 1: La guerra de la independencia y los
orígenes del constitucionalismo (Madrid: Espasa-Calpe, 1996), 442; Lovett, Napoleon, vol. 1,
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tion was adopted, it was unknown how long the King would still have to stay at
Valençay. The Russian campaign which was to be the turning-point in Napoleon’s
rule lay still ahead.
It took indeed two more years before Ferdinand was allowed to return on his
throne. The advance of the allied armies in Germany and on the Iberian Penin-
sula during 1813 caused Napoleon on 11 December 1813 to conclude with him the
peace treaty of Valençay.¹² The Emperor recognized Ferdinand as King of Spain
and promised to release him from captivity. He hoped that the treaty with Spain
would procure to him the badly needed relief and enable him to reinforce his ar-
mies at the remaining theatres of war. On 13 March 1814 Ferdinand made for his
realm. His departure had been delayed because Napoleon had at first intended to
await ratification of the treaty by the Cortes.
Article 173 of the constitution of Cádiz of 1812 ruled that the King take an
oath before ascending the throne. Thus, in April 1814, Ferdinand VII was in
the same quandary as Louis XVIII at the same time. But his reaction to the de-
mand of the assembly was exactly the opposite of Louis XVIII’s. This results al-
ready from the declarations by which the monarchs on their way back to their
capitals commented on the constitutions that had been elaborated during
their absence: the Declaration of Saint-Ouen of 2 May and the Manifesto of Va-
lencia of 4 May. Whereas Louis XVIII acknowledged the Senatorial constitution
in principle, Ferdinand VII denied to the Cortes of Cádiz any authority and to
their constitution any binding force.Whereas Louis did not dwell on the question
of who possessed the constituent power, Ferdinand declared that the Cortes had
divested “him of his sovereign power and had feigned to attribute it to the na-
tion, only in order to appropriate it to themselves.” By adopting the “revolution-
ary and democratic foundations of the French constitution of 1791” they had cre-
ated “principles not of a limited monarchy but of a popular government with a
president or a magistrate at the top” (Gobierno popular con un Gefe ó Magistra-
do). This magistrate, however, was nothing but a “delegated executor” (mero ege-
cutor delegado) and no King, “even though he had received the name of King
with a view to deceiving and misguiding the credulous and the nation.” Unlike
Louis XVIII Ferdinand would not even accept the work of the Cortes as a basis for
the elaboration of a constitution that preserved the monarchical principle. In-
stead he declared the constitution of 1812 and the other decrees of the Cortes
 J. Alberto Navas-Sierra, “El tratado de Valençay o el fracaso del pacto imperial napoleónico.
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“null and without any value and effect” (nulos y de ningun valor ni efecto).¹³ Si-
multaneously he promised soon to convoke the Cortes in line with the ancient
laws of Spain, a promise he never lived up to.¹⁴
Many historians call the reaction of the King a coup d’état (golpe de Estado).
This verdict makes sense only if the regime the Cortes had set up during the ab-
sence of the King, had possessed legitimacy. Since Ferdinand VII denied the
Cortes any legitimacy, he felt entitled to refuse them any share in the govern-
ment. At any rate he could have pointed out that since he had never assented
to the constitution of the Cortes, it had not attained force of law. But to the ju-
ridical argument must be added a moral point of view. Since Ferdinand’s return
on the throne was largely due to the Cortes, his attitude appears not only ex-
tremely ungrateful but also highly impolitic.
On the same 4 May 1814, the day when he published the Valencia manifesto,
the King ordered the arrest of the members of the Regency, of the government,
and of leading members of the Cortes, 38 persons in all.¹⁵ Thereupon many
other liberal leaders flew abroad. At the ensuing law-suits the courts were con-
fronted with the difficulty that there was no norm in Spanish law that the de-
fendants might have violated.¹⁶ Nevertheless, by the middle of June a list of 28
accusations had been put up. The first three items contained the main charge
that encompassed all the others: in the first place that the defendants had “vio-
lated the sovereignty of Sr. Don Fernando VII and the rights and prerogatives of
the throne with a view to establishing a democratic government and divest him
of his royal crown and his realms”; in the second place that by convoking the
Cortes in 1810 they had usurped the King’s sovereignty; in the third place that
they had intended to make the principle of popular sovereignty (soberania pop-
ular) the foundation of government.¹⁷ The ensuing law-suit dragged on for more
 Manifiesto de 4 de mayo 1814, Gaceta Extraordinaria de Madrid del jueves 12 de mayo de
1814, 515–521, here: 517, 520; Manuel Pando Fernandez de Pinedo (Marqués de Miraflores),
Apuntes histórico-criticos para escribir la historia de la revolucion de España, desde el año
1820 hasta 1823, vol. 1 (London: Taylor, 1834), 32–38, here: 34–35, 37. The manifesto is also print-
ed in: Manuel Fernández Martín, Derecho parlamentario español, vol. 2 (Madrid: Espasa-Calpe
1992), 856–863.
 Ibid., 518, 36; Artola Gallego, España, vol. 1, 527–528.
 Ignacio Lasa Iraola, “El primer proceso de los liberales (1814–1815),” Hispanica 30 (1970),
328, 336–367.
 Ibid., 341–342.
 Quoted from: Manuel Fernández Martín, Derecho parlamentario español, vol. 3 (Madrid: Es-
pasa-Calpe, 1992), 106– 107: “Cargo 1.o Lo es, el haber atentado contra la soberania del Sr. Don
Fernando VII y contra los derechos y regalias del trono para establecer un gobierno democrát-
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than 18 months. At last, the King lost patience. On 15 December 1815 he issued
the sentences himself by royal decree. They provided for prison of between six
and ten years.¹⁸
The trial was political. The charge that the defendants had tried to transfer
sovereignty from the King to the nation, was justified. But this charge, quite apart
from the fact that in Spanish penal law it did not exist, would of right have to be
directed not only against the 38 defendants, but against all the other deputies of
the Cortes as well who had voted for the constitution of Cádiz. Because of this
omission the limitation of the accusation on 38 persons only was arbitrary. In-
compatible with any rightful procedure was issuing the sentence by royal decree.
The fact that the defendants had for six years, during the absence of the law-
ful monarch who had frivolously gambled it away, defended the guideless coun-
try against the imposed King Joseph and the French army of invasion, did not
play any role in the law-suit, notwithstanding the fact that the revolt of the Span-
ish people since 1808 fully justified the policies of the Junta Suprema and the
Consejo de Regencia, and likewise the Cortes of Cádiz. The writer Ramón de Mes-
onero Romanos called Ferdinand’s proceedings against the liberals in his “Mem-
oirs of a Septuagenarian” a symptom of “political ingratitude and dullness” of a
kind that the history of modernity had not known yet (ingratitud y torpeza politi-
ca que no tiene semejante en la historia moderna). The numerous “futile revolts”
of the following period and the “terrible reactions” directed against them had
“ensanguined” his government. Ferdinand had impregnated the next two gener-
ations with a “spirit of discord, of intolerance, and of wrath.” From this had re-
sulted “three civil wars, half a dozen constitutions, and innumerable pronuncia-
mientos and crises” which had procured to the Spaniards the reputation of “an
ungovernable people” and of “a rebellious race that was condemned to inces-
sant struggle and to senseless and feverish agitation.”¹⁹
By persecuting the leaders of the national resistance against Napoleon Fer-
dinand deprived himself of a social élite that could after his return have assisted
him in the restoration of his government. And that was not all: He also drove an-
other élite to emigration, namely the large number of those who had collaborat-
ed with Joseph Bonaparte, the so-called afrancesados.When after the battle of
Vitoria in June 1813 King Joseph sought refuge in France he was followed by
about 12.000 families of Spanish collaborators who wanted to escape persecu-
ico, privarle de su Corona Real y de la posesion de sus Reinos”; see also: Lasa Iraola, “Proceso,”
356–357.
 Artola Gallego, España, vol 1, 531, 533–534; Lasa Iraola, “Proceso,” 379.
 Ramón de Mesonero Romanos, Memorias de un setentón (Madrid: Tebas, 1975), 129.
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tion by the returning monarch.²⁰ At this time Ferdinand VII was still a French
prisoner at Valençay. When he returned to Spain the refugees hoped for an am-
nesty. By decree of 30 May 1814, however, Ferdinand barred to all those who had
supported Joseph Bonaparte in the public service or in the army, the way back to
Spain. The prohibition included the spouses. An amnesty was issued to rank and
file only.²¹ By the expatriation of the afrancesados Ferdinand VII broke the prom-
ises he had given to Napoleon in the treaty of Valençay in December 1813. He
could have referred to the fact that this treaty had not been ratified by either
party.²² Other than Ferdinand, Louis XVIII in article 11 of the charte constitution-
nelle granted amnesty to those who in 1792 had participated in the overthrow of
the monarchy, and in this way excluded political purges.
Ferdinand’s return to absolutism and the relentless persecution of the liber-
als and the collaborators severely strained the assent to the monarchy. The lib-
eral opposition went underground and hid to a great extent in the various secret
societies. In the following years criticism of the King found expression in several
unsuccessful rebellions of officers, the so-called pronunciamientos. According to
José Luis Comellas a “pronunciamiento” was “a kind of military insurrection pe-
culiar to 19th century Spanish history and directed against the power of the state
with a view to bringing about political reforms.”²³ The phenomenon originated
between 1814 and 1820 from the discontent of a minority that felt slighted by Fer-
dinand VII’s government in its dignity and rights.²⁴ All pronunciamientos of the
period served liberal objectives. Before Napoleon’s intervention officer’s posts
had in the main been reserved to the aristocracy in line with Ancien Régime
practice. During the war against the French invasion many non-noble officers
distinguished themselves by their prowess and made a career in the army.²⁵
After his return from exile the King was forced to reduce armaments. Since he
set about restoring the structures of the ancient professional army, he dismissed
even war heroes of great merit or displaced them to the provinces for garrison-
duties. Because of these measures discontent if not hostility shortly piled up
among the dismissed and side-lined officers. Among the military personnel con-
 Miguel Artola Gallego, Los afrancesados (Madrid: Soc. De Estudios y Publ., 1953), 236.
 Decreto de 30 de mayo de 1814, Artt. 1, 6 e 7, ibid., 268–269.
 Navas-Sierra, “Tratado,” 262, n. 8.
 José Luis Comellas, Los primeros pronunciamientos en España 1814– 1820 (Madrid: Consejo
Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 1958), 23: “Una forma de golpe militar asestado contra el
poder para introducir en él reformas politicas, propia de la Historia española del siglo XIX.”
 Ibid., 31.
 Julio Busquets, Pronunciamientos y golpes de Estado en España (Barcelona: Ed. Planeta,
1982), 52.
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cerned three groups can be distinguished: the former members of the guerillas,
mostly coming from the peasantry or from the working classes; the young offi-
cers of bourgeois origin who during the war had entered into the military aca-
demies and whose opportunities of advancement were now restricted by the re-
storation of aristocratic privileges; finally the officers, approximately 4.000, who
had after the conclusion of the peace returned from captivity in France where
they had become acquainted with the liberal institutions of the restored Bourbon
monarchy.²⁶ A great many officers entered Freemasonry and hoped that the re-
gime would shortly turn liberal and restore the constitution of Cádiz. The
mood within the officer corps is best characterized by a sentence in a letter
that General Pedro Augustín Girón on 30 August 1814 sent to his father. Girón
writes he despised the officers in the entourage of the King, because “they
were better acquainted with the promenades of Ceuta and Cádiz than with the
battlefields on which Spanish independence had been won.”²⁷ Behind the pro-
nunciamientos, however, there was no solid organization. Therefore in the first
years all of them collapsed after a short period of time. It was only the pronun-
ciamiento of colonel Rafael del Riego on new year’s day of 1820 in Las Cabezas
de San Juan that produced far-reaching consequences. Riego was one of the pris-
oners of war who had returned from France. Near Cádiz troops had been gath-
ered for embarkation to America where they should fight the independence
movement in the Spanish colonies. Since the preparations for embarkation
were delayed the opposing officers were offered opportunities for conspiracy.²⁸
The rebellion soon extended to large sections of the realm. Ferdinand VII had
no choice but to swear the constitution of 1812 and to convoke the Cortes
again.²⁹ For three years he ruled as head of a democratic monarchy. At the elec-
tions to the Cortes the liberals gained the majority. Before long, however, the lib-
eral camp split into two wings that fiercely fought each other, the so-called do-
ceañistas or moderados (moderates) on the one hand and the exaltados
(radicals) on the other. The conflict was sparked off by the question whether
the army near Cádiz from which the revolution had originated, was to be kept
in readiness or dissolved, and by the plans of the moderate government, to dis-
 Ibid., 52–55.
 Quoted from: Comellas, Pronunciamientos, 50.
 Charles J. Esdaile, Spain in the Liberal Age. From Constitution to Civil War, 1808– 1939 (Ox-
ford: Blackwell, 2000), 48; Artola Gallego, España, 634–635.
 Ibid., 543–547; Walther L. Bernecker and Horst Pietschmann, Geschichte Spaniens. Von der
frühen Neuzeit bis zur Gegenwart, 4th ed. (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 2005), 249.
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solve the Patriotic Societies. The moderates were afraid that the army or the So-
cieties exert pressure on the organs of the constitution and control the proceed-
ings of the Cortes.³⁰ In the last resort the question was, whether the revolution
had attained its objectives or whether it had to continue in order to protect its
achievements against reaction. At the elections of February 1822 the exaltados
obtained the majority.³¹ Rafael del Riego, symbol of democratic resistance, was
elected president of the Cortes. The conflict between the two fractions of liberal-
ism impaired the government’s ability to act. In particular by his personnel pol-
icy the King intensified the conflict, apart from the fact that he sued the conser-
vative great powers for help at restoring absolutism.³² In 1823 constitutional
France of all powers terminated the constitutional interlude by military interven-
tion. On 1 October Ferdinand VII revoked the constitution of Cádiz and annulled
all acts of the liberal government of the trienio.³³ Again many liberals flew
abroad, the majority of them to France, whereas the leaders of liberalism re-
paired to England.³⁴ Once more, as with respect to 1814, the question arises,
why Ferdinand had not taken advantage of the French intervention to combine
the repeal of the democratic constitution of Cádiz with the imposition of a con-
stitution framed in accordance with the monarchical principle, and thus to trans-
fer the monarchy by way of an organic restoration and without infringement of
its traditional legitimacy carefully and under control into the age of democracy.
Twice this opportunity was offered to Ferdinand and both times he failed to seize
it.
Until Ferdinand’s death on 29 September 1833 the country was subjected to
the most severe reaction. In Spanish collective memory these ten years have been
preserved as the “ominous decade” (década ominosa).³⁵ Only half a year later the
country again received a constitution, the Estatuto Real. This unforeseen turn of
events resulted from the dynastic crisis into which Ferdinand’s death had pre-
cipitated the country. Ferdinand left behind two daughters but no son. Since
1713 the lex salica had been in force in Spain which excluded female succession.
 Christiana Brennecke, Von Cádiz nach London. Spanischer Liberalismus im Spannungsfeld
von nationaler Selbstbestimmung, Internationalität und Exil (1820– 1833) (Göttingen: Vanden-
hoeck & Ruprecht, 2010), 60–64.
 Esdaile, Spain, 58.
 Charles Wentz Fehrenbach, “Moderados and Exaltados: The Liberal Opposition to Ferdinand
VII, 1814– 1823”, Hispanic American Historical Review 50 (1970), 67; Manuel Espadas Burgos and
José Ramón de Urquijo Goitia, Guerra de la Independencia y época constitucional (1808– 1898)
(Madrid: Ed. Gredos, 1990), 49.
 Ibid., 141.
 Ibid., 142–147.
 Angélica Sánchez Almeida, Fernando VII. El deseado (Madrid: Alderabán), 1999, 141.
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To be sure, the Cortes had in 1789 adopted a Pragmatic Sanction permitting fe-
male succession, but the then reigning King Charles IV had not signed the de-
cree. His son and successor had in three marriages remained without issue.
When his fourth consort, Maria Cristina, princess of the Two Sicilies, in 1830
got pregnant, he made good his father’s omission and signed the Pragmatic
Sanction of 1789. In October a daughter was indeed born to the couple, María Isa-
bel Luisa. Upon Ferdinand’s death the infant succeeded her father on the throne
at the age of only three years as Isabella II. By will Ferdinand had appointed his
consort Maria Cristina regent and had ordered the formation of a regency council
(Consejo de Gobierno) in her support. Ferdinand’s brother, Don Carlos María Isi-
dro, however, contested the succession settlement arguing that the signature
under the Pragmatic Sanction, rendered forty years later by the successor of
the King who had issued it, was invalid. On 4 October 1833 he declared himself
the lawful King of Spain by the manifesto of Santarém.³⁶ Since Don Carlos shared
the reactionary views of Ferdinand VII, all liberal-minded Spaniards, in particu-
lar among the high aristocracy, the public servants and the educated middle
classes, not to mention the middle classes of the coastal cities, supported Isabel-
la and the regent. During the Queen’s minority the regent was dependent on the
support of these social groups. The consequence was a liberalization of the re-
gime and the renewed transition of the country to constitutionalism.³⁷
After Ferdinand’s death the regent had at first tried to continue the absolute
government of the deceased King. On 4 October 1833, the same day that Don Car-
los raised his claim to the throne, she published her program of government in a
manifesto that her first minister Cea Bermúdez had drawn up. Therein she de-
clared it her duty not to tolerate any limitation of the royal power entrusted to
her and not to admit any “dangerous innovations.”³⁸ Instead she announced re-
forms of the administration. Against this program resistance emerged from var-
ious parts and soon became public. One of the most prominent opponents of Cea
Bermúdez’ policy was the Marqués de Miraflores. A critical memorandum he
sent on 15 November 1833 to the regent, was spread without his involvement.³⁹
 Joaquin Tomás Villarroya, El sistema politico del Estatuto Real (1834– 1836) (Madrid: Inst.de
Estudios Politicos, 1968), 21.
 José Luis Commellas, Isabel II. Una reina y un reinado (Barcelona: Editorial Ariel, 1999), 27–
28.
 Manifiesto de S. M. la Reina Gobernadora, Palacio, 4 de octubre de 1833, quoted from: [Don
Manuel Pando Fernández de Pinedo], Marqués de Miraflores, Memorias del reinado de Isabel II,
vol. 1 (Madrid: Ed. Atlas, 1964), 197.
 Tomás Villarroya, Sistema, 30; the text of the memorandum in: Miraflores, Memorias, vol. 1,
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When the regency council also advocated a change of policy, the regent dis-
missed Cea Bermúdez and in January 1834 appointed the writer Francisco Mar-
tínez de la Rosa, a man in whose biography is reflected the history of Spanish
liberalism since 1814. Martínez had been a member of the second Cortes that as-
sembled at Cádiz in the autumn of 1813.⁴⁰ After Ferdinand’s return from exile he
shared the fate of many other liberals. During the night of 10 March 1814 he was
arrested at Madrid and imprisoned at the barracks of the royal guard where he
remained for about 20 months under indescribable conditions.⁴¹ On 15 December
1815 he was by the above mentioned royal decree sentenced to eight years of
hard labour in the fortress of Peñon de Vélez de la Gomera on the Moroccan
cost of the Mediterranean. Thanks to the revolt of Cádiz he regained his liberty
ahead of time in March.⁴² Immediately upon his return he was elected to the re-
stored Cortes. On 9 July he presided their solemn opening.⁴³ After the split of the
liberal camp into moderados and exaltados Martínez developed into one of the
most prominent spokesmen of the moderates. In February 1822 he followed an
invitation of the King and formed a cabinet.⁴⁴ Only a few months later, however,
the government succumbed in the July troubles short of civil war.⁴⁵ After the
French intervention had terminated the trienio liberal in April 1823, Martínez
de la Rosa asked for asylum in France. On 24 June he arrived at Bayonne.⁴⁶
On 26 September he settled in Paris. He remained there for seven years before
he returned home in the autumn of 1831.⁴⁷
The critics of the minister Cea Bermúdez had unanimously demanded the
convocation of the Cortes. As results from the memoirs of the Marqués de Mira-
flores they regarded this step as the only method by which the endangered mon-
archy could be placed again on secure foundations. The monarchy appeared en-
dangered by the controversy over the succession, by the minority of the Queen
and by the high-wrought expectations of many liberals who hoped, after Ferdi-
nand’s disappearance, for the restoration of the constitution of Cádiz. Miraflores
considered it an illusion to expect the resolution of the crisis from an absolute
regime. He was convinced that for this task a man was required who by his “au-
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thority” and by his “moral and material force” filled the “great gap” […] “the late
King had left. This man should either be of royal descent or base his power on
the sword.”⁴⁸ Cea Bermúdez had not been that man. Instead of resolving the cri-
sis he had by adhering to absolutism estranged from the party of the Queen
many personalities of moderately liberal ideas whose support the regent should
in her contest with the pretender under no circumstances have renounced. Like
many others Miraflores also advised her immediately to convoke the Cortes, but
he admonished her to take this step “very tactfully.” The Cortes she convoked
must in no case resemble those which had assembled on the basis of the consti-
tution of 1812. The least suspicion that she was about to restore the regime that
had fallen in 1823, would only engross the files of the pretender. If however she
proceeded with adequate caution she could assemble the sober-minded mem-
bers of the liberal party behind the Queen. These included many men of fortune
and prestige who were only waiting for an opportunity “to join the cause of Her
Majesty.”⁴⁹
Even if Miraflores at the moment did not expressly mention the imposition of
a new constitution, by pleading for the convocation of the Cortes he did not de-
mand anything else but a constitutional restoration of the endangered monarchy.
At the same time he defined the conditions for an attempt to secure the power of
the crown. In the civil war that was on the verge of breaking out the Queen was
in need of support. From the partisans of absolutism she could not expect assis-
tance, because these sided with the pretender. Neither could the regent count on
the adherents of the constitution of 1812. On the one hand this constitution was
based on popular sovereignty and therefore incompatible with monarchical re-
storation. On the other it had in the eyes of many Spaniards proved impractica-
ble during the trienio liberal.⁵⁰ Therefore the monarchy was obliged to strive for
an alliance with the composed and moderate forces of liberalism and to seek a
course between the extremes.
Francisco Martínez de la Rosa who was appointed first minister, embodied
this policy. Accordingly, only a few days after his taking up government prepara-
tions were initiated for the imposition of the Estatuto Real, a constitution based
on the monarchical principle. At first a draught was worked out on the minister-
ial level. On 7 March 1834 Martínez de la Rosa forwarded it to the regency council
(Consejo de Gobierno). In his accompanying note he justified it with the care of
Her Majesty for “the stability of the throne and the general well-being of the na-
 Miraflores, Memorias, vol. 1, 28.
 Ibid., 29–30.
 Tomás Villarroya, Sistema, 49.
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tion.”⁵¹ From 9 to 24 March the regency council deliberated in no less than six-
teen sessions on the draught of the ministers, before it transmitted to the council
of ministers a detailed comment.⁵² The most important objection of the regency
council referred to type and legal weight of the proposed Estatuto. The regency
council recognized in the draught only the torso of a constitution. Therefore it
proposed “to name” it instead of an Estatuto Real simply a “royal decree con-
cerning the convocation of the Cortes.”⁵³ Eventual supplements if required
could easily be worked out later on by the government themselves in collabora-
tion with the Cortes. Of this recommendation the government gave no heed. The
crown claimed sovereign power for itself and was not ready to share it with the
nation. Therefore it refused to assign to the Cortes the right to cooperate in the
revision of the constitution. But it followed the suggestion to grant to the Cortes
the right of petition. The regency council did not oppose the limitation of the
right to initiate legislation to the crown. On 10 April 1834 the regent signed
the Estatuto.⁵⁴
The Estatuto Real has indeed remained a torso in many respects. It is limited
to composition and procedure of the chambers and does not include the forma-
tion of the government and the position of the ministers or of the judiciary. In
particular, there is no catalogue of basic rights. Unusual in the text of a consti-
tution is the first article. It informs that the Queen-regent had on behalf of her
daughter Isabella II, referring to the pertinent articles in the “new Spanish col-
lection of laws of Castile” (Nueva recopilación de las leyes de Castilla) of 1567 re-
solved to convoke the Cortes generales of the realm. A date for the assembly is
not indicated. The constitutional norms for the Cortes are listed only afterwards,
beginning with the second article. But even in this part of the constitution more
than once reference is made to the Castilian collection of laws of 1567, namely in
the articles 27, 30, and 34. Instead of introducing new law, at these points the
Estatuto only confirms the already existing law. Article 27, for example, calls
to memory that “after the King’s death Cortes should be convoked in order
that his successor swear observance of the laws and receive from the Cortes
the oath of fidelity and allegiance due to him.” The wording shows that the Es-
tatuto Real was expressly inserted in the tradition of Spanish public law. The
Cortes had from of old been an institution of the Spanish monarchy and did
not have to be introduced anew. But the Estatuto Real reorganized division
and composition of the Cortes. In the Ancien Régime the assembly had consisted
 Quoted from ibid., 57.
 Ibid., 62.
 Ibid., 63.
 Ibid., 77. Text of the Estatuto Real ibid., appendix, 635–642.
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of three curiae that represented the clergy, the aristocracy, and the cities. The
constitution of Cádiz had put in the place of the three curiae a single chamber.
In article 2 of the Estatuto the Cortes were divided into two chambers, the Esta-
mento de Próceres and the Estamento de Procuradores. The Estamento de Procu-
radores was to be composed of the representatives of the high clergy, of the gran-
dees of Spain, the titulars of Castile, merited public servants and rich
landowners, industrialists, merchants, university professors, scientists, and writ-
ers. The grandees should be members by heritage, the other próceres should be
appointed by the King for life. The procuradores were to be elected by a high cen-
sus for a period of three years. The suffrage was limited to the 16.000 most heav-
ily taxed subjects.⁵⁵
The announcement of the impending convocation of the Cortes and the lim-
itation of the Estatuto to their composition and procedure are to be explained
from the preconditions of the imposition. As has been shown, in view of the crit-
ical situation of the monarchy after the death of Ferdinand VII several authors
had demanded the convocation of the Cortes. A constitution they had not ex-
pressly asked for. However, the convocation of the Cortes required a foundation
in constitutional law. If the constitution of Cádiz should not be brought into force
again, a new foundation had to be created. That was the purpose of the imposi-
tion of the Estatuto Real. Since no binding procedures could have been deduced
from the constitutional tradition of the realm, the Estatuto had to settle structure
and procedure of the future Cortes. In all matters it did not touch, the traditional
law should be observed. This rule corresponded to the principle that sovereignty
remained with the monarch and was subjected to those limitations only that
were expressly enumerated in the constitution.
The fact that the Estatuto presupposed the existence of Cortes as a matter of
course corresponded to the intention to let it appear, in relation to the Ancien
Régime, as little as possible as an innovation. The designation of Cortes alone
referred to the monarchy in an estates-based society. Estamento was the tradi-
tional term for “estate.” The use of the term estatuto instead of constitución
with its revolutionary connotations points in the same direction. It is as plain
as can be that by these linguistic regulations the government wanted to empha-
size that the legitimacy of the crown was not based on the national will but on
the ancient laws of the monarchy. In accordance with this principle in the letter
by which the council of ministers transmitted to the regent the Estatuto it is writ-
ten that it was to her that “had been reserved the glory of restoring our ancient
fundamental laws of which the non-observance had during three centuries
 Comellas, Isabel II, 33; Estatuto Real, Art. 17, in: Tomás Villarroya, Sistema, Apéndice IV, 638.
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caused so much trouble and of which the restoration by the august hand of Her
Majesty will be the happiest omen for the government of Her elevated daugh-
ter.”⁵⁶
The obvious incompletion of the Estatuto has caused not only the Regency
council but modern authors as well to deny it the quality of a constitution and to
interpret it merely as a decree for the convocation of the Cortes. Such an inter-
pretation is indeed suggested by the first article in which the Regent announces
her intention to convoke them. But essential features of a convocation decree are
missing in the document, namely place and date of the proposed meeting. Joa-
quín Tomás Villarroya in his treatise on the Estatuto Real has raised two further
objections to the supposition that it was merely a letter of convocation and no
constitution. In the first place he points out that the Estatuto does not refer to
a single case but expresses general norms. Article 25 is a case in point. It
rules that the Cortes assemble on the basis of a royal letter of convocation at
the place and on the day determined therein.⁵⁷ This alone shows that the Esta-
tuto itself cannot have been regarded as a letter of convocation. Accordingly
the Regent issued a formal letter of convocation for the assembly of the Cortes
on 20 May 1834 in which reference was made to the Estatuto by saying the Re-
gent convoked the Cortes “according to the principles contained in the Estatuto
Real.”⁵⁸ Joaquín Tomás Villarroya’s second objection to the thesis that the Esta-
tuto was merely a letter of convocation, consists in pointing out that renowned
contemporaries had indubitably regarded it as a constitution and discussed it as
such, no matter whether they consented to it or criticized it.
The expectations, with which the Estatuto was received in Spain, are docu-
mented in the Madrid newspaper La Revista of 16 April 1834. The delivery of the
printed copies had been announced for 10 o’clock in the morning of the day be-
fore. In the early hours already the royal printing-office had been thronged by a
great number of people who were waiting for the text: “Within a few moments
they snatched thousands of copies and distributed them in every corner of the
capital; reading it was the exclusive and coveted pursuit of all citizens […].”⁵⁹
 Exposicion preliminar al Estatuto real, in: Tomás Villarroya, Sistema, Apéndice III, 621: “AV.
M. está reservada la gloria de restaurar nuestras antiguas leyes fundamentales, cuyo desuso ha
causado tantos males por el espacio de tres siglos, y cuyo restablecimiento por la augusta mano
de V. M. será el más prospero presagio para el reinado de su excelsa Hija.”
 Estatuto Real, Art. 25: “Las Cortes se reunirán, en virtud de Real Convocatoria, en el pueblo y
en el día que aquélla señalare.”
 Quoted from Tomás Villarroya, Sistema, 105: the entire debate ibid., 102– 106.
 La Revista, 16 April 1834, quoted from ibid., 80.
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The paper continues: “It was not a novel by Walter Scott that aroused public cu-
riosity; it was and is the sacred claim to our civil rights and our future securi-
ty.”⁶⁰
Soon however curiosity and joy increasingly yielded to disappointment. Only
a short time after their opening there was initiated in the Cortes a lively debate
on an extension of the Estatuto.⁶¹ Several members of the Estamento de procu-
radores demanded that a catalogue of basic rights be drawn up, including pri-
marily the freedom of the press. On 28 August a group of procuradores directed
a petition to the government according to article 32 of the Estatuto and attached
to it the draught of a catalogue of basic rights. After a vivid discussion the second
chamber adopted the petition with a few amendments.⁶² For the time being the
resolution remained without consequences. In 1835 the demands of a revision of
the Estatuto grew more insistent. During the summer several provinces rose and
demanded a reform of the constitution. Some of them proposed the reintroduc-
tion of the constitution of Cádiz. In September Prime Minister Juan Álvarez Men-
dizábal promised a revision of the Estatuto. However he was not able to keep his
promise before his fall from office in May 1836. His successor Francisco Javier de
Istúriz took the project up again. A draught of 55 articles was adopted by the
council of ministers.⁶³ The draught took the demands of reform which had
been voiced since the promulgation of the Estatuto Real, largely into account.
It contained a list of basic rights such as freedom of the press (art. 3) and the
right of property (article 6). Expressly stated was the separation of powers
(art. 8– 10). The legislative power was to be exercised in common by the two
chambers and the King (art. 13). The right to initiate legislation was conferred
to either chamber separately and to the King (art. 12). The question of sovereignty
was not touched. Before Istúriz could introduce the draught into the Cortes, a
military revolt at La Granja, the summer residence of the Kings of Spain, forced
the Regent to reintroduce the constitution of Cádiz. The constitutional restoration
of the Spanish monarchy had failed.
To an explanation of this failure might contribute a comparison with the re-
storation in France. Both the Estatuto Real and the Charte constitutionnelle were
imposed in the hope to meet the expectations of the citizens. In either country
these expectations resulted from incisive historical experiences, of the Revolu-
tion in France, of the war of independence against Napoleon in Spain. Both in
 Quoted from ibid.: “No era una novela de Walter Scott la que excitaba la curiosidad pública;
era y es el título sagrado de nuestros derechos civiles y de nuestra seguridad venidera.”
 For a summary of the criticism at the Estatuto see ibid., 86–91.
 Ibid., 537–543.
 Ibid., 547–552; the text of the draft in: Miraflores, Memorias, vol. 1, 264–269.
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Spain and in France the impositions wrecked the hopes of attaining democratic
constitutions. In France Louis XVIII had replaced the Senatorial constitution of 6
April 1814 by the Charte. In Spain there existed at the death of Ferdinand VII nei-
ther a constitution nor the draught of a constitution, but the exaltados set their
hopes upon the reintroduction of the constitution of Cádiz. The constitution of
Cádiz was a myth. It was connected with the memories both of the sacrifices dur-
ing the resistance to Napoleon and of the humiliating suppression of the trienio
with the help of French troops in 1823. The Estatuto Real was measured against
the constitution of Cádiz no less than the Charte constitutionnelle was measured
– going further back – against the constitution of 1791. As compared to the dem-
ocratic constitutions the imposed constitutions were impaired by a structural
deficit which they could not overcome and which they tried all the more diligent-
ly to compensate by concessions regarding content. Missing was the declaration
of national sovereignty.
As to content the Charte constitutionnelle differed as little as possible from
the Senatorial constitution. In the declaration of Saint-Ouen Louis XVIII had em-
phasized that in principle he consented to the constitution. If only to avoid call-
ing this statement into question, he was interested in minimizing the changes
effected in the Senatorial constitution. Many articles, especially those that
were meant to confirm the achievements of the Revolution and the Empire
were indeed literally inserted in the Charte. But the Charte is much more detailed
and therefore more precise than the Senatorial constitution.While the Senatorial
constitution only contains 29 articles, the Charte numbers as many as 76. This
may be called an improvement.
A comparison of the Estatuto Real with the constitution of Cádiz, however,
reveals at once the great difference between the two texts. In the first place
they differed extremely by dimension. Whereas the Estatuto contained 50 arti-
cles, the constitution of Cádiz extended to no less than 384. As far as the reso-
lution of crucial questions is concerned, the most conspicuous deficiency is the
absence of essential traits which are ordinarily expected from a constitution,
most seriously the failure to state fundamental rights. Precisely in Spain which
under Ferdinand VII had two times – in 1814 and in 1823 – experienced the re-
peal of the constitution of Cádiz and the return to unlimited despotism, legal
guarantees were indispensable. In this respect the Regent had disregarded a cru-
cial prerequisite of the success of any restoration when it imposed the Estatuto
Real. Since the country still kept in mind the democratic constitution of 1812
which was widely regarded as a model, the imposition should have taken into
account to a much larger extent the demands of the radical liberals in order
to ensure at least a moderate chance of success.
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It should not be overlooked that the forced reintroduction of the constitution
of 1812 by the Regent on 13 August 1836 was subjected to the condition that gov-
ernment and Cortes cooperated in the elaboration of a new constitution. The
Cortes were convoked for 24 October. A committee was entrusted with the elab-
oration of a draught. The new constitution was put into force on 18 June 1837. In
determining the role of the Crown at the creation of the constitution the pream-
ble returned to the formula of the constitution of 1812. Isabella II proclaimed the
constitution as “Queen by divine right and by the constitution of the Spanish
monarchy.” Notwithstanding the formal appeal to divine right she simultaneous-
ly declares: “Since it is the national will to revise, in application of its sovereign
rights, the constitution of Cádiz of 19 March 1812, the Cortes generales, having
assembled for the purpose, decree and sanction the following constitution of
the Spanish monarchy.”⁶⁴
The first title of the constitution contains a catalogue of fundamental rights
which largely corresponds to the government draught of the preceding year. Leg-
islation is entrusted to the two houses of Parliament, to the Senate and the Con-
gress of deputies, on the one hand, and to the King on the other. The King is in-
violable. The ministers are responsible. Without ministerial countersignature
royal ordinances are ineffectual. Ministers may be members of either chamber.
Both houses separately and the King have the right to initiate legislation.
By the preamble the Cortes placed the new constitution unmistakably on the
foundation of national sovereignty. As compared to the Estatuto Real the defi-
nitely liberal character of the constitution of 1837 is also shown by the articles
on the right to initiate legislation. Following the Charte constitutionnelle it
was characteristic of imposed constitutions that they reserved this right to the
crown and granted to parliament only the right of petition. In this way parlia-
ment should be prevented from infringing on the prerogatives of the Crown ei-
ther by legislating or by changing the constitution. This protecting wall of the
monarchical principle had disappeared through the repeal of the Estatuto
Real, and the constitution of 1837 only underscored this change. The abrogation
of the Estatuto Real confirmed the failure of constitutional restoration in Spain.
As compared to the other European monarchies the constitutional restora-
tion in Spain was only of very short duration, and more than that: The imposed
constitution of April 1834 was opposed from the outset by many citizens. Some
explanations of this have already been given. On the whole it appears that the
backwards oriented policies of Ferdinand VII had polarized Spanish society to
a degree that after the two decades of his reign a constitutional compromise
 Constitución de la Monarquía Española, 18 June 1837, Preamble.
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had become impossible. If the imposition of the Estatuo Real was an attempt to
attain the impossible the odds notwithstanding, it was clearly a much too half-
hearted and thus unsuitable attempt. The incompletion of the Estatuto, the omis-
sion of a catalogue of fundamental rights, and the severe restrictions of the suf-
frage demonstrate a degree of timidity on the part of the Regent and her govern-
ment which is hard to understand. It should not be overlooked, however, that
she had taken over the government under extremely difficult circumstances. Fer-
dinand had severely undermined confidence in the monarchy. Upon his death a
civil war broke out over the succession. The Queen was a three year old child, her
mother a foreigner.
In comparison to the French restoration of 1814 the Spanish restoration of
1834 resembles a two-act play with a long break in between. The constellations
after the breakdown of the Napoleonic Empire resembled each other. In both
countries the monarchs were presented with a constitution based on national
sovereignty when they returned from exile. But whereas Louis XVIII immediately
subjected the Senatorial constitution to a revision and promulgated the revised
version as an expression of monarchical sovereignty only a few weeks after his
return, Ferdinand VII restored absolutism. It was only his widow Maria Cristina
in her capacity as Queen Regent for his daughter Isabella II who finally decided
to impose a constitution which remained, however, in many respects rudimenta-
ry, the Estatuto real. As it soon became clear, this concession came too late. Even
the Regent’s attempt of 1836 to impose a far more liberal constitution, proved un-
able to save monarchical sovereignty. There was no margin left for compromise.
At last the Regent had no choice but to swear the democratic constitution of 1837.
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When the French Empire broke down Italy was divided into four areas of domin-
ion.¹ A broad strip of territory along the Western coast of the Apennine Peninsula
from Piedmont to Latium and including the city of Rome had been annexed by
France and was governed from Paris. To the East it bordered on the Kingdom of
Italy (Regno d’Italia) which had been founded in 1805 with Milan as capital. It
was composed in the main of Lombardy, Venetia, Istria and Dalmatia, the Lega-
tions around Bologna, and the Marche region. Napoleon had himself crowned
King and connected the Kingdom by personal union with the French Empire.
His stepson Eugène de Beauharnais was made Viceroy. The Kingdom of Naples
in the South was since 1806 a French satellite. At first governed by Napoleon’s
brother Joseph it was in 1808, after Joseph’s takeover of the Spanish throne,
placed under the government of Napoleon’s brother-in-law Gioacchino Murat.
The fourth area was formed by the Isles of Sicily and Sardinia which Napoleon
had not been able to conquer, since they were shielded by the British fleet. On
Sicily King Ferdinand IV of Naples had found refuge, on Sardinia King Victor
Emanuel I of Sardinia. Upon the end of Napoleonic domination the former multi-
plicity of states was restored. But there were exceptions. The Republic of Genoa
was annexed by the Kingdom of Sardinia, because the great powers wanted to
erect a bulwark against new French expansionist tendencies at this point. The
Republic of Venice was united with Lombardy in a Lombardo-Venetian Kingdom
and in the interest of the European balance of power incorporated into the Habs-
burg monarchy. Possession of this Kingdom should secure to Austria the hegem-
ony over the Italian peninsula and in this way stabilize the European states sys-
tem as it had been renewed at the congress of Vienna. In the South the personal
union of the Kingdom of Naples and Sicily was restored. But in 1816 King Ferdi-
nand abrogated Sicilian autonomy and changed the personal union into a real
union by the name of a Kingdom of the Two Sicilies (Regno delle due Sicilie),
which he governed henceforth as King Ferdinand I from Naples. This step had
major consequences for the interior structure of the Isle of Sicily: In the Kingdom
of Naples incisive reforms had been carried through during the Decennio francese
(French decade). These reforms, among other things the introduction of the Code
civil, were from 1816 onwards transferred step by step to Sicily, whereas the con-
 Alfonso Scirocco, L’Italia del Risorgimento 1800– 1871, 2nd ed. (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1993), 14;
see also Volker Sellin, “Die Restauration in Italien,” in: Rainer Marcowitz and Werner Paravicini,
eds., Vergeben und Vergessen? Vergangenheitsdiskurse nach Besatzung, Bürgerkrieg und Revolu-
tion (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2009), 126.
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stitution that had in 1812 been created on the English model under the patronage
of the British plenipotentiary Lord Bentinck, was tacitly rendered inoperative.
From now on the Apennine Peninsula was subjected to Austrian hegemony
for four and half decades. Until the revolution of 1848 Austrian policy was in the
hands of State Chancellor Clemens Metternich. Under his leadership the Imperial
government both in interior and in foreign relations persistently defended the
Status quo.Wherever revolutionary tendencies made themselves felt, Metternich
sought to intervene either by diplomatic or, if need should be, by military means,
appealing to the alliance of the four great powers which had been concluded
against France at Chaumont in March 1814 and renewed a year later. In addition
he had secured himself against liberal reforms in the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies
by the treaty of 12 June 1815 by which King Ferdinand was obliged not to admit
any political changes that went beyond the principles governing in the Austrian
provinces of Italy.² In Lombardy and in Venetia as well as in all other provinces
of the Habsburg Empire Metternich opposed the introduction of constitutions for
fear of encouraging the struggle for independence of the various nationalities. By
the treaty just mentioned King Ferdinand was prevented from according a con-
stitution to his subjects.When however during the revolution of 1820 the citizens
of his realm forced him to adopt the constitution the Spanish Cortes had voted in
1812, Austrian troops marched in and compelled him to return to absolutism,
and when in 1821 the Spanish constitution was introduced in Piedmont, Austria
again intervened militarily.³
The introduction of the Spanish constitution in the Kingdom of the Two Si-
cilies and in the Kingdom of Sardinia was no more than its introduction in Spain
itself an act of restoration on the model of the imposition of the Charte constitu-
tionnelle in France. The three monarchs, to be sure, acted under the pressure of
the revolutionary movement like Louis XVIII. The constitution of Cádiz which
was forced upon them, however, was not based on divine right like the Charte,
but on the sovereignty of the people. Its introduction did not aim at strengthen-
ing the monarchical principle, but placed monarchy in the three countries at the
disposition of the nation.
In Metternich’s eyes the revolutions in the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies and
in Piedmont were a consequence of injudicious policies. After the breakdown of
 Traité d’Autriche et le roi des Deux-Siciles, 12 June 1815, articles séparés et secrets II, in: Re-
cueil des traités, conventions et actes diplomatiques concernant l’Autriche et l’Italie (Paris: Amyot,
1859), 203.
 For the revolutions of 1820/21 in Italy see Jens Späth, Revolution in Europa 1820–23. Verfas-
sung und Verfassungskultur in den Königreichen Spanien, beider Sizilien und Sardinien-Piemont
(Cologne: SH-Verlag, 2012).
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Napoleonic domination in Italy these countries had restored the bureaucratic ab-
solutism of the Ancien Régime and had not even preserved the council of State
characteristic of the Napoleonic constitutional system. The returning princes
thus renounced an institution which could have promoted the acceptance of
the monarchy among the population. The Napoleonic council of State had
been an institution independent from the bureaucracy and in which not only
highly placed state’s servants but also representatives of the social elites advised
the ruler und reported regularly on the needs of the country.⁴ The Supremo con-
siglio di cancelleria which King Ferdinand I had created in December 1816 in-
stead of the council of State did not possess the independence from the govern-
ing organs which had characterized the Napoleonic model. Accordingly the new
council was presided over not by the first minister as had been the case with the
council of State, but by the monarch.⁵ In order to forestall further revolutions
Metternich obliged King Ferdinand on the congress of Laibach in 1821 to reintro-
duce independent advisory bodies. He called to mind the experiences Austria
had made in the government of the Lombardo-Venetian Kingdom, where as
early as 1815 advisory bodies consisting of elected representatives of the country
had been established: two general congregations seated in Milan and Venice re-
spectively and a provincial congregation in each province.⁶ On 26 May 1821 Fer-
dinand I issued a decree which transformed the obligations imposed on the
Kingdom of the Two Sicilies at Laibach, into law. It provided for the creation
of two advisory bodies by the name of Consulte di Stato with far-reaching com-
petences. The Consulte were to have their seats at Naples and Palermo. Besides,
in every province was to be created a provincial advisory body (Consiglio provin-
ciale).⁷
Metternich expected that by establishing Consulte the monarchy would be
strengthened, because they would, not unlike the Napoleonic Council of State,
enable representatives of the social elites to cooperate at the formation of public
policy. The Consulte were characteristic instruments of restoration, because they
were meant to contribute to the acceptance of monarchy, even if in political effi-
cacy they remained naturally far behind a constitution. But constitutions were
excluded by Metternich. That the advisory bodies had to exercise a restorative
 On the Napoleonic Council of State see: Jacques Godechot, Les institutions de la France sous la
Révolution et l’Empire, 2nd ed. (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1968), 561–563.
 Carlo Ghisalberti, “Dalla monarchia amministrativa alla monarchia consultiva,” in: Ghisalber-
ti, Contributi alla storia delle amministrazioni preunitarie (Milan: Giuffrè, 1963), 155; Marco Mer-
iggi, Il Regno Lombardo-Veneto (Turin: UTET, 1987), 42–62.
 Ghisalberti, “Monarchia,” 161.
 Ibid., 162– 164.
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function, is demonstrated by a letter of the Austrian envoy to Naples, count Karl
Ludwig von Ficquelmont, of 1 April 1824, to the State chancellor. The Consulte,
he writes, are nothing but “an additional instrument in the hands of the King”
that was to help him “reconstruct the monarchy” (à reconstruire la monarchie);
their task was to inform the government of “the requirements and the truth.”
If “the concentration of power in the hands of the King” would constitute by it-
self already “the veritable monarchy” (la véritable monarchie), nothing would
have to be changed at Naples, because since 1815 the King had had a free
hand to do everything that he had deemed useful in the interest of the well-
being of his subjects, and he had been able to do it again since 1821. In this re-
spect “the monarchical principle” was valid without any limitation. In other
words: The King of Naples ruled absolute, his will knew no limits, but still Fic-
quelmont would not regard the regime as a perfect monarchy. He maintained
that it was not the will (volonté) of the King to which something had to be
added. Missing was force (force). The Consulte or other advisory bodies could
not by themselves provide him with force, if it was lacking, but they could
show him how to find and use it. Only in this way “the real restoration of mon-
archy” (la véritable restauration de la monarchie) could begin.⁸ But the govern-
ment of Naples was not ready to follow Metternich’s suggestions without reser-
vation. They delayed even the application of their own decree of 1821. In the
law of 1824 on the Consulta generale del Regno only a shadow remained of the
original concept. The Consulta for Sicily was not established at Palermo but at
Naples. Moreover, the tasks of the two bodies were reduced. By the decree of
1821 they would have been called to give an opinion on every draught law of
the government, but the law of 1824 permitted them to give comments only at
request.⁹
After Ferdinand I of Naples and Sicily the next Italian monarch to introduce
an advisory body was King Carlo Alberto of Sardinia. By edict of 18 August 1831
he established a State council which in composition and attributions exceeded
by far the Neapolitan Consulte. As is explained in the preamble to the edict
the King expected from this institution that it disclose to him the needs of the
population in the various parts of his country, make proposals for improvements
and discover abuses if need should be. Accordingly, here as well a provision was
made that to the general assembly of the State council were appointed, apart
from senior officials, also leading representatives of society from all over the
 Ruggero Moscati, ed., Il Regno delle Due Sicilie e l’Austria. Documenti dal marzo 1821 al novem-
bre 1830 (Naples: Presso la R. Deputazione, 1937), vol. 2, 238–239.
 Ghisalberti, “Monarchia,” 163, 169– 171.
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country. This norm, however, was already suspended for an indefinite period of
time in September 1831. Maintained was the regulation that the council of State
would give an opinion on every bill before its enactment.¹⁰
In other States of the Peninsula the introduction of consultative bodies was
delayed. Obviously, measures for the stabilization of thrones at the moment were
not considered urgent. The reason was less a belief that the monarchies were sta-
ble than Austrian hegemony in Italy. Since military interventions of the Habsburg
monarchy were to be expected, as soon as revolution appeared imminent any-
where, the Italian princes did not feel obliged to secure their thrones in the
long term by way of concessions. Quite to the opposite, after the experience of
1821 they had to reckon with Austrian intervention just as well, if they tackled
liberal reforms in their countries by themselves. Under these circumstances
the concession of constitutions and thus the only efficient type of a long-lasting
restoration was out of the question until 1848.
The political stagnation was drawing to a close only after Cardinal Giovanni
Mastai Ferretti had been elected to the Holy See on 16 June 1846. On 21 June the
new Pope was inaugurated and adopted the Papal name of Pius IX. Four weeks
later, following an ancient custom, he proclaimed an amnesty thanks to which in
the States of the Church hundreds of political prisoners were released and hun-
dreds of fugitive and exiled persons were invited to return home.¹¹ As never be-
fore, the amnesty of 1846 was hailed enthusiastically, even far beyond the bor-
ders of the Papal States. In numerous cities of the Peninsula joyous
demonstrations took place. The Papal action was everywhere understood as a
harbinger of liberty, of political unity and of Italian national independence. In
the words of Giacomo Martina the amnesty was “the spark” that “carried the
fire all over Italy and into a great part of Europe.” It had even aroused a “collec-
tive fever.”¹² The governments felt threatened by the public stir Pius IX had cre-
ated by his amnesty, since everywhere the demonstrations of joy and gratitude
were mixed with demands of political reforms.¹³ To what degree the demonstra-
tions were coordinated across the borders of the single States is shown by a sym-
 Ibid., 175– 180; Paola Notario and Narciso Nada, Il Piemonte sabaudo. Dal periodo napoleo-
nico al Risorgimento (Turin: UTET, 1993), 210–213.
 Giacomo Martina, Pio IX, vol. 1 (1846–1850) (Rome: Ed. Pontificia Univ. Gregoriana, 1974),
97–100. Martina estimates that about 400 prisoners had been released; the number of exiled
and fugitive persons who were invited to return appears to have been similar.
 Ibid., 101.
 Narciso Nada, “Le riforme carlo-albertine del 1847,” Rassegna storica toscana 45 (1999), 262;
for developments in the Regno delle Due Sicilie see: Alfonso Scirocco, “Il 1847 a Napoli: Ferdi-
nando II e il movimento italiano per le riforme,” Archivio storico per le province napoletane 115
(1997), 437–438.
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bolic act of national protest during the night of 10 December 1846, when on the
highest summits of the Apennines from Liguria down to Calabria gigantic fires
were lit.¹⁴ The authors of the action are unknown.
By the election of Pius IX and the ensuing amnesty the whole of Italy had
over night got into a revolutionary situation. Most of the governments sought
to obviate the menace by reforms. It is obvious that all of a sudden they no lon-
ger were sure that they could rely on the military power of Austria alone for pro-
tection. Therefore the year of 1847 was to become in all States of the Peninsula,
with the exception of Lombardy and Venetia, a year of reforms from above.¹⁵ But
the idea that the absolute monarchs even now still had the chance to calm down
the aroused spirits by introducing reforms without renouncing the monarchical
principle was questionable. This is illustrated by a satirical article of 21 June
1848, published in the democratically oriented Gazzetta del Popolo of Turin, in
which the “moderate monarchy” (monarchia moderata) is said to be “not only
just as despotic,” but “dissimulated over and above” that it was not.¹⁶
Forerunner in the policy of reform of 1847 was again Pius IX whose country,
to be sure, of all Italian monarchies required modernization by far the most ur-
gently. The press law of 15 March 1847 introduced the most liberal censorship in
contemporary Italy.¹⁷ On 19 April 1847 the Papal government issued a circular by
which the institution of a Consulta di Stato was initiated.¹⁸ From each province of
the Papal States should be elected and sent to Rome a person who “excelled by
his social position, by his wealth and by his knowledge” and who “was devoted
to the government and enjoyed public reputation and the trust of his fellow citi-
zens.” With the help of the appointed person the public administration should
be improved.¹⁹ When the news of the Papal initiative became known to the pub-
lic the citizens of Rome thronged Piazza del Popolo and from there marched to
Quirinal Palace where the Pope resided. Their route was illuminated by thou-
sands of torches fixed to the balconies of the houses. The procession carried
with it a poster on which in big letters was reproduced the Papal circular.²⁰ By
 Nada, “Riforme,” 254–255.
 On 20 and 21 March 1998 a congress was held in Florence that was devoted to the reforms of
1847; see “Le riforme del 1847 negli Stati italiani,” Rassegna storica toscana 45 (1999).
 Quoted from: Filippo Mazzonis, “La monarchia sabauda,” in: Umberto Levra, ed., Il Pie-
monte alle soglie del 1848 (Rome: Carocci, 1999), 151–152.
 Martina, Pio IX, 125.
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di Stato (Rome: Vittoriano, 1939), 34, 39 and passim; Martina, Pio IX, 129– 130.
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his decision to institute a Consulta di Stato Pius IX not only introduced a reform
of the State but permitted for the first time the participation of laymen in the ad-
ministration of the States of the Church. Under the chairmanship of a cardinal to
whom was adjoined a prelate as vice-chairman, the 24 ordinary members of the
body assembled on 15 November in Rome for their inaugurating session. They
had been chosen by the sovereign from proposals transmitted to him by the pro-
vincial councils, each one containing three names. The Roman aristocracy was
as well represented in the Consulta as the landed nobility of the provinces. Mem-
bers of the agricultural bourgeoisie were seated next to representatives of the
educated and the economic middle-classes of the towns. Among the members
there were numerous lawyers.²¹ The high-pitched expectations the public con-
nected with the Consulta caused the Pope in the very first session to make it
clear that even though he loved to stand up for his subjects, he would not toler-
ate that from “the supreme rights of his Papal office, as he had received it from
God and his predecessors,” the least part be curtailed. The attributions of the
Consulta were limited to advising his conscience and to discussions with the
ministers and the Holy Office. Those who expected that the Consulta would
put into practice “any private utopia” and the foundation-stone of an institution
“incompatible with Papal sovereignty,” deceived themselves.²² Obviously the
Pope was afraid to be driven by the wave of consent with which the first reforms
were greeted, from one concession to the next. The Austrian state chancellor Met-
ternich belonged to the number of those who, nevertheless, regarded the estab-
lishment of the Roman Consulta as a first step towards the overthrow of the ex-
isting political system. On 2 November 1847 he wrote to the Austrian envoy at
Paris that the Roman Consulta contained the germ of a representative system
that was compatible neither with the sovereignty of the head of the catholic
world nor with the constitutions of the church.²³
Like a confirmation of Metternich’s apprehensions appears a heated discus-
sion of December within the Consulta itself about the publication of their de-
bates. In the final analysis the question touched upon the nature of the institu-
tion. The Pope insisted on secrecy. To him the Consulta was a body to advise the
ruler. The advocates of publication on the other hand argued that its members
had emerged from elections, and the electors ought to have the opportunity to
inform themselves on the performance of the elected. By this argument the Con-
 A list of the members ibid., 54.
 Quoted from ibid., 55–56.
 Metternich to Apponyi, 2 November 1847, in: [Clemens Metternich], Aus Metternich’s nachge-
lassenen Papieren, ed. Richard Metternich-Winneburg, vol. 7 (Vienna: Braumüller, 1883), no. 1617,
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sulta was looked upon as something close to a representation of the people.
Whereas Pius IX regarded the Consulta as the utmost concession he was ready
to make, the discussion about the publicity of their debates shows how a de-
mand of reform, once fulfilled, brought forth further demands.²⁴ Not without rea-
son Carlo Ghisalberti has defined the consultative monarchy (monarchia consul-
tiva) as a mere intermediate stage in the development from bureaucratic
absolutism (monarchia amminstrativa) to constitutional monarchy (monarchia
rappresentativa or costituzionale). Conservatives regarded the consultative mon-
archy as a welcome alternative, liberals as a prelude to monarchical constitution-
alism.²⁵
On 7 May 1847 Grand-Duke Leopoldo II of Tuscany enacted a law on the free-
dom of the press on the model of the Roman press law of 15 March. On 24 August
a Consulta was established in Florence as well.²⁶ The creation of a militia fol-
lowed. Towards the end of the year the call for a constitution intensified. But
the government hesitated because it was afraid that political concessions
might provoke Austria to a new intervention.²⁷ Carlo Alberto of Sardinia on 29
October 1847 also ordered a series of reforms on the example of the States of
the church and Tuscany. A press law reformed censorship; the competences of
the police were restricted. A new criminal procedure was introduced. The people
greeted the measures with demonstrations.²⁸ On 27 November an edict on the re-
form of the communal and provincial administration was issued. In the future
the communal councilors (consiglieri comunali) should be elected. The mayor
(sindaco) should be chosen by the King from among the elected communal coun-
cilors. The provincial councilors should be determined by the King from a list of
candidates presented to him by the communal councilors. In the same way he
was to proceed in the appointment of the divisional councilors. The whole of
the communal reform, however, remained a dead letter, because in March
1848 it was rendered obsolete by the imposition of the constitution.²⁹
On 12 January 1848, on the 38th anniversary of Ferdinand II, King of the Two
Sicilies, a riot broke out at Palermo, the first revolution of 1848 in Europe. The
aims of the revolt were political autonomy and the restoration of the Sicilian con-
stitution of 1812 with timely adjustments. Within only seventeen days the garri-
son was driven out of the city. By the middle of February the government of
 On the debate see: Ara, Statuto, 67–75.
 Ghisalberti, Monarchia, 174, 182.
 Luigi Lotti, “Leopoldo II e le riforme in Toscana,” Rassegna storica toscana 45 (1999), 248.
 Ibid., 245, 249–250.
 Nada, “Riforme,” 263–264.
 Ibid., 264–267.
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the Bourbons on the Island had broken down. Only the city of Syracuse and the
citadel of Messina had withstood the assaults.³⁰ The unrest soon extended to the
mainland. Following revolts in Cilento in the province of Salerno, on 27 January
at Naples a demonstration took place with thousands of participants.³¹ Repeat-
edly the people shouted: “Long live Pius IX! Long live Italy! Long live the consti-
tution!”³² Thereupon on 29 January the King promised to impose a constitution.³³
The year before, Ferdinand had repeatedly refused to cede to the pressure of his
first minister, the Marquis of Pietracatella, and embark on reforms like the other
Italian monarchs in order to meet the expectations of the public. No later than 8
September 1846 Pietracatella had warned the King not to put his trust exclusively
on the army: “Instead of waiting weapons at the ready for the revolution every-
thing must be done to prevent it.”³⁴ At that time the minister had already pointed
out the critical situation especially in Sicily: “Sicily perspires discontent from all
pores: Even benefits remain without effect. Sicily is a case like Ireland and Po-
land.”³⁵ In the provinces of the mainland the danger was just as great. Among
the measures Pietracatella had proposed with a view to appeasing the citizens,
were the restoration of the Consulte in the manner, in which they had originally
been conceived, and the establishment of the Consulta for Sicily at Palermo, as
Metternich had demanded at the congress of Ljubljana. In addition he had rec-
ommended a far-reaching autonomy for the Island and a greater degree of liberty
of the press on the Prussian model.³⁶ At that time the King had disregarded Pie-
tracatella’s admonitions. Now the revolution had indeed broken out and had
compelled Ferdinand on 29 January to promise a constitution. Two days earlier
 Giorgio Candeloro, Storia dell’Italia moderna, vol. 3: La rivoluzione nazionale (1846– 1849),
3rd ed. (Milan: Feltrinelli, 1995), 120– 123.
 Kerstin Singer, Konstitutionalismus auf Italienisch. Italiens politische und soziale Führungs-
schichten und die oktroyierten Verfassungen von 1848 (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 2008), 196– 197.
 Luigi Parente, “Francesco Paolo Bozzelli e il dibattito sulla costituzione,” Archivio storico per
le province napoletane 117 (1999), 78.
 Singer, Konstitutionalismus, 195, 252 ff.
 Pietracatella to Ferdinand II, 8 September 1846, in: Alfonso Scirocco, “Il 1847 a Napoli: Fer-
dinando II e il movimento italiano per le riforme,” Appendix, Rassegna storica toscana 45
(1999), 294: “Invece di aspettare la Rivoluzione con le armi al braccio, bisogna far di tutto per
prevenirla”; idem in: Archivio storico per le province napoletane 115 (1997), 457.
 Scirocco, “1847,” Rassegna storica toscana 45 (1999), 296: “La Sicilia traspira da tutti i suoi
pori il malcontento: gli stessi benefizi sono inefficaci. La Sicilia è un stereotipo dell’Irlanda,
della Polonia.”
 Ibid., 297–298: “Vorrei come in Prussia permettere alla stampa di esaminare e discutere le
quistioni d’interesse pubblico, ponendoci i limiti e le garanzie esistenti in Prussia.”
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he had dismissed Pietracatella and appointed the Duke of Serracapriola prime
minister. On 30 January Francesco Paolo Bozzelli was made the new minister
of the Interior.³⁷ Bozzelli was directed to present a draught constitution within
ten days. The King signed the constitution on 10 February and proclaimed it
on the next day. Bozzelli had entered the public service of Naples under the gov-
ernment of Joseph Bonaparte. Following his participation in the rising of 1820 he
had been arrested and exiled in 1821. During his exile he had got to know the
political systems of England, France, and Belgium.³⁸ This explains why his
draught was heavily influenced by the Charte constitutionnelle of 1814 and
1830 and by the Belgian constitution of 1831. Other than the revised Charte of
1830 and the Belgian constitution Bozzelli’s draught was based exclusively on
the monarchical principle. King Ferdinand declared in the preamble, to be
sure, that he had promised a constitution because of the “unanimous desire
of his dearly beloved peoples,” but he added that this promise had originated
from his “full, free, and spontaneous will.” To this corresponded the way in
which the constitution was made. No body, elected by the nation, took part in
its elaboration. The King alone imposed it, Ferdinand II, by divine right Re del
Regno delle Due Sicilie.³⁹ The constitution did not grant autonomy to Sicily.
The island did not receive its own parliament.
As late as 1847 Ferdinand II had felt so secure on his throne that, other than
the rest of the Italian monarchs, he had not considered it necessary to take ac-
count of the public criticism the political torpidity had aroused. Now it was him
who by the precipitate imposition of 11 February foiled the attempts of the gov-
ernments at Rome, Florence, and Turin, to weaken the revolutionary movement
by initiating moderate reforms. Ferdinand’s rushing ahead left to the other mon-
archs no choice but to impose constitutions as well.
From the point of view of a lasting restoration of monarchy, to the Statuto
albertino must be given precedence over the other three constitutions. When
the revolution was over, the monarchs at Naples, Rome, and Florence restored
absolutism and thereby entirely jeopardized their credibility. By consequence
they lost their thrones in the process of national unification between 1859 and
1861. Only in the Kingdom of Sardinia the constitution was retained beyond
the year of 1849. Since between 1859 and 1870 the King of Sardinia annexed
one after the other all other States of the Peninsula, the Statuto albertino became
 Romualdo Trifone, “La costituzione del Regno delle Due Sicilie dell’11 febbraio 1848,” Archi-
vio storico per le province napoletane 70 (1947–1949), 28.
 Parente, “Bozzelli,” 82–83.
 Costituzione del Regno delle Due Sicilie, 11 Febbraio 1848, in: Alberto Aquarone et al., eds.,
Le costituzioni italiane (Milan: Ed. di Comunità, 1958), 565.
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the constitution of the Italian national State and remained in force until the end
of the monarchy in 1946.
By imposing the Statuto the government in Turin responded to the crisis that
had unexpectedly broken upon the monarchy in the beginning of 1848. In reac-
tion to the demonstrations that followed the amnesty of Pius IX neither King
Carlo Alberto nor the other monarchs had let themselves be induced to share
power with a representative assembly. His ideal remained bureaucratic absolut-
ism, a monarchy possessing an administration that was enlightened but in no
ways hostile to innovation. The reforms he carried through in October and No-
vember 1847, corresponded to this conception. It should be noted, however,
that even before the announcement of a constitution at Naples it had become
evident that the reforms only stimulated the citizens to expect further conces-
sions. Several political newspapers of various tendencies were founded in
Turin at the end of 1847 following the relaxation of censorship. By their reports
and commentaries they accompanied from now on the political development.
One of the newspapers was Il Risorgimento, organ of moderate liberalism, of
the moderati. Director of Il Risorgimento became Cesare Balbo. But the driving
force in the background was Camillo di Cavour.⁴⁰
Within the monarchy the strongest impulses towards a continuation of the
reforms came from Genoa. On 4 and 5 January at mass demonstrations in the
city the expulsion of the Jesuits and the creation of a civil guard were demanded.
Cesare Cabella drafted a petition to this effect and collected at least fifteen thou-
sand signatures. In the evening of 5 January at Marquis Andrea Doria’s house a
deputation of nine men was elected and charged to transmit the petition to the
King. The next morning the deputation left for Turin. But the King would not
allow himself to be pushed on the way of reforms by his subjects and refused
to receive the deputation. Instead he ordered the minister of the Interior, Giacinto
Borelli, to point out to them the lawlessness of their undertaking and to send
them back home. Meanwhile the Genovese initiative was taken over by the citi-
zens of the capital as well. In the evening of 7 January the representatives of the
Turin newspapers assembled at Hotel Europa and discussed possibilities of sup-
porting the deputation from Genoa.⁴¹ Whereas democratically-oriented partici-
pants of the assembly proposed to make one’s own the demands of the Geno-
vese, Camillo di Cavour proposed on behalf of the moderate wing of the
liberals (moderati) at the assembly, to chose a different path and invite the
 Rosario Romeo, Cavour e il suo tempo, vol. 2 (1842– 1854) (Bari: Laterza, 1977), 272–278.
 [Camillo Cavour], Tutti gli scritti di Camillo Cavour, ed. Carlo Pischedda and Giuseppe Tala-
mo, vol. 3 (Turin: Centro Studi Piemontesi, 1977), 1030, n. 1.
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King to grant a constitution.⁴² In the beginning of November 1847, immediately
after Carlo Alberto’s reform edicts of 29 October, Cavour had already declared
that the introduction of the representative system was ineluctable, but had ex-
pected it to come only after a couple of years.⁴³
The explanation of his unforeseen proposal is to be found in an unsigned
article Cavour published on 8 January in the newspaper Il Risorgimento. The ar-
ticle begins by a harsh criticism of the events at Genoa. They threatened the pub-
lic order and endangered the continuation of the policy of reform. Most of all
they put at risk the “harmony between monarch and citizens.” Demonstrations
as those of Genoa endangered “the foundation of any free government.” Free-
dom of opinion presupposed debate. But debates were made impossible “if
the clamour of masses of men in the streets and on the squares of a city dictates
the law to the State.”⁴⁴ However, Cavour warned the government to counteract
unrest with coercive measures: “Violence breeds more violence.” The demands
of the citizens had to be examined. For the sake of examinations of this kind
the Council of State (Consiglio di Stato) had been established. However, in its
present composition the Council of State was not able truly to represent national
opinion. Therefore the appointment of additional individuals was required – in
the interest of the continuation of the reforms, for securing the independence
and freedom of the fatherland, for the well-being of the citizens and for the sta-
bilization of the throne of Savoy on which all Italians placed their hopes.⁴⁵
The terms constitution and representative system do not appear in the arti-
cle. But its recommendations were tantamount to replacing the Council of State
that had been created on the model of the consultative monarchy, by a real rep-
resentation of the people and to creating a constitutional monarchy. By his ex-
plicit reference to the establishment of the Council of State Cavour sought to in-
sert his espousal of institutional reform in the political course the King had
already adopted. That was a clever assessment of the King’s cast of mind, all
the more so since Cavour simultaneously distanced himself emphatically from
the disturbances at Genoa. The King should not allow the street to force upon
him a policy. Instead it should result from his free decision. At the end of the ar-
ticle the motif of the advice emerges: restoration and stabilization of the monar-
 Narciso Nada, Dallo Stato assoluto allo Stato costituzionale. Storia del Regno di Carlo Alberto
dal 1831 al 1848 (Turin: Istituto per la storia del Risorgimento italiano, Comitato di Torino, 1980),
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chy in the long term. The unimpaired political debate with “free, educated, and
enlightened citizens” protected “the prince from the revolt of the people in exact-
ly the same way as it protected the people from arbitrary actions of the men in
power.”⁴⁶
However, Carlo Alberto was not yet ready to take such a step. For the time
being the reforms of 1847 had touched upon the limits of his readiness for con-
cessions. Meanwhile the development in the South of Italy came to a head. To the
imposition of a constitution by King Ferdinand II Carlo Alberto reacted with deep
resentment. In a personally hand-written letter to the minister of the Interior Bor-
elli he pointed out that the King of Naples could not have done greater harm to
the repose of Italy. It was to be expected that the success of the opposition in the
Kingdom of the Two Sicilies would encourage the opposition in other States as
well to enhance their activities. But this was no reason for the government in
Turin to lose courage, quite the contrary. If at Genoa, as the general governor
of the City, Marchese della Planargia, foresaw, a demonstration of joy should
be organized, patience was required. If, however, the demonstrators should de-
mand a constitution for Piedmont-Sardinia as well, he was determined to fight to
the bitter end.⁴⁷ But on 2 February the King believed the situation to be critical to
a degree that he considered laying down his crown.⁴⁸ But his ministers entreated
him to stay. At a session of the Consiglio di conferenza, the council of ministers,
Borelli declared that the abdication of the King would be the greatest misfortune
for the country. His name alone was a power. If he abdicated, everything would
fall down, and even the cause of the dynasty would be compromised.⁴⁹ Therefore
he asked the King to reconsider his attitude towards the constitutional question.
The decision of Ferdinand of Naples had indeed brought about a new situation.
The demand of a representative form of government would soon be made in
 Ibid., 1032.
 Emilio Crosa, “Lo Statuto del 1848 e l’opera del ministro Borelli. Con lettere inedite di Carlo
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Piedmont as well.⁵⁰ On 3 February 1848, at a meeting of the Consiglio di confer-
enza under the chairmanship of the King, Borelli recommended openly the im-
position of a constitution. The arguments by which he tried to win over the King,
underscore the restorative motif of the proposal. The point of departure of his
reasoning was the idea that an uprising would take place, unless it was prevent-
ed in time: “Refusing a constitution could provoke unrest, a revolt, perhaps
bloodshed and at last anarchy.”⁵¹ If the King waited, until the constitution was
forced upon him by the revolution, he inevitably risked weakening the monar-
chy. If, however, he granted it of his own accord, before it was demanded
from him, he would strengthen the throne and monarchy and neutralize the ad-
vance of the agitators, and the formation of the constitution would remain in his
own hands. Openly Borelli threatened the resignation of the entire cabinet if the
King insisted on his point of view.⁵² After Borelli the other ministers spoke one
after the other. Unanimously they underlined the gravity of the situation and en-
dorsed the advice of the minister of the Interior. Only by granting a constitution
could the King save the State and the dynasty, the minister of public works, Des
Ambrois, added.⁵³ Several ministers did not believe that the country was ready
for constitutionalism. After the latest developments in Sicily and Naples, howev-
er, revolt and anarchy threatened if the Crown refused to make the necessary
concessions.
On 5 February at an extraordinary meeting the municipal council of the city
of Turin resolved to send a petition to the King asking for a constitution. The cav-
alier Derossi di Santa Rosa had introduced the proposal. In the petition reference
is made to the demonstrations not only in Naples, but in Genoa, Turin, and many
other cities of Piedmont as well, and it was asserted that the constitution would
complete the reforms of the previous autumn, fortify the government and render
the throne more secure.⁵⁴
At the next meeting of the Consiglio di conferenza on 7 February it was re-
solved that the King publicly promise on the next day to grant a constitution. It is
a symptom of the general sensation of crisis that the government tried to inform
 See Borelli’s undated letter to Carlo Alberto in: Crosa, “Statuto,” 540–541.
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the public as comprehensively as possible of its intentions. In this way the deci-
sion fitted in well with the restorative tenor of the discussions in the Consiglio di
conferenza. In all contributions it was pointed out that Carlo Alberto governed
his country excellently and that therefore there was in fact no reason to intro-
duce a new system of government. The question of imposing a constitution
was discussed exclusively from a tactical point of view. The debate did not center
on the advantages or disadvantages of constitutionalism in contrast to bureau-
cratic absolutism, but on the best method of steering the monarchy as uninjured
as possible through the crisis and to preserve power and authority of the Crown.
A few days later Cavour commented on the events in a letter to Giacomo Gio-
vanetti, writing of “the so happily mastered crisis.” The King had ceded “to the
necessity of the times.” A constitution had become unavoidable in order to pre-
vent the unrest from spreading and to stop the radical party that strove towards
an “ultra-democratic constitution.” Cavour continued that the situation required
the formation of a “conservative liberal party” (un partito liberale conservatore).
He expected that soon an “extreme, impatient party” (un partito estremo, impa-
ziente) would be formed. One had to get ready to fight it and to support the gov-
ernment in this struggle.⁵⁵ On 13 February 1848 Cavour wrote to Mathilde de La
Rive, in few weeks the political institutions of the country had experienced a
“complete revolution.” He called it a “happy revolution,” because it had cost nei-
ther tears nor blood, and above all, because the Crown had neither been humili-
ated nor deprived of its moral authority. The hitherto existing institutions had no
longer been in accord with the development of society: The new institutions
would, so he hoped and believed, “satisfy the overwhelming majority of the
country.” He was convinced that there was no reason to fear “further upheav-
als.”⁵⁶
Indeed: Monarchical sovereignty had been maintained. No concessions had
been made to democracy. Accordingly, Carlo Alberto on 4 March proclaimed the
Statuto albertino in his capacity of King by the grace of God. He retained Ancien
Régime language also in that in the preamble he addressed not the citizens but
 Cavour to Giacomo Giovanetti, [after 8 February 1848], in: Camillo Cavour, Epistolario, vol. 5
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his “well-beloved subjects” (i nostri amatissimi sudditi).⁵⁷ The concept of subject
was unfit for the constitutional age.⁵⁸ But the wording is not strictly upheld in
the text of the constitution. The section on the fundamental rights is devoted
to the rights and duties of the “citizens” (cittadini). Article 24 states that all in-
habitants of the Kingdom (regnicoli) are equal before the law. But beyond such
terminological variations the constitution was without doubt liberal. Article 10
placed the right to initiate legislation into the hands both of the monarch and
of the two chambers, and article 67 limited the monarch’s freedom of discretion
by the prescription, central in all monarchical constitutions, that acts of govern-
ment would only be valid if they were countersigned by the responsible minister.
In the meantime in Tuscany as well unrest had attained a degree that Grand-
Duke Leopoldo II no longer could avoid promising to his country a constitution.
During the whole of 1847 the government in Florence had reacted to the repeated
demands of reform with utmost restraint. A disappointing press law, the creation
of a civil guard and the institution of a Consulta with limited advisory compe-
tence had not been sufficient to subdue the growing excitement.⁵⁹ In September
1847 the Grand-Duke was told by his own foreign minister, Neri Corsini, that “the
only means” that had remained, “to replace the government on secure founda-
tions was the transition from pure monarchy (monarchia pura) to moderate mon-
archy (monarchia temperata).” If Leopoldo did not grant “a reasonable constitu-
tion,” he ran into the danger that a constitution would be forced upon him which
was essentially determined by the “democratic principle.”⁶⁰ On 13 February Bet-
tino Ricasoli warned the government in his paper La Patria not to delay the un-
avoidable step any longer. The longer the government hesitated, the weaker the
monarchy became.⁶¹ In the meantime this admonition had become obsolete, be-
cause at court by order of the Grand-Duke for two days a committee of five no-
tables had been busy elaborating the text of a constitution. The committee had
been instituted through highest resolve (motuproprio) of 31 January and was orig-
 Statuto del regno di Sardegna, 4 March 1848, preamble, in: Aquarone, Costituzioni, 662; also
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inally meant only to prepare a reform of the existing press law and of the Con-
sulta di Stato. There had at first been no mention of a constitution.⁶² Obviously,
Leopoldo had still hoped to avoid this concession. His change of mind was
caused by the news of Carlo Alberto’s promise of a constitution for the Kingdom
of Sardinia of 8 February. This is shown already by the dates, since on 11 Febru-
ary the Grand-Duke enlarged the task of the committee by an additional motu-
proprio in which the creation of a national representation (rappresentanza nazio-
nale) was announced. All at once time appeared essential for the defense of the
throne. To the citizens of Tuscany, however, the Grand-Duke appealed by his sec-
ond motuproprio not to lose patience: “Wait calmly only a few more days until
the projects which are meant to secure your future, are ready.”⁶³
The committee fulfilled its new task within four days. Therefore the Grand-
Duke was able to proclaim the Statuto fondamentale as soon as 15 February.⁶⁴
The constitution provided for two chambers, a Senate to be appointed by the
Grand-Duke for life, and a Chamber of deputies (Consiglio generale), the 86 mem-
bers of which were to be elected.⁶⁵ The right to initiate legislation was reserved to
the government (Art. 50).With this constitution Tuscany placed itself on the level
of the Charte constitutionnelle of 1814. The Grand-Duke was not prepared as yet
to make a single step beyond absolute necessity.
In the Papal States as late as January 1848 the impression had prevailed as
though the public were satisfied by the reforms of the year 1847. But the promises
of the King of the Two Sicilies gave a new impulse to the opposition. In early Feb-
ruary there were demonstrations for a constitution in the streets and on the
squares of Rome and in other cities of the States of the Church.⁶⁶ The demonstra-
tions were mixed up with anti-clerical elements. On 8 February at a great gath-
ering at Rome people shouted: “Death to the government of priests!” (Morte al
ministero de’ preti).⁶⁷ Obviously, the demand of a constitution in the States of
the Church aimed not only at political participation but also at the secularization
of the State. If the Pope hesitated longer than all the other Italian sovereigns, be-
fore he promised a constitution, one of the reasons was certainly the difficulty to
separate spiritual and secular power in a constitutional system. On 12 February
he appointed a commission of ten members and ordered it “to propose systems
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of government compatible with Papal authority.”⁶⁸ Members of the commission
were exclusively clergymen, among them seven cardinals.⁶⁹ Obviously, the Pope
was afraid that the participation of laymen would lead to the demand that he
share sovereignty with them.⁷⁰ On 12 March the commission adopted a constitu-
tion. On 14 March it was proclaimed by Pius IX. In the preamble the Pope recal-
led that in the preceding year he had instituted an “advisory representative as-
sembly” (rappresentanza consultiva) and expected that it support his
government in legislating and in the administration. But since the neighbouring
countries had deemed “their peoples” mature enough to receive “the blessing of
a not only advisory but decision-making representation,” he did not want to
demonstrate less respect towards his subjects than those. The constitution de-
clared the “holy college of cardinals who elected the Pope” the Senate. Besides,
provision was made for a parliament consisting of two chambers, a “High Coun-
cil” (Alto consiglio) and a “Council of Deputies” (Consiglio dei Deputati). The right
to initiate legislation was reserved to the government and to each of the two
houses, provided that at least ten members supported an initiative of their re-
spective chamber (Art. 35).
With the proclamation of the constitution of the Papal States all four of the
Italian States not belonging to the house of Habsburg had adopted constitution-
alism. The history of the impositions in the four States shows characteristic par-
allels in essential respects. Under the protection of the great powers and espe-
cially of Austria the governments concerned had been able until the beginning
of 1848 to defend absolutism. The constitutions were imposed from fear of rev-
olution as political demonstrations increased rapidly. The demonstrations were
triggered by the amnesty Pope Pius IX had proclaimed after entering upon office
in the summer of 1846.With the exception of Ferdinand II the Italian princes had
at first tried to contain the revolutionary movement by reforms. Among the most
important measures were a relaxation of censorship, the admission of civil
guards, and the institution of advisory bodies (Consulte) of the kind the congress
of Ljubljana had first imposed on the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies in 1821. In the
beginning of the year 1848, however, it had become clear that the reforms were
not sufficient to satisfy the citizens. The outbreak of the revolution at Palermo
and the extension of the disturbances to the mainland caused King Ferdinand
II to a precipitate promise of a constitution. In this way he triggered a chain re-
action that within two months spread to the whole of Italy. Every success of the
 Quoted from ibid., 108.
 The names in: Aquarone, Costituzioni, 597.
 Ara, Statuto, 110.
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opposition in one State immediately encouraged the demonstrators in all others
States to demand the same concession from their monarchs. Following the impo-
sition of a constitution in Naples the monarchs feared for their thrones if they
refused to cede to the demands. Only by imposing constitutions they hoped to
save the monarchy, and the constitutions were just liberal enough to grant the
attainment of this objective. In Sicily in particular, however, the constitution
of 11 February for the Neapolitan-Sicilian composite State failed to satisfy the op-
position, because it did not grant autonomy to the Island.
On 12 March 1849 Ferdinand II dissolved the parliament at Naples not to con-
voke it again. But the 1848 constitution was not expressly abrogated. Formally
revoked instead was the constitution of Tuscany. In his memoirs Grand-Duke
Leopoldo justifies this decision by the political change-over that had taken
place in Europe. The coup d’état of Louis-Napoléon Bonaparte of 2 December
1851 had driven away “the spectre of revolution”: “France and Europe respired.”
On 31 December 1851 Emperor Francis Joseph had revoked the Austrian constitu-
tion. Thus the moment had arrived “to do away with the Tuscan constitution.”⁷¹
In November 1848 the Pope had fled from Rome. Thereupon elections to a con-
stituent assembly had been held in the city. The assembly convened and pro-
claimed a republic. When in May 1849 the Pope returned on his throne with
French help he did not restore the constitution of 1848. Only in the Kingdom
of Sardinia the Statuto albertino of 4 March 1848 remained in force beyond
the abortive revolution.
The impositions of constitutions in early 1848 were measures aimed at the
restoration of the monarchies threatened by revolution. Each of the four sover-
eigns acted under the pressure of demonstrations and from fear of losing his
throne. An imposed constitution is no less a contract between monarch and sub-
jects. If a monarch revokes it one-sidedly or renders it tacitly inoperative, he
commits a coup-d’état. Whereas the imposition was meant to strengthen the
monarchy, the breach of the given promise was bound irrevocably to weaken
it. This was revealed in 1860, when the citizens who had been cheated out of
their constitutions, in their overwhelming majority valued the attainment of na-
tional unity under the Statuto albertino and King Victor Emanuel II of Sardinia
higher than loyalty to their traditional rulers.
 Franz Pesendorfer, ed., Il governo di famiglia in Toscana. Le memorie del granduca Leopoldo
II di Lorena (1824– 1859) (Florence: Sansoni, 1987), 397: “Era manifesto che era venuto il tempo




On 9 October 1905, at 6 o’clock in the evening, Tsar Nicholas II received his first
minister, count Sergej Jul’evič Vitte, at Peterhof Palace for a conversation. Vitte
had requested the audience on 6 October in a letter to the Tsar. He had been mo-
tivated to take this step by count Dmitrij Martynovič Sol’skij, president of the
economic department of the Council of State.¹ Vitte had justified his request
with the political demonstrations and strikes that had troubled the country for
days. He pointed out that he agreed with Sol’skij in that “into the actions of
the State life had to be breathed” and that “fundamental reforms of the whole
administrative mechanism” had to be tackled.² It is characteristic of the situation
of the Russian monarchy in these days that Vitte had to cover the distance of 30
kilometers from Sankt Petersburg by boat on the Neva, because the railways were
on strike.³ Vitte, born in Tiflis in 1849, had from 1892 to 1903 been Russian min-
ister of finance. In this capacity he had, in accordance with Friedrich List’s “Na-
tional System of Political Economy,” energetically espoused the development of
the infrastructure and the rapid industrialization of Russia. Among his chief ac-
complishments were the introduction of the gold standard in 1897 and the con-
struction of the Trans-Siberian Railway.⁴ In August 1903 the Tsar unexpectedly
released him from his office and appointed him president of the committee of
ministers instead.⁵ Since every minister possessed access to the sovereign his
new position did not offer additional opportunities to influence policy.⁶ Another
important political commission was entrusted to Vitte only in June 1905. In Feb-
ruary 1904 Japan had attacked Port Arthur on Liaodong peninsula which Russia
had leased in 1898 for a period of 25 years, and by this act triggered the Russo-
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Japanese war for supremacy in Manchuria. In the course of the war the Tsarist
Empire proved unequal to the new great power in the Far East. Symptomatic
of Russian inferiority was the fate of its Baltic fleet. In order to employ it against
Japan it had to be sent to the theatre of war through the Belt and around the
Cape of Good Hope. Immediately upon arrival it was almost entirely annihilated
on 14 May 1905 in the naval battle of Tsushima. From now on Russia’s will of war
was broken. On the invitation of the President of the United States, Theodore
Roosevelt, plenipotentiaries of the two warring States in August met at Ports-
mouth, New Hampshire, for peace negotiations. Vitte had been appointed
head of the Russian delegation. In recognition of his success in the negotiations
the Tsar conferred the earldom upon him.
In the meantime the interior situation of Russia came to a head. Since the
beginning of the year the country had been shaken by a series of severe crises.
The 9 January 1905 is remembered in history as Bloody Sunday of St. Petersburg.
A peaceful demonstration of workers who had come to hand over a petition to
Tsar Nicholas II in the Winter Palace, ended up in a blaze of army gunfire. At
least 130 people died, about a thousand were wounded.⁷ The consequences
for the autocracy were drastically represented to the Tsar only a few days later
by the minister of Agriculture, Aleksej Sergeevič Ermolov, in a personal encoun-
ter. As Ermolov pointed out, the protest movement had already spread to other
cities. An extension to the countryside could not be excluded. If it should come
to extremes, the Tsar could no longer depend on the army. After all, the demon-
strators originated from the same people as his soldiers. In spite of these warn-
ings the Tsar did not heed Ermolov’s advice to pronounce a public regret and to
look after the families of the victims.⁸ On 12 January Petr Struve wrote in a lead-
ing article of the paper Osvoboždenie: “In this way one cannot live on!”⁹ On 4
February Grand-Duke Sergej Aleksandrovič, General Governor of Moscow and
uncle of Nicholas II, fell victim to an assassination. It was the first mortal at-
tempt upon the life of a member of the Tsar’s family since the assassination of
Alexander II in 1881. Bloody Sunday had triggered a series of strikes that exceed-
ed everything that had been seen so far. In January alone, there were more work-
ers on strike in Russia than in the previous ten years combined.¹⁰ During the first
 Manfred Hildermeier, Die Russische Revolution 1905– 1921 (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1989), 51.
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quarter of 1905 more than twenty times the number of workers participated in
strikes than in any one year since 1895. The strike movement spread to provinces
which during the previous ten years had either not known any labour disputes at
all or very few only.¹¹ At Ivanovo-Voznesensk, a center of the textile industry, 250
kilometers east of Moscow, the strike carried on for over two months, from May to
July 1905.¹² In the course of the year numerous unions and professional associ-
ations were founded, even by members of the liberal professions. In May dele-
gates of fourteen associations assembled in Moscow and created an umbrella or-
ganization, the “Union of Unions” (sojus sojusov). The liberal historian Pavel
Miljukov was made president of the umbrella organization.¹³ Society, separated
from the State, was about to organize themselves.
During the first half of the year the strikers’ demands were chiefly economic.
But since strikes, regardless of their purpose, were against the law, every strike
was a rebellion against the political authorities. Bloody Sunday had an impact on
politics also in the narrow sense of the term. The Tsar realized that he had to ap-
proach society. In a ukase for the Senate of 18 February he encouraged authorities
and citizens in the whole Empire to make proposals for the improvement of the po-
litical structures, a reverence to public opinion that was scarcely compatible with
the claim to autocratic power.¹⁴ Simultaneously he directed a rescript to the minister
of the Interior, Aleksandr Grigor’evič Bulygin, and ordered him to form a commis-
sion and charge it to make plans for a representative body that was to discuss legis-
lative proposals before they were adopted by the government.¹⁵ The message for the
Senate triggered a veritable flood of petitions during the ensuing months. The au-
thors were in the main private associations of all kinds and several government
agencies. The demands included the appointment of the members of the Bulygin
committee by election, social and political reforms, and the convocation of a constit-
uent assembly.¹⁶ By calling a constituent assembly the Tsar would have acknowl-
edged revolution. That was exactly what he sought to avoid. The empire-wide peti-
tion campaign, however, resulted in an unexpected politicization of the citizens, all
 Abraham Ascher, The Revolution of 1905, vol. 1: Russia in Disarray (Stanford: Stanford Uni-
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the more so since the proposals were for the most part published in the local news-
papers with the consequence that the awareness of the need of reform spread every-
where. The “consultative State Duma” (Soveščatel’naja Duma) was introduced on 6
August by a “Highest Manifesto” to which were attached a statute of the State Duma
and an electoral law.¹⁷
Louis XVIII had represented the imposition of the Charte constitutionnelle as
a bestowal of privileges in the tradition of the Kings of the Middle Ages in order
to counteract any impression as though he had made concessions to the Revo-
lution, incompatible with the ancient right of the monarchy. A similar endeavour
is discernible in the manifesto by which the introduction of the consultative
State Duma was announced. The Tsar maintains in the document “concord
and unity” (soglasie i edinenie) of Tsar and people were “the great moral force
that had created Russia in the course of the centuries.” As early as 1903 he
had appealed to the country to coordinate elected bodies and organs of the gov-
ernment in the sphere of local administration with a view to overcoming conflicts
among them. “The autocratic Tsars, our predecessors, have never ceased to re-
flect upon this.” Now time had come to follow their example. Nicholas expressly
emphasizes that the introduction of a consultative Duma would not affect the
“autocratic power” (samoderžavnaja vlast’) which was imbedded in the funda-
mental law of the Empire.¹⁸ Like Louis XVIII Nicholas placed the greatest empha-
sis on retaining public power in its entirety, notwithstanding the concessions he
had proclaimed. From 19 to 26 July he had invited the cabinet and high public
officials along with several respected notables to a conference under his chair-
manship at Peterhof Palace to discuss the proposals of the Bulygin commission.
The central issue was the question whether a merely consultative State Duma
was compatible with the Tsar’s claim to unlimited possession of autocratic
power.¹⁹ Baron Schwanebach, one of the liberal-minded participants in the con-
ference, felt very strongly about this. Turning to the Tsar who presided over the
conference, he declared that it was natural that the reform in question would re-
 Vysočajšij manifest, 6 August 1905, in: Zakonodatel’nye akty, 129–131; Učreždenie Gosu-
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sult in “a limitation of your autocratic rights,” but since it is a “self-limitation,” it
will “strengthen your Majesty’s hallowed authority.”²⁰ Thus he coined the basic
idea of restoration into a single sentence: the forced cession of rights weakened,
whereas the voluntary renunciation strengthened monarchy.
The electoral law that was proclaimed on 6 August along with the Imperial
Manifesto and the statute of the State Duma, provided for an extremely complicated
indirect procedure of elections to the Duma. High property qualifications excluded
the working class and a large part of the agricultural population from the suffrage.
At St. Petersburg out of a population of approximately 1,4 million only 7.130 persons
had the right to vote, at Moscow 12.000 out of 1,1 million. For the population of the
extra-European parts of Russia only unsatisfactory allowance was made.²¹ The
Duma was to meet no later than the middle of January of 1906.²²
In June the doubts about the reliability of the armed forces which Ermolov
had pronounced after Bloody Sunday, seemed to be confirmed when on the bat-
tleship Potemkin that belonged to the Black Sea fleet of Russia, a mutiny broke
out. Triggered by a complaint of the cooks about rotten meat the revolt ended up
at Odessa on 15 June in a new bloodshed. Thousands of Odessans had assembled
at the port where members of the crew had deposited the corpse of their killed
speaker Grigorij Nikitič Vakulenčuk upon a bier. Before long, agitators mixed
with the crowd. Grief and protest turned into revolt. People marched plundering
through the streets of the city. In the evening troops began to fire on the crowd. It
is estimated that 2.000 people were killed, 3.000 were wounded.²³
During the summer months the strike movement that had begun in January
gradually subsided. But already in early autumn new conflicts were in the making.
On 20 September in Moscow the printers downed tools, and in the beginning of Oc-
tober the Union of Railroad Employees proclaimed a general strike. On 10 October
there was no more train from and to Moscow. The railroaders of St. Petersburg
joined the strike. Within a short period of time food prices soared in Moscow and
St. Petersburg. In Moscow the deceased could no longer be buried.²⁴
That was the state of affairs when Vitte was received by Nicholas II on 9 Oc-
tober. In preparation for the encounter Vitte had asked Vladimir Dmitrjevič Kuz-
min-Karavaev, a right-wing liberal exponent of the zemstvo movement, to draft a
memorandum with a comprehensive program of government on the basis of fun-
 Quoted from ibid., 97.
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damental reflections on political philosophy.²⁵ Vitte’s report at the audience was
an abridged version of the memorandum. The point of departure was a phrase in
the second paragraph: “Thinking Russia has outgrown the existing structures.”
The “exterior forms of Russian life” must be assimilated to the ideas with which
the reasoning majority of society is imbued.²⁶ Vitte explained carefully that it
was only through comprehensive reforms that the indispensable transformation
of the country could be achieved. It required “labour, steadfastness, and circum-
spection,” but most of all “time.”²⁷ Nicholas listened to Vitte without making any
comment, but asked him to come back the next day.²⁸
The memorandum, on which Vitte’s report had been based, begins by the state-
ment that the “watchword which lay at the basis of the present social movement in
Russia,” was “freedom.”²⁹ The roots of the liberation movement “reached down into
the depths of the centuries” and in the last analysis “into human nature.”³⁰ With
this wide-ranging introduction Vitte obviously hoped to convince the Tsar that
the movement could not be stopped and that therefore it was imperative not to
delay the reforms any further. Until now the demands of the opposition had re-
mained within the sphere of what appears “feasible and reasonable.” Meanwhile
however the “evil symptoms of a terrible and stormy outbreak” were increasing
every day. In broad layers of society the government was losing support, and the
authorities were showing day by day their “weakness, incompetence, and helpless-
ness.” The institution of the consultative Duma on 6 August had remained almost
without any effect. Therefore, the Tsar was left with no other choice but to take
the government into his own hands: “A government that does not direct events
but is directed by them, plunges the State into ruin.”³¹ But as soon as the govern-
ment takes the lead it will recover the support of society and in this way the ability
to control the movement. If in the beginning of his exposition Vitte had declared
freedom the watchword of the present social movement, he now demanded that
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the government make freedom the guiding principle of their policy as well. But this
presupposed the introduction of a constitution (konstitucija). There was “no other
expedient for the rescue of the State.” Progress in history was irresistible. “The
idea of civil liberty” will at any rate prevail, “if not by way of reform, certainly by
way of revolution.”³² A revolution in Russia however would,Vitte continued prophet-
ically, assume apocalyptic dimensions and lay “everything in ashes, without sense
and without mercy.” In what shape Russia would emerge from such an ordeal, tran-
scended every power of imagination; “the horrors of the Russian Revolution” might
“surpass everything” that hitherto “had been recorded in history.”³³ All the more ur-
gent it was to overcome the actual crisis by an efficient policy of reform. To this ef-
fect Vitte had outlined a program expressly aimed at “saving the fatherland” (spasti
otečestvo).³⁴
In his memoirs Vitte quotes a report of Prince Nikolaj Dmitrjevič Obolenskij
of the summer of 1906 in which the dramatic events of October 1905 are record-
ed. According to Obolenskij during the encounter of 9 October Vitte had declared
to the Tsar that there were only two ways to overcome the crisis. The first solution
was conferring “unlimited dictatorial power” (neograničennaja diktatorskaja
vlast’) on a trustworthy personality, and authorizing it to break every resistance
by force, “even if it should cost immense bloodshed,” a policy, for which he,
Vitte, would not accept responsibility. The second solution was “following public
opinion” and “embark upon the constitutional path”: “In other words, Your
Highness decides upon imposing a constitution (darovanie konstitucii) and con-
firms count Vitte’s program.”³⁵
The constitution Vitte had in mind, provided for a State Duma that in legis-
lating possessed not only advisory, but deciding vote. Besides, it should have
budgetary power and control public administration. Vitte tried to overcome the
Tsar’s opposition to the introduction of a constitution by affirming that even
the deciding vote of the Duma would not limit the power of the Tsar since he re-
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tained the absolute veto power with the consequence that no resolution of the
assembly would obtain force of law without his sanction.³⁶ Vitte urgently recom-
mended a reform of the electoral law. The law that had been introduced in Au-
gust for the advisory Duma had created an “artificial system of representation,”
and the restrictions on the franchise and other regulations had excluded from
the elections to the Duma whole categories of citizens.³⁷
The imposition of a constitution, Vitte hoped, would restore confidence in
the Tsar and thus renew monarchical legitimacy. To Vitte’s concept of govern-
mental reform also belonged the institution of a cabinet under the presidency
of a responsible first minister possessing the exclusive right to report to the mon-
arch. Hitherto every minister had been free to pursue his own policies and had
thus been in a position to induce the Tsar repeatedly to contradictory actions.³⁸
How the country could the easiest be turned around, was controversial with-
in the government. Whereas Vitte tried to persuade the Tsar to assuage public
excitement by promising a constitution, the deputy minister of the Interior, Gen-
eral Dmitrij Fedorovič Trepov, simultaneously General Governor of St. Peters-
burg, on 14 October issued a proclamation to the population of the capital pro-
hibiting every demonstration and procession. In case people who had assembled
in the streets or on public squares would not disperse upon demand, police and
army were instructed not to use blanks and not to spare bullets.³⁹
Vitte’s assurance that the institution of a deciding Duma would not reduce
the power of the Tsar, as long as he disposed of the absolute veto, was certainly
incorrect. To be sure, by his veto power the Tsar could block every single project,
but if legislating should not cease, he had to acknowledge that henceforth he
would no longer legislate all by himself. By imposing a constitution in time
he would for the time being at least prevent the usurpation of the constituent
power by the people.
On 14 October Prince Orlov phoned Vitte from Peterhof to inform him that the
Tsar wanted to meet him on the following day at 11 a. m. He was asked to bring with
him the draft of a manifesto which was to be worded in such a way that all promises
contained therein would appear as given by the Tsar personally. In the draft Vitte’s
recommendations of 9 October should be listed as “facts granted by the Tsar.”⁴⁰ For
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the sake of prudence Vitte would have preferred that the Tsar limit himself to sanc-
tioning the text of his report instead of publishing a manifesto in his own name.⁴¹
He does not explain his doubts about the manifesto more in detail. But it is to pre-
sume that by the ministerial countersignature he wanted to exonerate the Tsar from
the responsibility of the risky move. After all, the imposition aimed at splitting the
opposition.Whether the concessions went far enough for this purpose,was not sure.
After Bulygin’s project of August had already missed its political objective, the Tsar
could not again risk a failure. Nicholas and his entourage appear not to have under-
stood that much, however. The obvious lack of comprehension of what constitution-
alism meant,was no propitious omen for the success of the constitutional system in
Russia.
Vitte asked Prince Aleksis Dmitrjevič Obolenskij, member of the State Coun-
cil, who happened to be present, to draft a text by next morning.⁴² His unmistak-
able order to Vitte notwithstanding the Tsar was considering as late as 16 Octo-
ber to renounce concessions and struggle through the crisis, if need should be,
by applying force. This was one of the two expedients that Vitte had sketched
out. The Tsar would have been obliged to appoint a new Minister if he considered
applying force and to confer full dictatorial power to someone who was ready to
steer the government through the state of emergency because Vitte had declined
the responsibility of such a course. As a candidate for the office of dictator Nich-
olas had in mind his cousin, Grand-Duke Nikolaj Nikolaevič. When the minister
of the Imperial household, Baron Vladimir Borisovič Frederiks, revealed this
plan to him, the Grand-Duke is reported to have taken his revolver out of his
pocket and to have shouted:
“You see this revolver. I shall presently go the Tsar and beseech him to sign the manifesto
and the program of count Vitte. Either he will sign, or I shall shoot myself a bullet into the
forehead in his presence.”⁴³
Vitte was not the only person the Tsar had asked to draft a manifesto. Several ver-
sions have long been known that the former minister of the Interior, Ivan L. Gore-
mykin, had presented together with the head of the petition chancellery, Baron Alek-
sandr A. Budberg. Recently a further draft has been discovered that Budberg had
written by himself und which provided for concessions that surpassed by far Vitte’s
 Ibid.; the text of the report in: [Vitte], “Černovik,” 62–66; the content of the report is dis-
cussed in: Szeftel, “Decisions,” 477–483.
 Vitte, Vospominanija, vol. 3, 14.
 Quoted from ibid., 41.
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manifesto. According to this draft the chamber of deputies should be elected by uni-
versal suffrage. The members of the upper chamber were to be appointed by the
Tsar. The president of the council of ministers and on his proposal the other minis-
ters should also be appointed by the Tsar. It was expressly stated that they would be
responsible to both chambers “for the overall performance of the government of the
State.”⁴⁴ Budberg’s proposals show that even within the closest entourage of the
Tsar the situation of the country was considered dramatic to a degree that some
of his advisors went so far as to recommend the introduction of parliamentary gov-
ernment in order to preserve the monarchy.
The Tsar decided in favour of Vitte’s draft, all the more so since Vitte had
declared that he would remain in the cabinet only if the Tsar supported his
course. On 17 October the Tsar finally made up his mind and signed. The man-
ifesto was a mile-stone in the history of Russian constitutionalism, comparable
to the promises of constitutions given by Charles Albert of Sardinia in February
and Frederick William IV of Prussia in March 1848. The purpose of the October
manifesto is said to be “the improvement of public order.”⁴⁵ The preamble once
more cites the two methods of resolving the crisis which the government has in
mind: Either repression of the unrest or pacification of the State (umirotvorenie
gosudarstva). With a view of overcoming the crisis without resorting to violence
the Tsar reports to have given to the government three instructions: first, to grant
to the citizens the imperturbable foundations of civil liberty, i.e. personal inviol-
ability and freedom of conscience, of speech, of assembly, and of association;
second, to grant also to those classes of citizens the suffrage to the State
Duma who had not received it yet; thirdly, to stipulate that every legislative proj-
ect had to be approved by the State Duma, and to insure that the members of the
Duma were entitled to control the legality of public administration.
The October manifesto brought Russian absolutism to an end. The Empire
turned constitutional. The history of the making of the manifesto and the circum-
stances of its proclamation leave no doubt that the Tsar had decided upon this
step because he believed that it was the only way to recover freedom of action.
He was ready to dispense with part of his prerogative and to share power with a
popular representation in order to stabilize his hold on the government. The suc-
cess of this policy depended to a great extent on the degree of firmness with
which it was pursued. It remained to be seen whether the Tsar was moved to
 Proekt manifesta A. A. Budberga (A. A. Budberg’s draft of a manifesto), in: A. V. Ostrovskij
and M. M. Safonov, eds., “Neizvestnyj proekt manifesta 17 oktjabrja 1905 goda” (Unknown draft
of a manifesto for 17 October 1905), Sovetskie Archivy 2 (1979), 63–65.
 Text of the manifesto in: Krasnyj Archiv 11– 12 (1925), 46–47, in: Pravo. Eženedel’naja Juridi-
českaja Gazeta, 25.10.1905, 3395–3397, and in: Zakonodatel’nye akty, 237–238.
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it by a momentary embarrassment only or by the conviction that in Russia as
elsewhere the development of society demanded the transition to constitutional-
ism. As Vitte reports in his memoirs, in October 1905 he regarded the monarchy
as endangered for other reasons as well:
“When I took over the government, I was fully aware that two things were required if Russia
were to overcome the revolutionary crisis and if the house of Romanov were left unshaken
– to obtain a great amount of money in order to be relieved from all financial anxieties,
and” – after the end of the Russo-Japanese war – “to relocate the chief part of the army
from beyond Lake Baikal into the European part of Russia.”⁴⁶
During the crisis the troops were badly needed for the maintenance of internal
security, and from the disposal of liquidity the freedom of action of the govern-
ment depended. After tough negotiations with an international consortium an
agreement was signed in Paris on 3 April 1906 providing for a loan of two and
quarter milliards of Francs.⁴⁷
In Nicholas’ diary there are only three sentences under the 17 October 1905:
“I signed the manifesto at five o’clock. At the end of a day like this the head grew
heavy, and the mind got confused. Lord, help us, save Russia and give her
peace!”⁴⁸ The meagerness of the note stands in no relation to the political signif-
icance of the occurrence, but it corresponds to the Tsar’s habit to limit himself in
his diary to the registration of external processes. In detail, however, he ex-
pressed himself in the letters to his mother, Marija Fedorovna, a Danish princess,
daughter of King Christian IX. In the days under discussion she was with her
family at the court of Copenhagen at Amalienborg Castle. In a letter of 19 October
Nicholas revealed the motives which had been at the bottom of his decision to
sign the October manifesto.⁴⁹
 Vitte, Vospominanija, vol. 3, 219.
 Ibid., 247; Harcave, Count Sergej Witte, 219.
 K. F. Šacillo, ed., Dnevniki Imperatora Nikolaja II (Diaries of Emperor Nicholas II) (Moscow:
Orbit, 1991), 285.
 M. Pokrovskij, ed., “Perepiska Nikolaja II i Marii Fedorovny (1905– 1906 gg.)” (Correspond-
ence of Nicholas II and Marija Fedorovna (1905– 1906)), Krasnyj Archiv 22 (1927), 153–209; the
numerous passages of Marija Fedorovna’s letters written in French are reproduced in the original
wording. The collection contains 45 pieces from the period between 18 May 1905 and 10 Novem-
ber 1906. In 1928 a French translation of the Russian edition was published with explanatory
notes: see Paul L. Léon, ed., Lettres de Nicolas II et de sa mère, l’Impératrice douairière de Russie
(Paris: Les Documentaires, 1928). An English edition of the correspondence was arranged by Ed-
ward J. Bing, ed., The Letters of Tsar Nicholas and Empress Marie, being the confidential corre-
spondence between Nicholas II, last of the Tsars, and his mother dowager Empress Maria Feodor-
ovna, London 1937. The letters published by Bing, all in English translation, cover a much longer
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The Tsar begins by describing the strikes and the unrest, first in Moscow,
then in St. Petersburg as well. As a consequence the two cities had been “cut
off” from “the interior governments” of the country. For a week already the Baltic
railway had been on a standstill. The only connection between Peterhof castle
and the capital was by sea. When “at meetings” – na mitingach, “a new vogue
expression,” as the Tsar added in brackets – an armed uprising had been decid-
ed upon, he had ordered General Trepov, General Governor of St. Petersburg, to
put the troops of Petersburg garrison in standby and to order them to repel every
attack by force of arms. Only by this peremptory order had he succeeded in
bringing the “movement or revolution” (dviženie ili revoljucija) to a halt. “Terrible
days of quiet” (groznye tichie dni) had ensued, and one had had a feeling as it
precedes “a strong thunderstorm” in summertime. Everybody’s nerves had
been strained to the extreme, and “naturally such a situation could not be
borne for a long time.”⁵⁰
During these “terrible days” he had regularly met Vitte. The conversation
had begun in the morning and had ended only in the evening at nightfall. Ob-
viously in the face of the immediate menace which was directed against the au-
tocracy, Vitte had succeeded in convincing the Tsar of the ineluctability of the
measures he had proposed, since Nicholas continues by pointing out that two
ways out had been envisaged. The first one was “the appointment of an energetic
military man and to try with all disposable forces to quell the sedition.” In this
way, however, peace would have been restored only for a certain period of time;
“streams of blood” would have run, and the urgent reforms would not have been
tackled. This was the resort to dictatorship that Vitte had already mentioned in
his memorandum of 9 October as an alternative which however he did not advo-
cate. The second alternative which was indeed chosen, was granting “civil
rights” (graždanskie prava) to the population – “freedom of speech, of the
press, of assembly, and of association and the inviolability of the individual”; be-
sides the obligation that every project of law was brought before the State Duma.
period of time than the edition by Pokrovskij. The first letter dates from 1879, the last one from 21
November 1917. As the editor explains in the preface, only those letters have been included in the
volume of which he believed they “were of the relatively greatest human and historical interest,”
and frequently the letters have not been reproduced in their entirety (see: The Editor’s Foreword,
ibid., 19–20). The German edition of the correspondence – Wladimir von Korostowetz, ed., Der
letzte Zar. Briefwechsel Nikolaus‘ II. mit seiner Mutter (Berlin: Metzner, 1938) – is a translation of
Bing‘s English edition. The omissions are not indicated. For scientific purposes the French edi-
tion appears to be the most adequate, apart from the Russian original.
 Nicholas II to Marija Fedorovna, 19 October 1905, in: Pokrovskij, Perepiska, 167: “Čuvstvo
bylo, kak byvaet letom pered sil’noj grozoj!”
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This, however, was the essence of a “constitution” (konstitucija).⁵¹ Vitte had pas-
sionately defended this course of action and declared, if it was risky, it was also
the only one that was feasible. In his report Nicholas continues by saying that
almost everyone he had asked, was of the same opinion.⁵²
As the Tsar continues in his report to his mother, the search for a way out of
the crisis was interlocked with the problem of the relationship between the Tsar
and his first minister and thus of the preconditions of government efficiency. As
has been pointed out, since 1903 Vitte’s position was “president of the commit-
tee of ministers.” The committee was not a cabinet. The president’s freedom of
action was limited. Every minister possessed personal access to the monarch.
Under these circumstances neither could be achieved discipline within the cab-
inet nor did the president dispose of the necessary support for winning the Tsar
over to his ideas. But constitutionalism required ministerial solidarity. Therefore
count Sol’skij had recommended in August, on behalf of a special conference he
had presided, the transformation of the committee of ministers into a cabinet.
This transformation would be connected with the creation of the office of
prime minister who would in the future preside at cabinet meetings in the
place of the Tsar.⁵³ The transformation was in fact commissioned by the highest
order of 19 October. The third article of the order demanded that the council of
ministers (sovet ministrov) work under the presidency of a personality appointed
by the monarch and chosen primarily among the ministers.⁵⁴ From now on the
cabinet was an autonomous institution, separate and distinct from the Tsar.
On 18 October, the day after signing the October manifesto, the Tsar appointed
count Vitte the first prime minister in Russian history.⁵⁵ Vitte had signified to
the Tsar that he could accept the charge only on condition that the Tsar assent
to his program and refrain from interfering with his governance.⁵⁶ The fact that
the Tsar accepted Vitte’s conditions indicates the gravity of the situation.
The Tsar’s letter to his mother is a unique document. In no other case of an im-
position exists a comparable personal statement of the imposing monarch about his
decision making process. A few statements give the impression as though Nicholas
wanted to justify his actions opposite his mother, for instance at the very start where
he writes he did not know how to begin.⁵⁷ After all, she was the widow of Alexander
 Ibid., 167– 168.
 Ibid.
 Szeftel, “Decisions,” 484–488.
 “Imennoj vysočajšij ukaz,” Zakonodatel’nye Akty, 244.
 Harcave, Count Sergei Witte, 177; Szeftel, “Decisions,” 487.
 Nicholas to Marija Fedorovna, 19 October 1905, in: Pokrovskij, Perepiska, 168.
 Ibid., 166.
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III who had been a determined and firm defender of autocracy. On the other hand
Marija Fedorovna had declared Vitte when he urged Nicholas to sign the October
manifesto, in a letter to the Tsar of 16 October the “only person who can help
you and can be of use to you” – un homme génial énergique et qui voit clair.⁵⁸
And her later letters do not reveal any criticism regarding her son’s decision.
Quite the contrary: On 1 November she assured him that he could not have acted
otherwise at all.⁵⁹ Therefore the helplessness which the Tsar’s letter is conveying ap-
pears in fact to be genuine. Ultimately, so Nicholas interprets his action, he signed
the manifesto for the only reason that he had not found anybody who was able to
show him an alternative way out of the severe crisis of the autocracy and dissuade
him from attaching his signature. On the other hand, it is obvious that he did not
possess the least understanding of the development of Russian society as it was rap-
idly advancing on the road to industrialization. Besides, the political calculation
that underlay the manifesto, namely that its most important aim was to recover
the confidence of the partisans of the monarchy, is not mentioned in his letter at
all. Granting basic rights to the citizens and giving to the State Duma a share in leg-
islation to him obviously was not part of a vision of a free and lawful society. He did
not even attempt to veil that he had not acted from personal conviction but exclu-
sively under the compulsion of the circumstances. This, however, gives rise to the
question how determined he was to abide by the constitution once it had been in-
troduced.
The October manifesto was only a promise. Now it was the government’s
turn to insert the promises into a constitution. The elaboration took until the
spring of 1906. On 23 April the Tsar put it into effect under the name of “funda-
mental laws of the State” (osnovnye gosudarstvennye zakony). The name recalled
the codification of the Russian laws that Michail Speranskij had carried through
in 1832. The term konstitucija was avoided on purpose because it would have
evoked associations with Western revolutionary ideas. Resorting to existing
legal traditions at the same time was meant to counteract the impression as
though the Tsar had allowed himself to get carried away to unheard of innova-
tions. By its name alone the new Russian fundamental law thus resembled the
Charte constitutionnelle of 1814 which had been inserted by Louis XVIII into
the tradition of medieval privileges.
One of the promises contained in the October manifesto was the elaboration
of an electoral law that corresponded to the criteria indicated therein. Since the
 Marija Fedorovna to Nicholas II, 16 October 1905, in: Pokrovskij, Perepiska, 166.
 Marija Fedorovna to Nicholas II, 1 November 1905, ibid., 171: “Enfin tu ne pouvais pas agir
autrement, le bon Dieu t‘a aidé à sortir de cette terrible et plus que pénible situation […].”
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council of ministers was unable to agree on a draft,Vitte proposed to the Tsar on
30 November to invite the cabinet, members of the State council, and other pub-
lic figures for deliberations to Carskoe Selo.⁶⁰ After the July conference at Peter-
hof castle this was already the second time within the year that Nicholas con-
vened the highest dignitaries of the State.⁶¹ Two more periods of deliberations
were to follow, the first one in February, and another one in April. In the mean-
time it became clear that Vitte’s hopes that the interior situation would rapidly
ease, were fulfilled only in part. On 27 October Nicholas wrote to his mother Vitte
had not expected to get confronted with so many difficulties. It appeared strange
that “such an intelligent man” had let deceive himself in his confidence in a
“rapid calming down.”⁶² All the more urgent was the swift adoption of an elec-
toral law. The secret deliberations of Carskoe Selo began on 5 December and
were presided over by the Tsar.⁶³ The deliberations were based on two alternative
drafts. One of the two, in the minutes called project no. 1, had been approved by
the council of ministers and was an improvement of Bulygin’s electoral regula-
tion in that the right to vote was extended to further classes of society. Depend-
ing on the category to which a citizen was assigned, his vote possessed more or
less weight. The other draft, called project no. 2 in the minutes, had been worked
out by two renowned public figures who were not members of the government –
Aleksandr Ivanovič Gučkov, son of a Moscow industrialist and member of the
city council there, and Dmitrij Nikolaevič Šipov, an exponent of zemstvo liberal-
ism. The council of ministers had asked them to elaborate electoral rules based
on universal suffrage.
At Carskoe Selo Šipov and Gučkov spoke first and defended their draft. Šipov
began by remembering that Russia was in the middle of a severe crisis. “Between
government and society” an “abyss” (propast’) had opened which it was urgent
to close again. It is true that by the October manifesto a basis for the pacification
of the country had been laid. But now it mattered to publish as soon as possible
an electoral law and to fix the date for the convocation of the State Duma. The
Duma had to be composed in a way to gain “the confidence (doverie) of all well-in-
 Harcave, Count Sergei Witte, 194.
 Verner, Crisis, 205–217; Pares, “Conference,” 87– 120.
 Nicholas II to Marija Fedorovna, 27 October 1905, in: Pokrovskij, Perepiska, 169.
 The minutes of the deliberations on the reform of the electoral law have been published in:
V.Vodovozov, ed., “Carskosel’skija soveščanija. Protokoly sekretnago soveščanija pod predseda-
tel’stvom byvšago imperatora po voprosu o rasširenii izbiratel’nago prava” (Deliberations at Car-
skoe Selo. Unpublished protocols of the secret deliberation chaired by the former Tsar on the
question of suffrage extension), Byloe no. 3 (25), September 1917, 217–265.
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tentioned subjects of your imperial Majesty.”⁶⁴ In this respect the electoral law of 6
August had been imperfect. It had taken into account only the wealthy classes and
had therefore not received the required consent (sočuvstvie) in society. On the other
hand the law had permitted the extremist parties to strengthen the “revolutionary
movement among the masses.”With the help of the Duma it was now to be attempt-
ed to tie the citizens again to the state. But the Duma would enter upon a conser-
vative course only on condition that the entire people of Russia and not only certain
classes were enfranchised.⁶⁵ To what degree the electoral regulation of August had
missed this mark was demonstrated by the next speaker, Gučkov. In Moscow only
8.200 citizens were permitted to vote. Under universal suffrage voters would have
numbered 300.000.⁶⁶
When Šipov contended that there was an abyss between government and soci-
ety, he alluded not predominantly to the council of ministers who could easily have
been replaced, but to the monarchy itself and to the whole apparatus of state. Ba-
sically he was concerned about the abyss between a society without political partic-
ipation worth mentioning, and a state that was separated from it and governed it
like a foreign conqueror. By this diagnosis Šipov tried not only to explain the revolu-
tionary disturbances in the country, but also to show a way out of the crisis. Closing
the abyss appeared to be possible only by creating a national representation elected
by all classes of society. Šipov was convinced that the monarchy could recover sup-
port in society only on the basis of a democratic electoral law.⁶⁷ The terms confi-
dence and consent that were used in this connection, had from the beginning be-
longed to the discourse of restoration. Confidence and consent are only synonyms
of legitimacy, and without legitimacy no government could persist. Therefore the ex-
tension of the suffrage to include all segments of the population appeared as a
means to restore monarchical legitimacy and, considering the deep crisis of the
country, as the most important instrument to restore monarchical authority in Rus-
sia. The fact alone that the autocrat Nicholas invited the leading public figures to
Carskoe Selo for extraordinary deliberations on the right of electing to the Duma,
shows how central a significance was attributed at court to the cooperation of
the people in the formation of policy.
Gučkov joined Šipov in advocating a democratic electoral law: “In my opin-
ion granting universal suffrage (vseobščee izbiratel’noe pravo) is inevitable,” and




 Ibid., 239: “V osnovanie izbiratel‘noj sistemy dolžen byt’ položen princip demokratičeskij”
(The electoral system must be based on the democratic principle).
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if it is not conceded voluntarily it will in the very near future be extorted by the
revolutionary movement.⁶⁸ It seems that the assembly was unanimous in the
opinion that the Duma was to be organized and composed in such a way as
to guarantee the maintenance of monarchy and state. Baron Pavel Leopol’dovič
Korf declared himself to be sure that the masses would vote conservative, and
Šipov agreed with him: “If universal suffrage is introduced, our candidates
will be elected, if not […], our opponents.”⁶⁹ Vitte who had originally advocated
project no. 1, meanwhile also advocated universal suffrage. He justified his posi-
tion by the argument that the revolutionary fermentation (smuta) had by all
means to be overcome. This could not be done by force. There were not enough
troops. Therefore there was no choice but to “take the road of moral appease-
ment.” The electoral law had to satisfy “the whole population, the whole peo-
ple,” and “not this, a second, or a third category, each one of them separately.”⁷⁰
Prince Aleksis Dmitrjevič Obolenskij proposed a middle-way between the two
projects by introducing universal suffrage on the one hand, but attributing differ-
ent weight to the single voters on the other. This should be made possible by
making the people vote within one of three categories: farmers, land-owners,
and at last those who were neither farmers nor landowners, in other words, es-
sentially the population of the cities.⁷¹ With a view to creating a counterweight to
the elected chamber Vitte recommended, not unlike Budberg had done in his
draft of the October manifesto, to create side by side with the lower chamber
a State council forming a first chamber.⁷² Nobody doubted the critical state of af-
fairs in the country. “At present Russia is experiencing a revolution,” Vitte de-
clared.⁷³ The demands of the revolutionaries must be anticipated by adequate
policies. Therefore, Šipov explained, it was imperative to remedy the grievances
which had turned out a “suitable breeding ground” for revolutionary propagan-
da.⁷⁴ Baron Korf was optimistic that the convocation of the State Duma would
put an end to the revolution.⁷⁵
Overcoming the crisis into which Russia had plunged, and restoring monar-
chical authority were the primary issues in every contribution. On the second day
 Ibid., 241.
 Ibid., 241–242.





 Ibid., 243: “Sozyv gosudarstvennoj dumy – eto konec revoljucii” (The convocation of the
State Duma – that is the end of the revolution).
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of the deliberations, on 7 December, the Tsar terminated the discussion of the
two projects and declared that only the first one was acceptable. He added
that he had been wavering during the two sessions. “But this morning it has be-
come clear to me that the first project is better, less dangerous and more ade-
quate to Russia. As to the second project I feel that it cannot be adopted. It is
impossible to go ahead by steps too great. If one concedes universal suffrage
today, the democratic republic has come close. That would be unreasonable
and a crime. The first project contains more guarantees of implementation of
the reforms proclaimed in the manifesto of 17 October.”⁷⁶ More guarantees of im-
plementation meant more security that the crisis could be mastered by the prom-
ised reforms and that the monarchy would in the end be stronger. In other
words: The Tsar regarded universal suffrage as a concession that exceeded by
far the purpose of restoration, namely the preservation of monarchical preroga-
tive. This explains his observation that along this road the democratic republic
was not far. Obviously, he could not imagine for Russia a combination of mon-
archism and universal suffrage on the model of the German Reich.
By decree of 11 December 1905 the new electoral law was proclaimed. As An-
drew M. Verner points out, it was neither universal nor equal nor direct, but it
admitted a greater number of people to elections than the electoral regulation
of 6 August had done.⁷⁷ The population was divided into four groups – landown-
ers, farmers, town dwellers, and workers. Those having the right to vote elected
electors and these in turn elected the deputies. The inequality of the suffrage is
expressed by the regulation that one elector was elected by every 2.000 land-
owners, 4.000 town dwellers, 30.000 farmers and 90.000 workmen.Women, ag-
ricultural labourers, and day-labourers did not receive the right to vote.⁷⁸
The expansion of the suffrage required a reform of the Council of State. If it
had so far been a body to advise the Tsar and his government, it was now to be
transformed into an upper chamber. One half of its members should from now
on be elected. A deliberation on the reform of the Council of State took place
on 14 and 16 February 1906 at Carskoe Selo at another extraordinary conference.
The Tsar had ordered count Sol’skij to draft a proposal.⁷⁹ At the very beginning of
the first meeting count Ignat’ev stated that the transformation of the Council of
State into a first chamber (verchnjaja palata) was a “decisive step towards con-
 Ibid., 258–259.
 Verner, Crisis, 290; the text of the new electoral regulation in: Imennoj vysočajšij ukaz, 11
December 1905, in: Zakonodatel’nye akty, 282–295.
 Abraham Ascher, The Revolution of 1905, vol. 2: Authority Restored (Stanford: Stanford Uni-
versity Press, 1992), 43.
 Verner, Crisis, 293.
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stitutionalism.” Vitte confirmed this statement indirectly by pointing out that the
first chamber was to form a counterweight to the second chamber. “A first cham-
ber only” could “save from the unpredictability of the second chamber.” Hence it
was required “with a view to preserving the conservative structure of the State.”
The first chamber served “to protect from all extreme opinions” that could easily
carry the majority in the second chamber. It was to function as a “buffer” be-
tween the second chamber and the monarch. In order to live up to this task it
had to be composed of “the most conservative elements possible.” Therefore it
was provided that among the 26 elected members there should be eighteen
from the aristocracy, six from the orthodox clergy and twelve from industry.⁸⁰
In the constitution, as adopted on 23 April 1906, it was left open how many mem-
bers the State Council would have. But article 58 ruled that the number of ap-
pointed members must not exceed the number of elected members.⁸¹ In the con-
stitution the body is still named Council of State, but at the same time its
functions of a first chamber are unmistakably defined. Accordingly, article 64
rules that Council of State and Duma disposed of the same rights in legislation,
and article 7 determined that the Tsar exercised legislative power in cooperation
with the Council of State and the Duma.⁸²
From the point of view of restoration the fourth article of the fundamental
laws deserves particular attention. According to its first sentence the Tsar pos-
sessed “supreme autocratic power” (verchovnaja samoderžavnaja vlast’). In the
fundamental laws of 1832 his power had still been defined as “autocratic” and
“unlimited” (neograničennaja). Since from now on the Tsar depended in legislat-
ing on the cooperation of State Council and Duma he no longer disposed of un-
limited power. Nobody denied him the title of “autocrat” (samoderžec), however.
It designated the possessor of supreme power and thus corresponded to the
 V. Vodovozov, ed., “Carskosel’skija soveščanija. Protokoly sekretnago soveščanija v fevrale
1906 goda pod predsedatel’stvom byvšago imperatora po vyrabotke Učreždenij Gosudarstvennoj
Dumy i Gosudarstvennago Soveta” (Deliberations at Carskoe Selo. The minutes of the secret de-
liberation of February 1906 chaired by the Tsar on the institution of a State Duma und of a State
Council), Byloe 4 (26) (October 1917), 293.
 Osnovnye Gosudarstvennye Zakony (Fundamental Laws of the State), 23 April 1906,
no. 27805, § 58, in: Polnoe Sobranie Zakonov Rossijskoj Imperii (Complete collection of the
laws of the Russian Empire), Sobranie tret’e (Third collection), vol. 26 (1906), St. Petersburg
1909, 460; for the fundamental law of 1906 see: Marc Szeftel, The Russian Constitution of April
23, 1906. Political Institutions of the Duma Monarchy, Brussels: Éd. de la Librairie Encyclopédi-
que, 1976; therein contained is an English translation of the articles 1– 124 of the fundamental
laws and a commentary; a German translation of the fundamental laws and a detailed commen-
tary in: Anton Palme, Die russische Verfassung (Berlin: Reimer, 1910).
 Osnovnye Gosudarstvennye Zakony, 23 April 1906, § 64, ibid., 460; § 7, ibid., 457.
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Western term of sovereign. By insisting on autocracy the Tsar disclosed the same
interpretation of his legal position as Louis XVIII and every monarch that had
imposed a constitution. All of them had steadfastly retained the understanding
that even under constitutionalism they had remained in full possession of public
power. When, however, Nicholas II at Carskoe Selo, during deliberations on the
fourth article, doubted if he was permitted to consent that his power was no lon-
ger unlimited,Vitte responded dryly, unlimited power was possessed by the Turk-
ish Sultan alone.⁸³
The episode illuminates the lack of willingness at court to make concessions.
The crisis of October 1905 appears to have been forgotten. Under the new constitu-
tion Duma and government faced each other from the beginning in a hostile mood.
The government’s policy of conflict culminated as early as 8 July 1906 in the prema-
ture dissolution of the Duma. The second Duma assembled in February 1907 but
was again dissolved in June. By taking advantage of the emergency article of the
constitution the Tsar simultaneously imposed a new electoral law by which the rep-
resentatives of the aristocracy and the middle classes obtained the majority in the
Duma. Under these circumstances there was no chance to integrate increasing sec-
tions of society into the State, and the monarchy proved less and less able to base its
legitimacy on social consent. The restoration of monarchy in 1906 had produced, in
Max Weber’s words, only the appearance of constitutionalism.⁸⁴
 V. Vodovosov, ed., “Carskosel’skija soveščanija. Protokoly sekretnago soveščanija v aprele
1906 goda pod predsedatel’stvom byvšago imperatora po per smotru osnovnych zakonov” (Mi-
nutes of the secret deliberation of April 1906 presided by the former Tsar, on the revision of the
fundamental laws), 9 April 1906, Byloe 5–6 (27–28), November-December 1917, 206; on the de-
liberations at Carskoe Selo see: Sellin, Gewalt, 191– 198.
 Max Weber, “Rußlands Übergang zum Scheinkonstitutionalismus” (1906), in: id., Zur Russi-
schen Revolution von 1905. Schriften und Reden 1905– 1912, ed. Wolfgang J. Mommsen, in coop-
eration with Dittmar Dahlmann (Tübingen: Mohr, 1989), 280–684 (Max Weber Gesamtausgabe,
part I, vol. 10).
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Conclusion
The triumph of democratic constitutionalism in North America and in France
was a result of the modern revolution. By contrast, the restoration that followed
upon the fall of Napoleon is often regarded as an attempt to transfer Ancien Ré-
gime principles to the 19th century. An entire period of European history is named
after this attempt. The period is said to have lasted in France until the July rev-
olution of 1830 and in Germany and Italy until the revolutions of 1848.
This understanding of restoration is fraught with difficulties. To begin with,
it is open to discussion whether restoration can be conceived as a uniform epoch
in European history. The conditions, from which the various attempts at restora-
tion originated, differed. In France the nation itself had abolished monarchy. In
Italy and in Spain the dynasties had been deposed by Napoleon without consult-
ing the subjects. In Germany the dethronement of princes by the emperor of the
French had remained the exception. When by the treaty of Paris of 30 May 1814
the left bank of the Rhine was returned to Germany, there were no princes who
had the right to recover their ancient possessions. The ecclesiastical territories of
the Empire had been dissolved in 1803 and the secular princes of the left bank of
the Rhine had been indemnified on the right bank. Obviously, after Napoleon’s
fall the political development in the countries of Europe pointed in different di-
rections. Only in France with its revolutionary tradition did the restoration of
monarchy require the imposition of a constitution. The other monarchs who
had lost their thrones, returned in 1814 without making concessions to their sub-
jects. The French restoration thus differed from the restorations in all other mo-
narchies. The Prussian general and politician Joseph Maria von Radowitz called
the French type of restoration organic. To the historian is thus left the choice be-
tween two concepts of monarchical restoration. By restoration is either under-
stood the return of dethroned dynasties after the fall of Napoleon, no matter
what kind of government they established, or the term refers more specifically
to the renewal and consolidation of monarchical legitimacy by imposing a con-
stitution whenever the need was perceived.
Taken in its organic conception restoration is no longer exclusively attached
to the period of 1814 but includes every imposition of a constitution in the course
of the century that was meant to consolidate monarchical legitimacy. In this
sense monarchical restorations took place in Poland in 1815, in Spain in 1834,
in Prussia, in Austria, and in the Italian states in 1848, and in Russia in 1906.
Restoration is then no longer a period of European history, but a period within
the history of every single monarchy, and restorations are no longer limited to
cases where the dynasty had been expelled or the monarchy abolished.
The imposition of a constitution turned restoration into a device to promote
freedom and to grant the subjects a degree of participation in government. In
this respect it resembled revolution. With regard to the stability of the changes
they caused, restorations were more successful than revolutions. The French con-
stitutional monarchy of 1791 lasted but one year. The constitution the Prussian
National Assembly elaborated during the revolution of 1848 failed. By contrast,
the Charte constitutionnelle remained in force during 16 years at first and after
its revision in the July revolution for another 18 years, and the Prussian consti-
tution that had been imposed in December 1848 and revised in 1850, persisted
until the end of the monarchy in 1918. When during the constitutional conflict
of the early 1860’s the Prussian House of Deputies was on the verge of extracting
parliamentary government from the monarchy, the new prime minister Otto von
Bismarck managed to safeguard the preponderance of the Crown. He argued that
since the constitution had been imposed by the King, the King alone was in the
position to resolve conflicts over its interpretation. In the same way as the Charte
constitutionnelle resulted from a revision of the Senatorial constitution the Prus-
sian constitution of 1848 and 1850 originated from a revision of the constitution
the Prussian National Assembly had elaborated during the revolution. Since
after the wars of 1866 and 1870/71 the new German Empire was founded by Prus-
sia, it was natural that the monarchical principle became the cornerstone of the
constitutional framework of Germany as well, thus making restoration the foun-
dation of the new German monarchy.
Restoration differs from stagnation. Still, its readiness to embrace change re-
ferred not primarily to the realization of new, but to the protection of long estab-
lished values. Its objectives were essentially defensive in nature. It aimed at the
preservation of monarchy and of the monarchical principle in the face of revo-
lution. By their ability to assert themselves through change Dieter Langewiesche
has recently explained the astonishing staying power of the European monar-
chies in the 19th century.¹ Change required readiness to adopt aims of the revo-
lution.Written constitutions had been an essential concern of both the American
and the French Revolution. Hence the most important instrument of monarchical
restoration was the imposition of a constitution.Whereas revolutions determined
their course of action by themselves, restorations reacted to the challenges of de-
mocracy. The appeal to what had been proven beneficial always remained the
strongest argument in favour of restoration. Therefore in spite of their readiness
for change, restorations sought to insert their program in established traditions.
 Dieter Langewiesche, Die Monarchie im Jahrhundert Europas. Selbstbehauptung durch Wandel
im 19. Jahrhundert, (Heidelberg: Winter, 2013).
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This is revealed by the terms by which the imposed constitutions were designat-
ed: Charte constitutionnelle in France, Estatuto real in Spain, Osnovnye Gosu-
darstvennye Zakony (Fundamental laws of the State) in Russia. Terms of this
kind served as linguistic barriers to revolution.
Even if the transition of monarchies to constitutionalism in the long run did
not succeed thanks to revolution but to restoration, it remains nevertheless true
that restorations were but reactions to the pressure of revolution, either to steal a
march on anticipated revolutions or to mitigate revolutions already under way.
Restorations did not follow political visions, but were tactical maneuvers by
which sovereigns sought to preserve their claim to dynastic legitimacy in the
age of democratic revolution. Accordingly, the readiness of monarchs to make
concessions was determined by this tactical aim. It was not uncommon for mon-
archs to withdraw the concessions made, either in part or in their entirety, as
soon as the pressure of revolution subsided. Emperor Francis Joseph and all Ital-
ian princes except the King of Sardinia revoked the constitutions they had im-
posed in 1848, when the revolution was over.
If the policy of restoration had everywhere been implemented consistently,
in present day Europe there would exist only monarchies. Their legitimacy, how-
ever, would most probably be, if not by law, at least in fact, no less democratic
than if they had, in the age of revolution, expressly been based on the constitu-
ent power of the people. In the long run monarchical and democratic principle
approached each other. They differed only in the method by which they admitted
a steadily increasing degree of political participation. The advantages of restora-
tion as against revolution consisted in the preservation of continuity in promot-
ing constitutionalism. The continuity was rendered possible through the mon-
arch’s formal retention of sovereignty while political participation was
extended to a growing number of subjects. The monarchical principle admitted
concessions without shaking monarchy to the core.
The origins of restoration go back to the French Revolution. The memoran-
dum that Louis XVI left in the Tuileries in the night of 20 June 1791 before his
attempt at flight, contains an early program of monarchical restoration. In the
memorandum the King promised “a constitution” that will guarantee “that our
holy religion will be respected, that government will stand on safe and beneficial
grounds, that property and everybody’s rights will be protected from encroach-
ments, that laws cannot be violated with impunity, and that freedom will rest
on safe and unshakable foundations.”² Since the flight failed and the King
 Archives parlementaires, series I, vol. 27, 21 June 1791, 383; see Volker Sellin, Gewalt und Le-
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was returned to Paris ahead of time, he did not get the opportunity to put into
practice his program of restoration. In 1814 his brother was unexpectedly given a
new chance to restore monarchical legitimacy. The Charte constitutionnelle
merges the two aspects of restoration policy in an exemplary way: the preserva-
tion of monarchical sovereignty and the qualified acknowledgement of revolu-
tion. By its two-faced nature the Charte became the widely imitated model of
19th century constitutionalism. But whereas during the July Revolution of 1830
parliamentary government was introduced in France, Article 57 of the Final
Act of the Vienna ministerial conferences of 1820 had introduced the monarchi-
cal principle into the public law of the German Confederation. The revolution of
1848 sought to put the democratic principle in its place, both within the single
states and on the national level. The national assembly of Frankfurt aimed at
a democratic monarchy and parliamentary government. But the revolution
failed, and the attempt of the Prussian Progressive Party in the early sixties to
make the government of Berlin dependent on Parliament, was thwarted by
prime minister Otto von Bismarck. After the Prussian victory over Austria and
the breakdown of the German Confederation in 1866 the new National Liberal
Party supported Bismarck for more than a decade, regardless of the fact that
there was no hope to introduce parliamentary government into the constitution
of the new German Empire. Germany remained a restoration type monarchy with
an Imperial Diet that failed to obtain the decisive influence on the national gov-
ernment. The Imperial Chancellor was appointed by the Kaiser alone and was
not responsible to the Diet. Thus the monarchical principle remained in force al-
most until the end of the First World War, and parliamentary government was
introduced only in 1917.
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